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THS I MUTABILITY QP GOP 
I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
Shis essay i s concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h the conception 
of the i m m u t a b i l i t y of God as i t bears on C h r i s t i a n f a i t h 
and experience. C h r i s t i a n thought has i t s souroe i n the 
h i s t o r i c a l f a o t of the I n c a r n a t i o n of God the Son, and i s 
i 
consequently inseparable from h i s t o r y as a whole, inseparable 
from the human experience and a c t i v i t y of which h i s t o r y i s 
composed. Thus C h r i s t i a n i t y can be but p o o r l y understood i f 
considered i n i s o l a t i o n not only from the world of the l a s t 
nineteen hundred years, but als o from the ce n t u r i e s before 
the b i r t h of C h r i s t . I t i s , then, e s s e n t i a l t h a t . t h e present 
study should begin w i t h some r e c o n n o i t r i n g o f the two streams 
t 
of h i s t o r y which, more than any others, were subsequently t o 
i n f l u e n c e the flo w of C h r i s t i a n thought, both by the power 
of t h e i r own o u r r e n t s , and also by a mingling of waters. 
Those two streams are Greek Philosophy, and Hebrew R e l i g i o n . 
ON 
PART: I . PRE-CHRISTIAN THOUGHT W IMMUTABILITY• 
A, Greek Philosophy and the idea of I m m u t a b i l i t y . 
H e r a c l i t u s and Parmenidee, men of the e a r l y youth of 
philosophy i n Greece, gave opposite aocounts of the w o r l d . 
H e r a c l i t u s said a l l things change: Parmenides said change 
i s impossible. Sinoe i n t h e i r day the idea of God had not 
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achieved the prominence i t was l a t e r t o a t t a i n i n p h i l o s o -
p h i c a l discussion, n e i t h e r of them considers m u t a b i l i t y 
i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o God, y e t they serve t o mark the extremes 
from which the subject i s capable of approach.' H e r a c l i t u s 
b u i l t h i s argument on t h i n g s immediately experienced - r i v e r s , 
men, f i r e . Parmenides took the wider basis of everything 
t h a t i s - the whole;.of existence. I f , he argued, we consider 
everything t h a t i s we cannot conceive i t t o be changed by 
the a d d i t i o n of something else; f o r having s t a r t e d w i t h 
e v e r y t h i n g , there i s nothing besides t o add. Nor can "every-
t h i n g t h a t i s " be changed by d i m i n u t i o n , since a p a r t taken 
away would have no place t o which i t could go, because a l l 
places are already comprehended i n everything t h a t i s . He 
proceeded by s i m i l a r arguments t o show t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r 
element i n the universe i s l i k e w i s e incapable of increase 
or decrease, and t h e r e f o r e of change. The r e s u l t i s a 
cosmos which i s f r o z e n , and of d o u b t f u l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . 
The c o n t e n t i o n i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o human experience, 
which, as H e r a c l i t u s saw, i s conscious of change on every side. 
What then i s t&&s change? To Parmenides there was only one 
answer open - t h a t change i s an i l l u s i o n . I n support of t h i s 
answer Zeno of E2Lea put forward contentions such as h i s 
c l a s s i c argument of the arrow's f l i g h t , t o i l l u s t r a t e the 
t r u t h t h a t n othing moves at a l l , but only seems t o move. 
Although not r e a d i l y disproved, the proposals of Parmenides 
and Zeno have found only l i m i t e d support, and i t i s said 
t h a t the trend of reoent mathematical examinations of 
conceptions of i n f i n i t y and movement do not favour them. 
But an achievement remains. Parmenides has shown t h a t a 
r e a l i m m u t a b i l i t y i s conceivable i n r e l a t i o n t o a world t h a t 
suggests change as i t s most conspicuous c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ; and 
t h a t such a conception i s most e a s i l y a r r i v e d at when the 
ground of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s increased from immediate exper- . 
ience, as w i t h H e r a c l i t u s , t o wider conceptions of r e a l i t y . 
P a radoxically i t was H e r a o l i t u s who provoked the' more 
s i g n i f i c a n t contentions i n support of i m m u t a b i l i t y i n u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y . A f l a w i n h i s argument was noticed by P l a t o , and 
the consequences were immense. Plato saw t h a t i f a l l i s i n 
a s t a t e of f l u x there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge, f o r 
any statement about the nature of t h i n g s would, as soon as 
made, cease t o be <true; f o r the t h i n g s would have changed 
i n t o something d i f f e r e n t . This would l i k e w i s e apply t o the 
very-statement of H e r a c l i t u s i t s e l f . I f the law i s of 
u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n , then the law i t s e l f must be subjeot 
t o change. Therefore the law i t s e l f must change; i n whioh 
oase i t would no longer be t r u e t h a t a l l t h i n g s change. 
C l e a r l y t h i s i s not what H e r a c l i t u s intended. I n s t a t i n g h i s 
law he assumed a t l e a s t three exceptions: knowledge, t r u t h , 
and t h e law i t s e l f . 
Plato's'way out of the impasse was i n $he d i r e c t i o n 
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i n d i o a t e d by Soorates when he r e f u t e d the s o p h i s t r y of 
'the r i g h t ' , *the good*, Jthe j u s t 1 there were no a b i d i n g 
p r i n c i p l e s - man WEB the measure of a l l t h i n g s . This made 
m o r a l i t y a matter of o p i n i o n . But So orates maintained t h a t 
i f ' r i g h t ' and 'good' were t o have any meaning a t a l l t h a t 
meaning must be oonstant, and i d e n t i o a l i n every instanoe 
where the terms were predioated. Here was the lead which 
Pla t o aocepted. He agreed w i t h H e r a o l i t u s t h a t a l l t h i n g s 
apprehended by sense were i n f l u x , but beyond t h a t he out h i s 
own path. Things apprehended by the senses could not c l a i m 
t o give knowledge; but the moral predicates of good, r i g h t , 
j u s t , were not apprehended by the senses, and so were not t o 
be included i n the sense-realm of f l u x , but i n the realm of 
conceptual experience, and were permanent and unchanging. 
Pla t o pressed on beyond the Socratio moral predicates 
t o t h e predicates of knowledge i n general* The senses • «. * i 
perceive p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s - a p a r t i c u l a r w h i t e ~ o T j e o t , a£" 
a p a r t i c u l a r t r e e , but i n experiencing these t h i n g s , he s a i d , 
we recognize natures t h a t we do not sense, but know and 
There are then two worlds, the one of the ever-ohanging 
t h i n g s of sense; the other of the permanent t h i n g s of which 
we oan have genuine knowledge. These l a s t are the 'Forms'. 
I n a l l experience the knowledge of these Forms i s presupposed. 
Protagoras. Protagoras had held t h a t i n such questions •©£ a* 
A>hieulttr horse. (4 *f cv a. ?
c%-oTJeot, a x 
•it understand These natures are whiteness,horse-ness,tree-ness 
-•5 *•* 
A r i g h t aot cannot be understood without the Form of r i g h t -
ness; a p a r t i c u l a r horse cannot be recognised w i t h o u t t h e 
Form of gorse-ness; t o t h i n k t h a t a l i n e i s s t r a i g h t we must 
know s t r a i g h t n e s s . .Forms are permanent, e t e r n a l r e a l i t i e s 
i n P l a t o T s philosophy. 
Absolute e q u a l i t y , a b s o l u t e beauty, and absolute 
existence, t r u e being - do they ever admit of any -
change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence 
since i t i s uniform and e x i s t s by i t s e l f , remain 
ever the same, and never i n any way admit of any 
• change?-- - . . . . . - • — • 
I t must, s a i d Cebes, necessarily remain the 
same ,^ m JSocrates .(fleUb; PJUaU, "J^pMatt. ft>*7*'*l 
Plato had thus found reason f o r maintaining both t h e 
existence of immutable Forms, and-also of a changing p h y s i c a l 
w orld. From t h i s i t follows, t h a t the r e l a t i o n which the 
p h y s i c a l world has t o the r e a l world of the, Forms i s ohanging 
at every moment. How i s t h i s change to be explained? The ' 
movement cannot have i t s o r i g i n i n the Forms, f o r they are 
the p r i n c i p l e s of s t a b i l i t y ; nor by matter i t s e l f , f o r there 
i s nothing i n i t s own nature t o give i t motion, or t o aocount 
f o r any p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n of matter w i t h the.Forms. 
By experience we see t h a t the only t h i n g s capable of moving 
themselves are animate iBaSzEgB, and Plato concluded t h a t such 
being, which he. c a l l s s o u l , must be working i n the universe. 
The observation of motion i n a l a r g e f i e l d , as i n watching 
the heavenly bodies, shows i t t o be o r d e r l y and r e g u l a r : i n 
s h o r t , i t shows the signs of r a t i o n a l i t y . Thus Plato could 
go f u r t h e r and say t h a t there i s a r a t i o n a l s o u l working 
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throughout the p h y s i c a l universe. This he c a l l s God* 
Since there i s a p l u r a l i t y of p e r f e c t l y ordered motions 
there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a corresponding p l u r a l i t y of 
p e r f e c t l y good souls. For t h i s reason Plato uses the terms 
rGod r anil .'gods' synonymously. I n so f a r as one can: 
generalize of a person whose thought was never s t a t i c , one 
may say t h a t Plato's own b e l i e f s were probably monotheistic; 
but f o r the sake of convenience he was prepared t o use the 
vernaoular. 
What, then, i s the. r e l a t i o n between God'arid the Forms? 
i 
To no small degree i t i s oharacterisefleby independence. The 
Forms e x i s t i n t h e i r own r i g h t , are e t e r n a l , and so do not 
depend on any mind f o r t h e i r c r e a t i o n * They are not derived 
from God. Nor does Pla t o o a l l the Forms gods, exoept by 
i m p l i c a t i o n i n tTimaeus T 27C,. a passage whioh has gained i t s . 
s i g n i f i c a n c e because i t i s p e c u l i a r , and does not represent -
the general run of Plato's thought as exposed i n the 
Dialogues. Nor i s God the Form of the Good: God i s a s o u l ; 
the Good i s a Form. The contention t h a t the Forms are the 
Tthoughts of God1 i s now accounted the suggestion.of specula-
t i o n subsequent t o P l a t o . I t i s t o the Forms, and not t o God, 
t h a t Plato ascribes p r i o r i t y as being e t e r n a l , and maintains 
t h a t t o some extent God conforms t o them. What i s r i g h t i s 
not r i g h t because i t i s beloved by the gods; r a t h e r the gods 
love what i s r i g h t , and conform t o i t (of.'Euthyphro 1 1CA). 
This conformity i s a t once the most r i g i d there i s , because 
not omnipotent. I t a l s o must imply t h a t they are not. iaranit* 1)! 
t a b l e ; a conclusion which i s i n agreement w i t h the reasons 
already given f o r P l a t o T s p o s i t i n g the existence of r a t i o n a l 
s o u l i n the universe. A passage i n the TRepublio'f380E-38TC) 
0 
which argue Si f o r the changelessness'of the gods concerns 
t h e i r shapes (^ o^ cj>»| ) , and i s a condemnation of such s t o r i e s 
as. those of Zeus appearing as a b u l l or a swan. God i s moved, 
but i s moved by h i s own w i l l : he i s the self-moved mover. 
Such i s the nature of s o u l , and. so, pre-eminently, of. God; 
the w o r l d - s o u l . 
What i s the immediate s i g n i f i c a n c e of P l a t o r s philosophy' 
f o r the study o f the i m m u t a b i l i t y of God? . I t i s t h a t the 
f i r s t of the r e a l l y great systems of thought i n s i s t s on the 
existence of both ohange and i m m u t a b i l i t y . God i s not 
immutable (though Aquinas was l a t e r t o attempt t o prove t h a t 
Plato's self-moved mover can be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s 
unmoved-mover * see pp. 77~~7'9) J t u - t "then i t i s not the oonoep-
t i o n of God which i s given the supreme p o s i t i o n . . The^t i s 
reserved f o r the Forms, and they are immutablei Nevertheless, 
God,, who i s sub j e c t t o them i n t h a t he must conform, and t h a t 
they are p r i o r t o him, i s . i n v o l v e d only i n movement of which 
he himself i s the author. Thus of Plato's three orders - the. 
ph y s i c a l w o r l d , s o u l , and the Forms - i m m u t a b i l i t y i s absent , 
the gods are p e r f e c t , and also a demonstration t h a t they are ia 
in the f i r s t , of r e s t r i c t e d reference i n the second, and 
absolute i n the t h i r d . I t , then, i s e s s e n t i a l i n the cosmos, 
and i s to be*located' i n those existences whioh are not 
subject to the physical world. 
Plato's philosophy of God and the Forms was arrived at 
by argument from v i s i b l e effects to th e i r causes. A r i s t o t l e 
employed the same pri n c i p l e , but was d i s s a t i s f i e d with the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God with a self-moved mover. He thought 
the question oould be taken further. With such self-moving 
there axe disoernable, he maintained, two constituent parts -
that whioh moves but i s not movedj and the body which l a 
not the mover, but i s moved. Consideration of the 
"heavenly spheres? of h i s astronomical theory led him to 
believe that both these constituents oould not be predicated 
to the spheres. They were the bodies moved, c l e a r l y enough, 
but could one ascribe to them the intelligence which moved 
them? A r i s t o t l e thought not. There must then be f o r each 
sphere a separate intelligence which was i t s unmoved mover; 
and f o r the complete "diurnal movement" of the s t a r s there 
must be a supreme unmoved mover postulated. This i n t e l l e o t 
i s the God of A r i s t o t l e ' s philosophy. I n d i s t i n c t i o n from 
Plato , God and1 the ultimate immutability are united by 
A r i s t o t l e . What can be s a i d of the nature of God, and of 
his a c t i v i t y ( i f such as an unmoved mover oan have"any)? 
I t oannot be a soul i n Plato's sense since a s o i l i s s e l f -
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moved, not unmoved. I t does not act ( TTp<*Tv<rvs ) 
or produce (rr<Mfc«V ). what i s l e f t ? 
S t i l l everyone supposes t h a t they l i v e and t h e r e -
f o r e t h a t they are a c t i v e ; we cannot suppose then 
t o sleep l i k e Endymion. Now i f you take away 
from a l i v i n g "being a c t i o n , and s t i l l more production, 
what- i s l e f t hut contemplation? Therefore the 
a c t i v i t y of God, which surpasses a l l others, i n 
blessedness, must he contemplative; and of human 
a c t i v i t i e s t h e r e f o r e , t h a t which i s most a k i n t o 
t h i s mast be most o f the nature of happiness. 
( A r i s t o t l e , Eth.Nic.X 1178b. Vol. IX) 
But i n a sense . A r i s t o t l e i s making an exception i n 
excluding contemplation from the realm of a c t i v i t y . 
For that, which i s capable o f r e c e i v i n g the object 
of thought, i . e . the essence,"is"thought. And i t 
i s a c t i v e when i t possesses t h i s o bject. Therefore 
the l a t t e r j p o s s e s s i o f l j r a t h e r than the former fe e e p t i v i t g i s the d i v i n e element which thought seems o contain, and the act of.contemplation i s most 
pleasant and best .... the a c t u a l i t y o f thought i s 
l i f e , and God i s t h a t a c t u a l i t y ; and God's e s s e n t i a l 
a c t u a l i t y i s l i f e most good and e t e r n a l . We say 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t God i s a l i v i n g being, e t e r n a l , most 
good, §o t h a t l i f e and d u r a t i o n continuous and 
e t e r n a l belong t o God; f o r t h i s i s God. 
( A r i s t o t l e , Met. TV , 1072b, V o l . V l i r ; ef.Ibid.1073a. 
fcsL^^tuaJS etc. as t r a n s . ) . 
The object of God's contemplation i s himself: 
Therefore i t must be i t s e l f t h a t thought t h i n k s 
(since i t i s the most e x c e l l e n t of t h i n g s ) , and i t s 
t h i n k i n g i s a t h i n k i n g on t h i n k i n g 
^ As, then, thought and the object of thought 
are not d i f f e r e n t i n the ease o f t h i n g s t h a t have 
not matter, they w i l l be the same, i . e . the div,ine 
t h i n k i n g w i l l be one w i t h the object of i t s thought. 
( I b i d . 1074b-l@5UteO. 
Such i s the existence of the supreme unmoved mover. By 
unmoved A r i s t o t l e connotes t h a t which i s w i t h o u t p o t e n t i a l i t y . 
Motion i s the a c t u a l i s a t i o n o f what i s i n p o t e n t i a l 
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though the movement i t s e l f oannot be c l a s s i f i e d either 
a8 p o t e n t i a l i t y or a c t u a l i t y : i t i s an aotualisation i n 
which the po t e n t i a l i t y and an inoompleteness are both 
implied, (of. pp. 7**-~]S on S. Thomas Aquinas). 
The r e l a t i o n of God to the world i s very remote. 
Knowing only himself he i s unaware of the world's existence, 
and oertaialy of that of individual men. Yet, through the 
spheres he moves the world.. A r i s t o t l e explains t h i s as 
being s i m i l a r to the influence of the loved over the lover, 
an all-powerful a t t r a c t i o n by one who himself remains at 
r e s t . There i s no provident oare exeroised by God, nor i s 
man's love consequent upon a prior love by God for man. 
A r i s t o t l e (did not regard h i s God as s t e r i l e , nor was 
ths po8tulation of the unmoved mover a stop-gap measure. 
I t was the crown of h i s system, and* was arrived at by what 
appeared to be the imperative demand of logio when applied 
to maf&ofe e x p e r i e n c e d the world. ( The immutable God, indeed 
the immutable God 'par excellence', takes i t s place i n 
A r i s t o t l e ' s philosophy of shear neoessity. This I s a point 
of no 8mall significance to the present study* Many l a t e r 
philosophers accepted the idea of an immutable deity because 
norm 
they were thus provided with a stable -£eeo f o r e t h i c a l 
values. With A r i s t o t l e i t was not so. His ethios required 
no appeal to an unohanging existence outside the world. 
L a s t l y i t i s worthy of. notice that immutability and 
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oontemplation , whioh i s , a f t e r a l l , a kind of a c t i v i t y , 
a functioning, are not regarded by Arietotle/of their 
very nature,ss exoluding each other. This doctrine of . 
what might be termed' an immutable a c t i v i t y reours i n the 
thought of Christianphilosophers i n l a t e r ages, and i t 
i s important that i t f i r s t appeared not as an attempt by 
the Christians 1 to esoape from a dilemma by a contradiction, 
but l i e s i n the thought of A r i s t o t l e , and, to a l e s s e r 
degree, of Plato. I t i s then not wholly surprising to 
find that with the fusion of Platonism and Aristotelianism 
in Aquinas God i s expounded as an unmoved mover whose 
nature i s pure aot. 
B. Ideas of Immutability i n the Old Testament. 
The passage from Greek philosophy to Hebrew r e l i g i o n 
involves a change of climate: for whereae the great Greek 
thinkers approached c l o s e l y to the scholar's i d e a l of 
impartial, detached searohing for truth, the Jewish prophets 
and historians believed i n a 8elf-revealing Deity who was 
for . them the souroe of t r u t h . Except for the questioning 
and probing, of some l a t e r w r i t e r s who were not unaff ected 
by the Hellenic s p i r i t , the i n t e r e s t was always to record 
the relations and intercourse between God and man. The 
souroes of t h e i r writing l i e i n personal experiences, and 
as such they take muoh fo r granted. The whole approach i s 
d i s t i n c t . Thus whereas Plato and A r i s t o t l e maintained 
the immutability of supreme being because they f e l t that i:a 
reason demanded i t , the Jews, i n so f a r as they tended to 
regard God as unchangeable, conceived that Unohangeability 
in terms of t h e i r own experience of God's constancy. 
I t would be a t t r a c t i v e to trace the origin of t h i s 
experience to God's revelation of himself by name as 
" I am" (Exodus I I I 14), and both Fathers and Schoolmen 
made free use of the text to i l l u s t r a t e God's fundamental 
unchangeableness. But i t seems probable' that the passage, 
deriving from the pentateuohal source E, was not written 
u n t i l the Eighth oentury B.C., and i t i s possible that 
i t s origin l i e s i n an attempt to put a meaning toT. 1H'>» * , 
the l e t t e r s of the divine Name. I f , for the sake of oautio 
we allow t h i s to be eorreot, we s t i l l have l e f t the 
interesting information that an Eighth Century writer, 
t r y i n g to account for the name il believed he was right 
in interpreting i t as an assertion by God of the permanence 
and independence of h i s nature (of .E.R.E. , A r t G o d -
B i b l i o a l and C h r i s t i a n , Vol*VI, p.254).: the writer was 
s u f f i c i e n t l y eonvinoed of something akin to immutability 
in God to believe i t possible that therein should l i e the 
prime assertion God1 made about himself when f i r s t revealing 
h i s Name to the chosen people. The writer may have been 
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given a lead i f the souroe he was using provided what he 
himself has recorded immediately a f t e r the revelation of 
the diivine name, that, i s j 
Thus Shalt thou say unto the children of I s r a e l , 
D I D * , the God of your fathers, the God of 
Abraham,, the God of Isaao, and the God of Jacob, 
hath sent me unto you: t h i s i s my name fo r ever, 
and t h i s i s my memorial unto a l l generations. 
(Exodus i n 15) . 
Here there i s a d e a r idea that there i s permanenoe i n 
God which transcends the. time and change of the world, he 
i s as he was i n the past, and so he w i l l be for a l l future 
time. I t i s possible,. on the other hand, that having 
found h i s interpretation of the l e t t e r s of the divine name 
the writer was influenced thereby to continue to expound 
the theme. opposed to t h i s l i n e of argument i s a si m i l a r 
referenoe to Yahw.eh's past and future a c t i v i t i e s , together 
with the names of Abraham, Isaao and Jaoob, i n the acoount 
supplied by the souroe P of the revelation of the divine 
name. (Exodus 3 ) . Again, i t could be. that P being a 
l a t e r work has copied E. I t i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , but not a 
oertaintyy.and without s u f f i c i e n t evidence to disprove the 
main points of the b i b l i o a l accounts there i s no neoesslty 
to1 desert them. I t would Beem, then, that a conservative 
judgment allows that the revelation of the divine name was 
early oonneoted i n Hebrew thought with some s o r t of a 
revelation of Yahweh's permanence, and to an immutability 
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i n h i s nature vrhich "at l e a s t comprises an independence 
of worldly and mortal change. 
Farther there i s the consideration of the meaning oi 
DIPT . The writer of the E source, i f the interpretation 
i s due to him, assumes the name to be -derived from the 
verb 1 \]ri\ ., a bye-form of f)\T) ,. meaning, roughly, 
"to be", or more pr e c i s e l y "to become". The name then 
comprises the th i r d person, masculine singular imperfect -
a form found i n other Hebrew names -V and means "he becomes 
or "he w i l l become".. Presumably the-use. of the f i r s t 
person i s r e s t r i c t e d to God, and the t h i r d person i s used 
when he i s spoken of by others (cf.H.D.B. i i p 199). S. L« 
Brown (New Conu^ following MeNeile prefers "he i s wont 
to be what he i s wont to be" as, giving the r e a l meaning. 
The impression then given i s that Yahweh i s whfclly s e l f -
. determinate, and dependent on h i s own w i l l , and that 
future s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n w i l l make clear t h i s w i l l for the 
chosen people. The notion i s - r a t h e r that Yahweh cannot 
be changed, than that he cannot change. 
One may contend that the association of and 
the verb derives solely from the p h i l o l o g i c a l 
ingenuity of the E writer. But. the contrary need not 
c o n f l i c t with the archeological evidence for e a r l i e r 
Canaanitish and Babylon^divine names as the source of 
H l f ] 7 - .. F ° r a God with an entire l y new and unfamiliar 
name would not have been immediately acceptable to the 
I s r a e l i t e s . 
These i s no reason why God l a revealing himself should 
hot have designed the twofold purpose of associating himself 
with a name already hearing a divine connotation, and also 
imparting a truth about h i s own nature. Moreover there i s ' 
considerable cause to believe that, the early revelation 
of God should have emphasised h i s unchangeableness; sinoe 
i t i s the perfect preparation for the giving of the lawn,, 
and also accounts for that acceptance of^God's immutability 
almost as a foregone conclusion i n Hebrew thought of l a t e r 
centuries. . 
The evidence indicates that comparatively early i n 
the education of the chosen people, perhaps about the time 
of the exodus, there was a f o r c i b l e revelation of God as a 
being, whose w i l l i s unchangeable by outside influence, and 
who i s not subject to human experience of change; also that 
i n the Eighth Century, at the time the B document was 
written, there was current a profound1 b e l i e f i n a speoies 
of immutability i n God* 
Between the two .periods there i s l i t t l e e x p l i c i t 
evidence of the b e l i e f , but some i m p l i c i t . I n the former 
category are exerpts from the. s t o r i e s of Balaam and of the 
humiliation of Saul (Hum.XXIII 19, 1 Oam.XV CO)• 
God i s mot a man, that he should l i e ; neither 
the aon of man, that he should repent: hath he 
sa i d , and s h a l l he not do i t ? or hath he spoken, 
and s h a l l he hot make i t good? 
(Num.XXIII 19} 
And also the Strength of I s r a e l w i l l not l i e nor 
repent: for he i s not a man, that he should repent. 
i(:3:"Sam.XV.29).' 
Both passages were probably recorded by writers of the 
E sohool and oonform to the s t y l e of thought that has 
already been associated with E. The passages are 
si m i l a r , and are valuable i n showing the manner i n 
which the conception of God's ohangelessness was 
s i g n i f i c a n t to the Jews. Similar thought subsequently 
found frequent expression i n Hebrew l i t e r a t u r e . There 
are three main points: 
i . God i s f a i t h f u l to his purpose: he does not 
repent, he does, not change-his mind, 
i i . God transoends the v i c i s s i t u d e s of men; hi s 
course i s . d i s t i n c t , superior and unwavering, 
i i i . And i n both passages there i s a sense of the 
r e l i a b i l i t y of God. 
One fe e l s that Balaam, Samuel and the writer a l l derive, 
confidence froh the certainty of God's ways. Here we-hs? 
have an approach to the Greek conception of an immutable 
being as the fixed point of the universe. The two 
way8 of thought are s t i l l f a r distant from each other, 
but i t i s the nearest approaoh u n t i l the time of the 
late r Wisdom °literature. 
The i m p l i c i t evidence i s p r i n c i p a l l y supplied by the 
attitude of the people to the Law. I n an anarchic state 
laws lose a l l force because there i s no guarantee of the 
permanence of the government that should be t h e i r founda-
tion,, nor of a consistent administrative policy. When 
laws are held i n high regard i t i s i n part because the 
authority that has established the laws, and the polioy 
of that authority, are both regarded as being free from 
ohanges or caprice. The I s r a e l i t e s ' conception of the 
Mosaic law was that i t comprised permanent decrees * i t 
was stable. Hence i t i s safe to say that they also 
regarded the authority perpetrating the laws, God, as 
consistent i n his demands, and i n his polioy with men. 
There i s no proof here of a conception of God as e n t i r e l y 
3ta&&$a>b:]&,, but there i s testimony to a b e l i e f that ohange 
was not to him as i t i s to men. He i s constant and true to 
his purpose i n a way that men are not. 
There are many devices i n a man's heart; but the 
counsel of the Lord, that, s h a l l stand. 
(Prov. XIX 21) , 
was probably written some while before the e x i l e , and may 
c 
be regarded as a suooinjb expression of the idea of God held 
by a l l who venerated the law. 
I n the period of the divided kingdoms there was no 
cause for speoial appeal to the f a i t h i n God's changeless-
ness. I n a l l probability i t was a souroe of strength and 
joy t o the devout. But when the tragedy of the e x i l e 
threatened, and oppressed the Jews with a burden of despair, 
the prophets fought any tendency to desert the old f a i t h 
by proclaiming the superiority of God to changes wrought by 
worldly oiroumstanoes'. The f a l l of Judah was not the f a l l 
of . G'odl. Both E z e k i e l and Deutero-Isaiah repeatedly o a l l 
attention to God's, immutability as a contrast to man's 
v i c i s s i t u d e s ; and of the three consequences of. t h i s belief-
already discerned as previously existing i t i s the second, 
God's transcendence, that i s repeatedly emphasised. Ezefciel 
s t r e s s e s i t to the almost entire exclusion of the other 
two, declaring that though the oiroumstanoes of the chosen 
people have altered they are not thereby given licenoe to 
forsake l o y a l t y and obedience to God, for he has not altered 
Their transgressions w i l l be punished as before * God i s 
s t i l l lord.. 
And mine eye s h a l l not spare thee, neither w i l l I 
have pity: but I w i l l bring thy ways upon thee, 
and thine abominations s h a l l be i n the midst of 
thee: and ye s h a l l know that I am the Lord.. 
(Ezek.VII 4) 
And ye s h a l l know that I am the Lord: for ye 
have not walked i n my statutes, neither have ye . 
executed my judgments, but have done af t e r the 
judgments of the nations that are round about you. 
(Ezek. X I 12; of.71 7,13; T i l 9; 
XI 16; X I I IS) 
The transgressions to whioh these chapters r e f e r are the 
transgressions committed by Judah before the e x i l e . Their 
punishment w i l l continue into the period of the exile and 
in the foreign environment of Babylon. God oan and w i l l 
both punish past s i n s and present. .This appeal to God's 
steadfastness of purpose i s at times tempered with words 
of hope (XXXIII-XXXVII), but i t i s the tone of *£e threat-
ening that seems to come most ea s i l y : ' 
I the Lord have spoken I t : i t s h a l l come to pass, 
and I w i l l do i t : I w i l l not go back, neither w i l l 
I Spare, neither w i l l I repent: aocording to thy 
ways, and according to thy doings, s h a l l they 
judge thee, s a i t h the Lord God. 
(Ezek. XXIV 14). 
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With Dentero-Isaiah consolation i s the more dominant 
theme. The message of s i n and judgment i n E z e k i e l IV-XXIV 
has been superseded by a message of hope. God's transoendenoe 
i s s t i l l the most emphasised aspeot of h i s changelessness, 
but i t i s emphasised to revive the s p i r i t of t r u s t and 
confidence i n the future. Suffering does not sever a man 
from God; rather i n his suffering h i s consolation i s that 
those changes whioh may buffet and deprive w i l l pass even 
as they have arisen*but God neither r i s e s nor f a l l s , a l t e r s 
nor changes. He i s a sure rook of hope* 
The grass withereth, the flower fadeth; but the 
word of our God s h a l l stand for ever. 
( I s . XL 8) 
Who hath raised up one from the east, whom he oal l e t h 
i n righteousness to h i s foot? he giveth nations., 
before him, and maketh him r u l e over kings;, he 
giveth them as the dust to his sword, as the driven 
stubble to his bow. He pursueth them and passeth on 
safely; even by a way that he had not gone with h i s 
f e e t . Who hath wrought and done i t , c a l l i n g the 
generations from the beginning? I the Lord, the 
f i r s t , and with the l a s t , I am he. 
( I s . X I I 8-4; of.XLII 8-9; X L I I I 10-11; XLIY 6; 
XLVI 10; X L V I I I 12) 
Deutero-Isaiah further l a i d s i g n i f i c a n t s t r e s s on God's 
immutability as being of importance as such. This side of h i s 
message i s d i s t i n c t l y noticeable when the passages referred 
to above are read together. " I , the Lord, the f i r s t with the 
last,1 am he" (XLI 4) i s not a testimony i n i s o l a t i o n : i t i s 
of the theme of h i s whole message to the Hebrews: 
Dieu eternel est a u s s i immuable; i l ne se fatigue n i 
ne s'epuise, (Is.XL 28). I I est des l e commencement; 
et toujours l e m@me (XLI 4) (D.T.C.,Art: Sieu, sa 
nature d'apree l a Bible, T. IV, pars 1.991). 
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Kor was the w r i t e r innovating, for there i s the s i m i l a r 
i t 
passage i n Exodus I I I (see p.# f f - ) ; hu* h i s enlargement 
of the conception i s important i n view of the foretaste . 
he provides of subsequent Hebrew thought which was aonoerned 
with the more philosophical considerations concerning God's 
being. 
But for the prophets the metaphysical approaoh oould 
never become very important i n i t s e l f . With them the 
personal relationship^held pride of place: I f God i s unchange-
able i t i s i n his purpose for his people, and i n his manner 
of dealing with then. There was never 1 much s i m i l a r i t y to 
the absolute immutability envisaged by A r i s t o t l e . " I , even 
I am the Lord" i s not God's whole message: "beside me there 
i s no Saviour" i s the complement. There i s nothing impersonal 
or mechanical i n h i s immutability. Thus without any apparent 
sense of contradiction the prophets oan t e l l of changes in 
God*s methods of dealing with men (of.Jer.XXXI 31-34,Isaiah 
XL 2 ) . They thought of God as active on man's behalf; he 
i s working h i s purpose out, and the a o t i v i t y and purpose are 
unchangeable by any worldly force or incident. This aspeot 
of Hebrew thought must be given due weight when the thought 
of C h r i s t i a n theologians comes to be considered, f o r here t s 
a seed that was in'time >to blossom again and again. 
The c l a s s i c Old Testament statement of God's immutability, 
to whioh compilers of proof texts and text books a l l r e f e r , 
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oomea from the propheoy of Malachi, belonging probably 
to the end of the F i f t h Century. 
"For I the Lord change- not C J T J V X'*? D1H' 
as ( M a i . I l l 6a). 
Smith (I.C.C. i n loo. p.66) i s probably right i n asserting 
that t h i s i s not "an abstract proposition that Yahweh cannot 
be changed in any respect". He points out that i t s impli-
cations are related to the previous verses, and so lead us 
to group the passage with the many others whioh emphasise 
God's faithfulness to h i s purpose and laws. We have not, 
then, "an abstract proposition"; but there i s here a c l o s e r 
approach to a reason for asserting that "Yahweh cannot 
change i n any respect" than has previously appeared i n 
Hebrew thought. To read the passage as meaning that the 
matter under disoussion, namely God's intention to purge 
his people, i s alone a matter i n which God does not change 
i s too narrow an interpretation. The sense seems rather to be 
that God does not change, so there i s no more likelihood 
of h i s changing i n respect to the present matter than to 
any other. This i s the extension of previous Hebrew thought 
that might be anticipated, and derives, l i k e so much that 
i s best i n Hebrew r e l i g i o n , from the inspired e f f o r t s of a 
prophet to impress the nation with the consequences of 
negleoting t h e i r covenant with God. 
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Jahve jugera lee adulteres, lee perjures et lee 
oppresseurs (w.3-5) , oar i l n fa pas oharige, t a n d i s / ?ue lee J u i f s .n'bnt oeeee de" f a i r s l e dial (vv.6-7) D.T.G. ,Art:Bieu,sa nature.d'apres l a Bible, 
T. IV, pare 1. 991). 
By the Second and F i r s t Centuries B.C. t h i s c l e a r e r 
idea of unohangeableness as generally applicable to God had 
become fused with the e x i l i c emphasis on God's transoendenoe. 
The future kingdom of the Son of Man i n the book of Daniel 
i s characterised by d i s s i m i l a r i t y to the changes of earthly 
kingdoms - i t s h a l l be eternal, without end-, indestructible -
that i s , change cannot be wrought i n i t from outside fBan.VII 
14, 27). The Preacher depicts the same features as charac-
t e r i s i n g a l l God's a c t i v i t y : 
I know whatsoever God doeth i t s h a l l be for ever: 
nothing oan be put to i t , nor anything taken from i t . 
(Boo 'tes I I I 14). 
They also appear to l i e . a t the root of the oonoeption 
of the divine wisdom (Wisd.VII 24-27), and they find foroible 
expression i n the words of Judith: 
Bo not- bind the counsels of the Lord our God: 
for God i s not as man, that he may be threatened; 
neither i s he as the Son of man, that he should 
be wavering. (Judith V I I I 16. A.V.). 
The writers of these l a t e r passages were doubtless 
acquainted with Hellenic b e l i e f i n divine immutability, but • 
there i s no indication that they were greatly influenced, and 
cer t a i n l y they were, not ca r r i e d away. The expression of 
their thought takes i t s place comfortably as the l a t t e r part 
of a development of b e l i e f whioh i n i t s origin and whole 
course i s i n t e g r a l l y Hebrew. Study of the Hebrew thought 
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alone gives no suggestion of a sudden twist to accomodate 
new and a l i e n doctrines of changelessness. This ohange' 
never happened; and i f i t were not that we know from separate 
evidenoe that i t was possible, there would have been no 
reason to suspect i t . 
The passages i n the Old Testament and Apocrypha which 
involve ideas related to divine immutability may be c l a s s i f i e d 
as follows: 
i . Passages where the ohangelessness i n God i s 
related to an emphasis on God's r e l i a b i l i t y 
and dependability, 
i i . Passages where the emphasis i s on God's fa i t h f u l n e s s 
to h i s purpose. 
i i i . Passages where the emphasis i s on God's transoendence. 
i v . . Passages concerned to emphasise God as not subject 
to ohange. 
i and i i are present throughout, but most prominent in-pre-
e x i l i o thought. (As i s to be expected they are also the 
notes struck i n the devotional l i t e r a t u r e - of. Pes.XXXIII . 
11, XLVI 1-5, C I I 26-27). 
i i i has pre-exilio foundations, but i s most noticeable 
i n the e x i l i o prophets, and oomblnes with i v i n the l a t e 
Hebrew writings. 
i v becomes pronounced i n Deutero-Isaiah and Hfelaohi, then 
with i i i i s dominant i n the F i r s t andSecond*Centuries B « C 
There i s here neither a philosophical nor an exact 
investigation of .immutability. There i s no de f i n i t i o n . But 
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olearly Hebrew experience of God's revelation led to an 
understanding of the necessity of a ohangelessness i n God, 
which i s characterised p r i n c i p a l l y i n expressions of 
b e l i e f i n God's fait h f u l n e s s to his purpose, and i n the 
impossibility of any external or worldly influence capable 
of causing him to ohange. 
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PABSi I I THE KSffrTEB,TAMEHT AKP IMMUTABILITY. 
Orthodox d i v i n i t y regards the Hew Testament as 
pr i n c i p a l l y a reoord of the incarnate l i f e of God the Son, 
and an exposition of the implications of that l i f e . With 
the aooeptanoe of t h i s position the student of immutability 
i s a t once face to face with h i s most profound problem -
God humbles himself, for us men and for our salvation he' 
opmes down from heaven.and i s made man. There seems to be 
an inescapable change i n the manner of the existence of God 
the iSon* ' •> 
For clearness i t w i l l be convenient to postpone the 
investigation of t h i s problem u n t i l consideration has been 
made over as wide a f i e l d as possible' of what immutability 
connotes, and of how i t should be applied to the Chr i s t i a n 
conception of God. I t i s to t h i s end that the following 
examination i s made o f f t h e material which the Hew Testament 
can supply. 
I n general the Hew Testament w r i t e r s assumed the 
theology found i n the Old. Just as the ideas of the Seoond 
Century B.C.' provided the bulk of the foundation ideas of 
the F i r s t Century B.C., so the F i r s t Century B.C. served the 
F i r s t Century A.D.. The conception of the immutability of 
t 
God which has been extracted from the Old Testament provides 
i n essence what was consciously or unconsoiously believed by 
the characters of the gospels. I t was assumed by 'Christ. 
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As the Law had received strength from the b e l i e f that God, 
who had instituted i t , did not change from generation to 
generation, so Christ's teaching on oonduot i s based on an 
appeal to the father's steadfastness: . 
.....that thou be not seen of men to f a s t , but of . 
the'y Father which i s i n secret, and th/fy Father, 
which-seeth i n secret, S h a l l recompense thee. 
(Mt. VI 18; of. VI l i V I I 21 etc.) 
There i s , though, a new emphasis that God i s unchangingly 
good.. ' 
..... For a f t e r a l l these things do the Gentiles 
seek; for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye 
have need of a l l these things. 
(Mt. VI 32) 
I f ye then, being e v i l , know how to give good g i f t s 
unto your children, how muoh more s h a l l your Father 
which i s i n heaven give good things unto them that 
ask him? ( I b . V I I 11). 
This aooords with the understanding of God's immutability 
as being characterised by a personal a c t i v i t y , but i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t extension of i t . 
The same implication of divine s t a b i l i t y was present 
i n a l l C h r i s t ' s teaching: 
Heaven and earth s h a l l pass away, but my words s h a l l 
not pass away. (Mk. X I I I 31). 
While the extent of this assertion i s not d e a r i n the 
context, especi a l l y as there i s reason for maintaining that 
t h i s part of 8.Mark's gospel i s not an exact reqord of a 
single speech by C h r i s t , i t i s true of the attitude of 
Chr i s t and of his f a i t h f u l hearers to a l l his teaching -
that i t wasi a divine message, and therefore not subject 
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to change. 
There i s no reooroi of Ch r i s t direotly teaching that' 
God i s immutable, but at such times as he witnessed to the 
divine existenoe there was never the least indication that 
he regarded h i s statement as possibly needing future 
r e v i s i o n . 
A l l things have been delivered unto me of my Fatherj 
And no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither 
doth any know the Father,, save the Son, and he to 
. whomsoever the. Son w i l l e t h to reveal him. 
(Mt. XI 27^fisLk.X 22; of.Jn.lV 24, X 30)'. 
The olearest a s c r i p t i o n of immutability to himself 
was contained i n his s t r i k i n g summing up on behalf of the 
Jews of h i s relationship to Abraham: 
Jesus said unto them, V e r i l y , v e r i l y , I say unto 
you, Before Abraham was, I am. 
(Jn. V I I I 58), 
I t i s not enough to explain t h i s as t e s t i f y i n g to Chri s t ' s 
previous existence, or even as a suggestion that there i s 
that i n him which i s eternal. In £ y ° <^t^tl there i s 
almost c e r t a i n l y a referenoe to the reoords of the revelation 
of the divine name. His Jewish audience seemingly took i t 
so. Already there had been a more veiled hint i n the same 
B 
direction whioh, though obscured i n A.V. and R.V., i s noted 
i n R.Vm., for the Greek of S.John V I I I 24 reads, ' 
O \ v v / . Cf ~) t ^ 
£<xV yoy? fAtj m LTQrV <S ^TGr o n t y w ^ h ' , 
rt'TtO$cLV&\(> €rV Toils- ofpi.cy-rfof.1 f U f / w V . 
Further weight i s added by the close connection of the 
whole passage with the desoeut from Abraham: for the revelation 
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of the divine name i n E x . i l l 14*15, and VI 3 i s joined 
with the names of the patriarchs, Abraham, isaao and Jacob. 
I n the former passage from Exodus i t i s Abraham's fatherhood 
of the nation that i s introduced * the precise subject of 
Christ'8 controversy with the Jews. Moreover the LXX of 
ExodUS I I I 14 reads: / e - i T r f c y b -ry^&s 
• ' . . . / ' / > C V . 
There oan, then, be l i t t l e doubt that Christ had the Exodus 
passages i n mind, and i n that case h i s statement about him-
s e l f oannot be severed from a remarkable emphasis on his own 
eternity amd permanenoe of personal identity. 
The Transfiguration bears s i m i l a r implications: that 
there' i s that i n Christ which transcends mortal l i m i t a t i o n s , 
that i s superior to the darkness of the world, and that, 
moreover, i s not subjeot to the changes wrought by time, 
for i t was with Moses and E l i j a h that he talked. 
The e p i s t l e s attributed to Paul provide l i t t l e that i s 
new. When immutability i s introduced i t i s either to r e i t e r -
ate what has been learned from the Old Testament (e.g.Bom.XI 
29, 2 Cor.l 18-19, 2TIM. I I 9. TIT. 42-' ) , or to apply those 
conceptions to Ch r i s t fjTim I I 13). Of the passages coming 
under the l a t t e r head Rom.VIII 38-39 i s the most interesting, 
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with i t s sonorous assertion of God's unchangeable active 
relationship with man expressed i n terms of the love of 
God - the note that has already been noticed as f i r s t struck 
by Christ himself % 
For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor l i f e , 
nor angels, nor p r i n c i p a l i t i e s , nor things present, 
nor things to oome^ nor powers, nor height, nor 
depth, nor any other oreature, s h a l l be able to 
separate us from the love of God, whioh i s i n C h r i s t 
Jesus our Lord, (loo.oit.) 
The New Testament counterpart of Malaohi I I I 6 as a 
perennial proof-text of God's immutability i a 
..... the Father of lights,, with whom can be no 
vari a t i o n , neither shadow that 18 cast by turning, 
( j a s . 1 17b.) 
* — . The passage, when read i n conjunction with the pre-
ceding verses/ i s an appeal to r i s e above the world and i t s 
temptations through a confidence i n God's promise of the 
orown of l i f e , a promise made by God who cannot be turned 
aside by any influence exterior to himself, and who, moreover, 
does not deviate of his own w i l l . I t i s the f u l l e s t New 
Testament statement of the seourity of the l i f e lived i n 
ob^ienoe to the divine w i l l . A si m i l a r attitude has been 
observed i n the o a l l s of the prophets for submission to the 
Law,; but where they were content to say God oannot be changed 
i n hie purpose^ here we have an implication that God cannot 
himself change from h i s purpose, that a l l variableness i s 
foreign to his nature.•*There i s here b i b l i c a l authority 
for a f u l l e r oonnotatiori of the t erm immutability as applied 
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to God, but 8 t i l l without traoe of the o r i e n t a l conception 
of a p a s s i v e d e i t y . 
Among the books a s c r i b e d to the l a t e r p a r t of the f i r s t 
Century the a t t e n t i o n paid to immutability i s more s u s t a i n e d . 
The w r i t e r of the E p i s t l e to the Hebrews, oonoerned as he was 
to show C h r i s t as an e t e r n a l high p r i e s t , and h i s s e l f -
o b l a t i o n as of an e t e r n a l worth, was of n e c e s s i t y i n s i s t e n t 
upon God*s e t e r n i t y , and beyond e t e r n i t y he o f t e n reached 
to t h e kindred a t t r i b u t e of i m m u t a b i l i t y . 
Jesus C h r i s t i s the 'same yesterday and today,yea 
and for ever. ( H e b . X I I I 8, of.1 10-12 ) 
i s a statement i n sympathy w i t h the thought of the whole 
e p i s t l e . She context which provokes the a s s e r t i o n i s a s u b j e c t 
s i m i l a r t o J a s . l 17, and there i s f u r t h e r s i m i l a r i t y i n the 
d i r e c t n e s s of the a s s e r t i o n . I f God never does change i t i s 
no great s t e p to say God oannot change. I f the w r i t e r d i d 
not take t h i s exaot s t e p he was y e t not f a r from t a k i n g i t : 
n Wherein God, being mindful to show more abundantly 
unto t h e . h e i r s of the promise the i m m u t a b i l i t y of 
h i s counsel, interposed w i t h an oath: t h a t by two 
immutable t h i n g s , i n which i t i s impossible f o r God 
to l i e , we may have a strong enoouragement.... 
(Heb.VI 17-18). 
The two t h i n g s , God's oounsel and h i s oath, are both declared 
to be immutable ( U^erT^Q^.Tov ) r a n a - immutable 
not i n the sense that they do not ohange, but that t h e y 
canmot be changed,("concerning which i t was impossible f o r 
God t o l i e " OL&JXSU TO v <Z &J>v 
I t must, though, be remembered t h a t the passage does not 
c o n s t i t u t e a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n about God. 
Of S. John's gospel i t has been s a i d t h a t i t c o n s c i o u s l y 
s u p p l i e s omissions from the biography of C h r i s t as given i n 
the Synoptic t r a d i t i o n . Whether or not t h i s i s t r u e , and 
very l i k e l y i t i s , t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t emphasis l a i d on 
e t e r n i t y , and the e t e r n a l i d e n t i t y of C h r i s t , the Word, that 
i s p e c u l i a r to the gospel, and consequently has a s p e c i a l 
b earing on our s u b j e o t . 
While ref e r e n c e i s being made to the motives cS>J:b&h:;:;:; 
may have had which i n f l u e n c e d the form taken by h i s gospel 
i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to speoulate whether the l a t e r y e a r s of 
the F i r s t Century provided oircumstanoes which gave the 
conception of changelessness an apologetlo Value. The 
F o u r t h Gospel, the E p i s t l e to the Hebrews and the R e v e l a t i o n , 
a l l u o u a l l y aooignod t o tho l a s t quarter of the oenturft, each 
show t h i s same tendenoy.—On tne other hand the-wr4tiags-of 
tho oub-apostolio age show no t-rape of i t • 
She s i g n i f i c a n c e of 3. John 711I 58 has a l r e a d y been 
i n d i c a t e d , ttuoh e l s e i n the gospel harmonises w i t h i t . 
She prologue p l a i n l y s t a t e s t h a t the Word i s e t e r n a l i n t h a t 
he i s from the beginning with God, and that he i s God f l 1-2). 
He i s the' c r e a t o r and s u s t a i n e r , the ' l i f e ' , of th&world 
(1 3**4). The Word who "oame unto h i s own" i n the world was 
not a new being. One point of the passage i s to s t a t e t h a t 
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the Word i n the world was the Word whose nature and 
a o t i v i t y were a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d . He was e t e r n a l and did 
not change, but r e t a i n e d h i s i d e n t i t y - i t i s the e t e r n a l 
Word who "was made f l e s h " (1 1 4 ) . The gospel contains 
numerous sentences' of C h r i s t f s , or sometimes a word or two, 
or a n ' A l l u s i o n , whioh by t h e i r cumulative e f f e c t g i v e t o 
the reader the r e a l i z a t i o n that the Wordy stands 'in r e l a t i o n 
to the world as s t a b i l i t y stands i n r e l a t i o n to f l u x 
(X 88, X I 25); he i s as e t e r n a l l i g h t opposed to a confusion 
of darkness ( T i l l 12, X I I 46, ) ; as the he l p e r who oannot be 
a s s a i l e d by the l i m i t a t i o n of those he helps ( I V 14,X 7,11); 
a s the transcendent opposed to the t r a n s i e n t and mortal 
( V I I I 23, JHFS£ 1 4 ) . S e p a r a t e l y many of these passages do not 
seem to bear on immutability: c o l l e c t i v e l y they lend impressive 
weight. Considered w i t h the message of the prologue, and the 
f i g u r e of the Chrisy, who says of himself " I am" ( V I I I 58) 
they t e s t i f y t h a t the e t e r n a l , e t e r n a l l y a o t i v e Word i s , by h i s 
v e r y unohangeableness w h i l e i n the world, the world's hope Of 
de l i v e r a n c e from c o r r u p t i o n and m o r t a l i t y . 
There i s one word used i n t h e gospel whioh epitomises 
these aspects of the d i v i n e nature as seen i n ' C h r i s t . I t i s 
the word 'g l o r y 1 ( So %<* ) . Glory i s i n s e p a r a b l e from the 
di v i n e Same ( X I I 2 8 ) . The Son g l o r i f i e s the F a t h e r , and the 
F a t h e r g l o r i f i e s the Son ( X I I I 31^32,XIV 13, X V I I 1 ) . The 
o 
S p i r i t g l o r i f i e s the Son (XVI 1 4 ) . T h i s i s the inner working 
of God that i s opposed to a l l t h a t is.changeable. The w r i t e r 
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oomments th a t the unbridgeable d i v i s i o n between the P h a r i s e e s 
and C h r i s t i s t h a t the Ph a r i s e e s p r e f e r r e d the mortal t o the 
- - - - - - * • - j , 
e t e r n a l - " f o r they loved the g l o r y ( So§«£ ) 0 f men more 
than the glory {-$•£-<- ) of God" ( X I I 4 3 ) . The f a t e of those 
-who are. redeemed "out of the world" i s t h a t they are oaught 
up i n t o the l i f e of d i v i n e g l o r y / 
...... that they may a l l be one; even as thou, 
F a t h e r , a r t i n me, and I i n thee,-that they a l s o 
may be i n us: that the world may b e l i e v e t h a t 
thou d i d s t se nd me. And the glory which thou 
ha s t given me I have g i v e n unto them; t h a t they 
may be one, even as we are one. ( X V I I 21-22). 
I n a s s e s s i n g the p l a c e of 3. John's gospel i n the study 
of immutability i t i s worthy of mention t h a t i t r a i s e s a l l 
three p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f i n immuta-
b i l i t y . They a r e (a) that the immutable oreates', '(b) that 
the immutable i s i n c a r n a t e , (o) t h a t i n some way man i s 
introduced i n t o the immutable l i f e . 
.The R e v e l a t i o n i e of a d i f f e r e n t temper. C h i e f l y i t 
i s important t o the s u b j e c t as w i t n e s s i n g to the t i m e l e s s 
s t a b i l i t y of God. Here, perhaps more f o r c i b l y than anywhere 
9 
e l s e i n the B i b l e , e t e r n i t y and immutability, e s p e c i a l l y 
i n t h e i r transcendent a s p e c t , a r e emphasised f o r t h e i r own 
i n t r i n s i o s p i r i t u a l value* I t i s of the e s s e n t i a l grandeur 
of God, a proclamation of h i s s o v e r e i g n t y , t h a t past,, 
present and f u t u r e are a l l one to him: 
Grace t o you and peaoe, from him which i s and whioh 
was, and which i s to come. ( R e v . l 4; o f . I V 8, X I 17, 
XVI 5 ) . 
-34- • 
He i s Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End (1 8,XXII 
13) • The p i c t u r e of God i n h i s heaven shows a l l . time as 
one; change i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l a s non-existent - except 
f o r one t h i n g : he who i s the f i r s t and the l a s t i s a l s o he . 
t h a t l i v e t h , and was dead, and i s a l i v e f o r evermore ( I 17-18) 
Again we a r e met by the seeming c o n t r a d i c t i o n provided by 
the I n c a r n a t i o n . 
I f the aim has been t o ' d i s c o v e r a p h i l o s o p h e r f s d i s c u s s -
ion of motion and immutability, then the Hew Testament has . 
l e f t our hands as empty as the Old. - I f we hoped f o r an 
exact d e f i n i t i o n we a r e e q u a l l y disappointed. But i f we 
have been seeking confirmation of Origan's.statement t h a t 
immutability was "Judaeorum C h r i s t ianoruinque doptrinai' . 
(Gont.Cels. 1) we have such a confirmation. 
• The teaohing of the Old Testament has been i n t e n s i f i e d , 
enlarged and brought to l i f e . The p r i n c i p a l augmentations 
of the Old Testament conceptions a r e : 
i . The unchanging a o t i v e n e s s of God i n h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
.'with man i n c l u d e s a a t l v g .goodness! a t l l i l o v e . 
(Synopios &. Jn) 
i i God i s unchangeably a o t i v e not only i n h i s r e l a t i o n 
to men, but a l s o in. h i s own e x i s t e n c e ( So£«c ) 
i i i That God does not change i m p l i e s not only t h a t he 
. cannot be changed, but that ohange i s f o r e i g n to 
him, and that some change, i f not a l l , i s 
impossible t o him (Jas.and Heb.). 
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The unchanged i d e n t i t y of the Word, and the 
Word unchangeably a o t i v e (Jn.)« 
A f u l l e r oonoeption of God as transcendent and 
e t e r n a l ( J n . and R e v . ) . 
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PART I I I . THE GROWTH OF THE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF DIVINE 
IMMUTABILITY. 
Divisions of the Subject: 
A. The Fathers. 
1. Before 180 A.J). 
2. 180-325 
(a) The East (Saint Clement and Origen) 
(b) The West (Saint Irenaeus, T e r t u l l i a n and 
Novatian). 
3. Saint Athanasius. 
4. Saint Augustine. 
5. The Council of Chalcedon. 
•B. The Schoolmen. 
1. The Scholastic Background. 
2. Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
3. Saint Bonaventure. 
4. Immutability and mysticism. 
A. The Fathers. 
1. Before 180 A.D. 
The influence of the Hellenic world was increasingly 
f e l t by the Church as her a c t i v i t i e s spread to the west i n 
the l a t e F i r s t andj^Second Centuries, and the environment 
introduced new factors to shape the manner and purpose of 
C h r i s t i a n thought. I n the main the converts to Chr i s t i a n i t y 
were uneducated people f a m i l i a r with popular Hellenism: the 
Church was grappling with untutored minds, not with philoso-
phers, and was finding few scholars i n her ranks. Discussions 
of the immutability of God are not to be expected,and did 
not appear u n t i l about 130 A.D.; moreover there were reasons 
why Christians should be shy of the subject altogether. 
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Deeply embedded i n the. H e l l e n i o thought which the Church 
was i n part a s s i m i l a t i n g , but more c o n s c i o u s l y t r y i n g to 
r e p u l s e , was the i d e a of God as immortal, i m p a s s i b l e , 
immutable, absolu t e - a s t a t i c , impersonal, d e i t y . I t may 
w e l l be that the C h r i s t i a n s of the e a r l y Second Century 
having t h e i r own b e l e i f i n God's unohangeableness, d e r i v e d 
l a r g e l y from the Old Testament, were aware of the d i f f i c u l t y 
of c o r r e l a t i n g i t w i t h t h e i r b e l i e f i n the d i v i n e Jesus who 
died on the c r o s s , and were i n c l i n e d t o avoid the s u b j e c t 
of i m m u t a b i l i t y which, i f the Greek t e a c h i n g beoame too 
i n f l u e n t i a l , might s e t them on the horns of a dilemma, as 
indeed i t was to do w i t h many generations of C h r i s t i a n s ' 
a fterwards. There i s then l i t t l e oauee f o r comment i n the 
t o t a l want of any expression.of God's change1essness i n 
s e v e r a l of the e a r l y p a t r i s t i o w r i t i n g s , e. g. Clement, 
1 ad Cor.; Didaohe; the E p i s t l e t o Diognetue. There i s , -
though,, the point of i n t e r e s t t h a t the tendency of the l a t e r 
Hew Testament books has shown i t s e l f tp be i n the opposite 
d i r e c t i o n , namely to an i n c r e a s i n g emphasis on immutability. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see what reason there was, i f any a t a l l , 
behind t h i s ohange. 
* 
U n t i l the advent of prominent C h r i s t i a n s c h o l a r s about 
the y e a r 180 e t e r n i t y and transcendence were the a s p e c t s of • 
God's nature most f r e q u e n t l y s t r e s s e d . The E p i s t l e to 
Barnabas i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n , and S a i n t I g n a t i u s w r i t e s of 
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God the Fa t h e r a s : 
.... foreordained before the ages to be f o r ever 
unto a b i d i n g and unchangeable g l o r y . 
( S . I g n a t i u s of.Antioch, Eph.froem. Vol.II,p.539) 
By the middle of the Second Century.the A p o l o g i s t s were 
i n c r e a s i n g t h i s emphasis, and providing a marked s i m i l a r i t y 
to the cruder kinds of Neo-Platonic d o c t r i n e of God as 
beyond i n t e l l i g e n c e and being. R e a c t i o n from H e l l e n i c 
anthropomorphism was leading towards H e l l e n i c agnosticism. 
J u s t i n d e c l a r e d that i t would be blasphemous to l i m i t God 
by a name, s i n c e t h e r e was no p r i o r being t o bestow the name, 
and therefore God must be nameless. The Apology fee A r i s t i d e s 
3 ' 
(o.lgS) i n c l u d e s one of the e a r l i e s t d e f i n i t i o n s of God i n 
negative terms: "immortal,without needs,above a l l p a s s i o n s , . . . 
unchangeable, i n v i s i b l e " . There, i s nothing here that ortho-
dox C h r i s t i a n s of any age could not approve, but i t i s of 
th a t kind of statement bred from H e l l e n i c stook, whioh ignores 
one s i d e of the S c r i p t u r a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of God a s one who i s 
e t e r n a l l y a o t i v e and pe r s o n a l , and by t h i s l i m i t a t i o n adds 
to the s c a n d a l of the oross a soandal of the i n c a r n a t i o n 
i t s e l f . Such thought, innocent i n i t s e l f , had a l r e a d y 
f o s t e r e d G n o s t i o i s o , and was l a t e r to produce suoh d i t h e i s t i o 
h e r e s i e s a s Hestorianism. 
Among the f i r s t to d i s c e r n the d i f f i c u l t y were the Logos 
theolog i a n s . T a t i a n the A s s y r i a n (0.180), and Theophilous of 
Antiooh (0.I8O) and Irenaeus were a l l f a c e d w i t h the a l t e r n a -
t i v e of so oonfounding the Logos and the Godhead as t o 
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deprive the Logos of p e r s o n a l i t y , or .of drawing such a 
d i s t i n c t i o n "between the immutable, impassive God and the 
Logos who was made f l e s h as would v i o l a t e the d i v i n e u n i t y . 
They discerned the d i f f i c u l t y , but were not able to rwsolve 
i t . 
2. 180 - 825 A.D. 
(a) The E a s t ( S a i n t Clement of A l e x a n d r i a 
and Origen) . 
The School of A l e x a n d r i a , although so plpe.e!%' r e l a t e d 
to the t r a d i t i o n of Greek thought , produced i n Clement a n d 
hi8 p u p i l Origen s c h o l a r s whose l e a r n i n g was s u f f i c i e n t l y 
wide to $i%v^hf& t h e i r being curtained i n oy Hellenism i n 
a way t h a t would obscure the S c r i p t u r a l conception of God. 
Th e i r balanced judgment averted the t h r e a t e n i n g catastrophe. 
Clement was i n l i n e w ith the Neo-Platonists i n saying God 
: was "beyond being" and adequate d e s c r i p t i o n ; but he avoids 
any p o s s i b i l i t y of a conception of God as s t a t i o and imper-
s o n a l by r e s t o r i n g i n part the a o t i v e God of S c r i p t u r e , 
i r e n a e u s was doing the same i n the west. Probably the growing 
i n f l u e n c e of the books which now comprise the New Testament, 
and the attempts a t the formation of a oanon, were i n part 
r e s p o n s i b l e . Clement ( E o l . P r o p h . L I I 2) a s s e r t s God i s 
"impassible and ohangeless", but i m p a s s i b i l i t y means f o r him 
p e r f e c t moral freedom, and i m m u t a b i l i t y means perfeot 
c o n s i s t e n c y of a o t i o n (Strom.IV 23,CLI 1 ) . God does not 
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survey o r e a t i o n w i t h Epicurean d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s from a 
metaphysical i n s u l a t i o n , but r a t h e r the point i s that h i s 
w i l l i s determined from w i t h i n , not i n f l u e n c e d from without. 
Origen, together w i t h Irenaeus and T e r t u l l i a n , was i n 
the van i n u s i n g immutability as a weapon a g a i n s t h e r e t i c s , 
[e.g.^Celsum I I I 70; c f . D . T . C , A r t : S i e n , s a nature d'apres 
l e s Peres, T.1V. pars 1.1046, r e f e r r i n g to con.Celsum I V ) . 
His thought i s v e r y muoh that of Clement, and balances the 
conception of God as "beyond l i m i t a t i o n , beyond e s t i m a t i o n , 
beyond s e n s a t i o n " w i t h the conception of God as e t e r n a l l y 
a o t i v e , a o t i v e as love, and as e s s e n t i a l l y g i v i n g and s e l f - , 
oommunicative. (Note. Origen i s notable, as u s i n g %±&a Y i o s 
i n p l a c e of A o y o c . Quiofc i n "Gospel of Divine A c t i o n " 
p. 93 f n., records an i n t e r e s t i n g suggestion of Hos'fcyns' 
that the change i n terminology from T&as to Aoy«* was intended 
to emphasise the d i v i n e a c t i o n . ) But though Origen i s the 
more emphatio on both p o i n t s , he comes ve r y l i t t l e nearer 
than Clement to reducing the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n . His 
d i f f i c u l t y became most acute i n h i s treatment, of the r e l a t i o n 
of God the F a t h e r and the inoarnate Son. The F a t h e r i s oitnoc, 
^ ( / T o ^ O e c s ; the Son i s inoapable of ohange, fGod of God 1, 
y e t . i s ^ o / v r - ^ t ^ T T - a c . origen was not able- to f i n d a 
s o l u t i o n t h a t would s a t i s f y him. I t was i n part the d i f f i c u l t y 
a r i s i n g from the H e l l e n i o view of immutability when ap p l i e d 
to the I n o a r n a t i o n which provoked Origen's subordinationism, m 
which 
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whioh had such unhappy r e s u l t s i n the Arianism of the 
Fo u r t h Century. 
(b) She West.(Saint i r e n a e u s , T e r t u i i i a n and Novatian. 
I n opposition t o the Gnostio d e n i a l t h a t God revealed 
in' C h r i s t , and the God who i s supreme Being are i d e n t i c a l , 
irenaeus i n s i s t e d on one omnipotent God, not two Gods 
l i m i t i n g eaoh other. But /£his great achievement i n r e s p e c t 
to i mmutability, an achievement t h a t was to i n f l u e n c e l a t e r 
western thought, and which was i n any case due more to 
I r e n a e u s r s l a t e r western environment than to h i s e a r l i e r 
e a s t e r n , was to make the a o t i y i t y ' o f the one, unchanging God 
predominant . God i s : ' «c': A •.  of- -the M:-, •.v-vjha^/..?'^ 3oS 
. . . . a l s o t r u l y p e r f e c t i n a l l t h i n g s , Himself equal 
and s i m i l a r to Himself, a s he i s a l l l i g h t , and a l l 
mind, and a l l substance...(Irenaeus,Adv.#aer.IV x i 
8, V o l . V, p.406). 
He i s "always the same" ( l b . ) , but he i s the Maker who i s 
ever the same, the Benefaotor who i s ever the same. Every-
t h i n g has i t s o r i g i n i n God and h i s a c t i v e w i l l : 
... the substanoe of a l l t h i n g s i s the w i l l of God. 
( I b . I I , xxx 9 ) . 
He brought t o the f o r e the New Testament r e v e l a t i o n of God 
as e v e r l a s t i n g l y good. Als o he made gr e a t use of the P a u l i n e 
conception of i n c o r r u p t i o n ( o f . *^Q<*f<r/U , 1 Cox.XV 50 etc) 
as denoting the permanenoe and s t a b i l i t y of a l l t h a t i s 
d i v i n e , i n opntrast to the m u t a b i l i t y and c o r r u p t i o n of 
mortal nature. The word was to be much used i n subsequent 
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C h r i s t i a n w r i t i n g s . Ireneeus c o n s i s t e n t l y expounds God 
as s u p e r i o r t o the f o r c e s of c o r r u p t i o n , and a s s e r t s t h a t 
the purpose of the I n o a r n a t i o n was to make i n c o r r u p t i o n 
i * . • . . . 
p o s s i b l e f o r man ( I b . V x i i i 3 ) : j u s t l i k e God's goodness, 
God 1 s i n c o r r u p t i o n e x i s t s a c t i v e l y and t o the b e n e f i t of 
man. ° . 
irenaeus was again a pioneer of western thought i n 
r e v i v i n g the old Testament r e a l i z a t i o n of God's transoendent 
ohangeieseness a s an i n s p i r a t i o n t o men t o seek God that they 
too may have peace and r e s t . The unchanging, l o v i n g God 
f u l f i l s the demand of man's oraving: <x<f>cis a b l e s s i n g 
that d e r i v e s from the B e a t i f i c V i s i o n (ib.1V n 4; 7 x i i i 3 ) : 
F o r as Godi i s always the'same, so a l s o men, when 
found.in God, s h a l l always- go on towards God. 
( I b . i V . x i Z, Vol.V,p.406) 
The immutable God i s revealed * perhaps t e n t a t i v e l y , a s an 
i n s p i r a t i o n to man t o l i v e the devout and holy l i f e . God's 
immutability i s a c t i v e and l o v i n g , and i t s consequences 
p r a c t i c a l . 
I t i s t r u e that P h i l o was not unaware of a p r a c t i c a l 
value a t t a c h i n g to immutability. I n h i s "Quod Deus immuta-
b i l i s s i t " he affirmed t h a t God i s * Z-rfhimf ; then, to 
point the d e s i r a b i l i t y of the d i v i n e e x i s t e n c e being such, 
he t e l l s how: 
even among men .. those who study philosophy i n 
g u i l e l e s s n e s s and p u r i t y . . . g a i n from t h e i r knowledge 
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t h i s as t h e i r reward , t h a t they do not change w i t h 
ohanging ^ circumstances." (Philo,"Quod Dens 
imoautabilis s i t " , 1.v.21-22. V o l . I I I . p.21) 
P h i l o has done no more than draw a p a r a l l e l between 
immutability i n God and s e r e n i t y i n man. On t h i s the 
suggestion made by Irenaeus that man p r o f i t s d i r e o t l y by 
h i s knowledge that God i s immutable i s a great advance. 
fi E e r t u l l i a n was dlsoouraged from any great e x p o s i t i o n , 
of immutability p a r t l y by h i s own S t o i c a l tendency i n a l l o w -
ing t h a t a s o u l i s a body, and t h a t God i s . t h e r e f o r e i n some 
sense c o r p o r e a l ( T e r t u l l i a n , Adv.Prax.VII), and p a r t l y 
beoause i n h i s a t t a c k s on Moharchianism h i s occupation w i t h 
God's s i m p l i c i t y tended to exclude the study of other 
a t t r i b u t e s (e.g. Adv.Marc.1 43). He d i d though on occasion 
r e s o r t to i m m u t a b i l i t y as a weapon: 
..... not unequal, beoause another p r i n c i p l e meets 
us r e s p e c t i n g the Supreme Being, t h a t he i s oapable 
of no diminution, f i b . { I ; 1 7) 
F o r the r e s t we must needs b e l i e v e God to be 
unchangeable and incapable of form (informabilem). 
(Adv.Prax. XXVII, p. 396). . 
I 
.A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y t e r s e sentence a f f i r m s God Ts a o t i v e n e s s f 
Moreover the nature of God himself knows nothing of 
i n a c t i v i t y . fAdv. Efero. $ 1 2 2 ) . 
God i s immutably and e s s e n t i a l l y a o t i v e . The idea i s more 
p r e c i s e than i n I r e n a e u s , but l e s s e x t e n s i v e l y expressed. . 
I n the referenoe to the ''nature-of God h i m s e l f " there i s 
again foreshadowed Aquinas's a s s e r t i o n that God i s pure 
being, and (to" be i s to a c t . 
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Novatian g i v e s the f i r s t c o nsiderable account of 
immutability. He i s a k i n to the Alexandrian school i n h i s 
metaphysioal^approaoh, but i n a l l e l s e e s s e n t i a l l y western: 
Hence God i s always l i k e unto himself. He does not 
change, or transform himself i n t o any shapes. Suoh 
change would be a s i g n of m o r t a l i t y ; i t would i n v o l v e 
a l t e r a t i o n , ' whioh i s a s t e p towards death of some s o r t . 
F o r t h i s reason any a d d i t i o n of p a r t s or of g l o r y 
i s e q u a l l y impossible to God, f o r that would imply 
t h a t a t some time he had been short of p e r f e c t i o n , 
nor can there be any question of diminution i n him, 
f o r that would a t t r i b u t e to him an approach to 
m o r t a l i t y . On the contrary, what he i s he always i s , 
and who he i s he always i s , and Such as he i s he always 
i s . Any a d d i t i o n s made to a thing show that i t had an 
origin,, and any diminution proveB i t s m o r t a l i t y and 
death. Therefore he s a i t h , ' I am the Lord, I change 
not' ( M a i . i l l 61 
<-He mai n t a i n s ^ e t e r n a l l y h i s own s t a t e of Being; t h a t 
which did hot oome in t o e x i s t e n c e oannot a l t e r . 
E v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t D e i t y possesses must always be 
i n him, i n order that he may be'always God, upholding 
himself by h i s own powers. T h i s e x p l a i n s h i s words, 
" I a n who am* ( E x . I l l 1 4 ) . That whioh i s bears t h i s 
name because i t always preserves the same a t t r i b u t e s . 
A l t e r a t i o n would a t once deprive him of the name 
'That whioh i s ' ; f o r e v e r y t h i n g t h a t a l t e r s i s shown 
by t h e v e r y f a c t of v a r i a t i o n to be mortal. I t ceases 
to be what i t was, and consequently begins to be what 
i t was not. God t h e r e f o r e , and of n e o e s s i t y , i s always 
l i k e to h i m s e l f , and equ|l to himself, without the 
diminution which ohange would i n v o l v e . His s t a t e of 
being abide8 e t e r n a l l y the same. That whioh did not 
oome into e x i s t e n c e , oannot ohange, s i n c e i t i s only 
t h i n g s t h a t a r e made, or come i n t o e x i s t e n c e , that are 
l i a b l e to a l t e r a t i o n ; t h i n g s whioh a t one time did not 
e x i s t , by coming i n t o being experience e x i s t e n c e , and 
s i m i l a r l y by ooming i n t o e x i s t e n c e experience ohange. 
On the other hand, things which do not oome into 
e x i s t e n c e * and have no a r t i f i o e r , a r e n a t u r a l l y exempt 
from ohange, as they have no beginning, and beginning 
i s the oause of a l t e r a t i o n . ((De)JIOvatlan,£Drin. I V ) . 
I t i s a narrow statement , and d i s c i p l e of ^ e r t u l l i a n though 
o * 
he was, i t shows none of T e r t u l l i a n ' s oonoision and acouraoy, 
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nor, more importantly, of h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n of the a c t i v e 
aspeo£ of d i v i n e immutability. His value to the d i s c u s s i o n , 
l i k e t h a t of Roman theologians i n some l a t e r c o n t r o v e r s i e s , 
l i e s not i n h i s advancing the contentions of any one s c h o o l , 
nor even i n the development of the main enquiry, but i n r e -
emphasising the best a t t e s t e d f a o t s . The e f f e c t i s to c l e a r 
the a i r . 
A d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the treatment of immutabil-
it y ; b y . C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s from Novatian to the time of the 
e a r l y Schoolmen i s e x c e p t i o n a l l y t e d i o u s , and only r e s u l t s 
i n a r e p e t a t i v e catalogue. A moderately w e l l defined concep-
t i o n of immutability had gained an accepted place i n orthodox 
do c t r i n e , and was a c c o r d i n g l y a commonplace of C h r i s t i a n 
• 
expression; but the m a j o r i t y of the w r i t e r s add nothing to 
what has been s a i d a l r e a d y . Two or t h r e e i l l u s t a a t i o n s w i l l 
serve as examples of the kind of statements t h a t were 
cu r r e n t : 
..... One who h i m s e l f remaining q u i e t , disposeth and 
ordereth t h i s v a r i e t y of motions. (Boethius,Cons.Phil. 
I l l I S , p. 289) 
A r i u s declares that the Son of God may change and 
swerve. How, then, i s he God i f he i s changeable, 
s e e i n g t h a t he himself hath s a i d : " I am, I am, and 
I ohange not' ? 
(S.Ambrose, Be F i d e , I X i x 131, p.222). 
But beoause i n God changeableness entereth not. 
•no shadow of changing 1 i n t e r c e p t s h i s l i g h t . (S.Gregory 
th-e Gt., Moral.XlI 33, p.68). 
But a minority of sources i n the period a r e of c l a s s i c 
importance. They a r e the w r i t i n g s of S.Athanaeiua, and 
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S. Augustiae-, and the f i n d i n g s of the Counoil of Chaloedon, 
and of them considerable aooount must now be taken. 
g> Saint, Athanasins. 
S a i n t Athanaaius was oonoerned p r i m a r i l y t o e s t a b l i s h 
the i m m u t a b i l i t y of God the don, r a t h e r than of the Godhead, 
or of the F a t h e r alone. She i m m u t a b i l i t y of the F a t h e r was 
so aooepted t h a t he was able t o employ i t as an agreed 
premise. But the i m m u t a b i l i t y of the Son was a matter of 
contention i n t h a t i t was denied by the A r i a n s . Athanasius 
quotes A r i u s ' s T h a l i a 1 as a s s e r t i n g t h a t the Logos: 
.... i s not u n a l t e r a b l e • l 2 - c p w r * s ) , as the F a t h e r 
' i s , but g & a l t e r a b l e . i n nature {rp^Txrh^ W r t <W<=< ) 
l.v a s the c r e a t u r e s . CJL 
(Athanasius, 1 O r . I l l 9, p.311; efe De Synod.XVI, 
Ad Bp. Aeg. X I I . ) 1 
I f , as the A r i a n s maintained, the Son was subordinate to t h e 
F a t h e r , and not c o - e t e r n a l , then c l e a r l y he could not be 
immutable, without^beginning or end, without p o t e n t i a l i t y of 
change, or incapable of moral change ( tf-r^e-rr-ro* J . 
I f , a s Athanaeius laboured to prove, w i t h the a i d of the 
teaching of S o r i p t u r e and t r a d i t i o n , and by dint of a r a t h e r 
giddy l o g i c and a p e n e t r a t i n g genius, the Son i s immutable, 
then the A r i a n s were routed. Never before had i m m u t a b i l i t y 
proved suoh a weapon to a p r o t a g o n i s t of orthodoxy. 
Athanasius took h i s lead from the Creed of the C o u n c i l 
of Nioaea which i n i t s c l o s i n g anathemas condemned -ro^-s $\ 
<\tyovr«><.s-. • «7 T/^e-jrrre»v'7 ^ ••^XXwwTbv' Tov YfoV TO<± tjc=«u. 
He affirmed and r e a f f i r m e d the equal i m m u t a b i l i t y of the 
F a t h e r and the Son: 
a f t e r the resemblance ( Gixoio-cq-c*. ) 
of 'the u n a l t e r a b l e ( ^r^^vrrov ^ ) F a t h e r , the 
Word a l s o i e u n a l t e r a b l e ( oLT^-u-r^e . ) . • 
(1 Or.XI 39,p.329; of.fc Or.XVIII,XXXVI;3 Or XXXiy; 
Ad Bp.Aeg.XVIII; De Fug.XIV e t c . .Cf .S.Cyril,Ad 
Joan, l i n e s 127-6 i n Bindley'8 t e x t ) . 
Against the A r i a n argument t h a t one who has a l l the 
> 
p h a r a o t e r i s t i o B of humanity cannot be immutable Athanasius 
pressed.the d i s t i n c t i o n of the two natures i n C h r i s t : 
He says that^ he has reoeived power, as man, which 
he ever {U<=C ) had a s God. (3 Or.XXVII 38 p.415; 
of. 1 O r . X I I , X I I I eto.y, 
T h i s emphasis on the immut a b i l i t y of the d i v i n e nature 
i n C h r i s t i s an a d d i t i o n to previous thought , though .. 
s o a r o e l y an advance int o f r e s h f i e l d s . But i n h i s e a r l y 
work on the I n c a r n a t i o n Athanasius had inoluded a passage 
c o n t a i n i n g an abundance of new wealth. The passage a t f i r s t 
r e a d i n g appears as a c o l l e c t i o n of splendid paradoxes, and 
might w e l l be taken f o r a piece of y o u t h f u l w r i t i n g whioh 
ignored the o b l i g a t i o n of r e c o n c i l i n g statements made, and 
the dangers of dogmatio obscurantism. F o r the purpose of 
a n a l y s i s i t i s neoessary to quote a t some length. 
F o r he was not, as might be imagined .circumscribed 
by t h e body; nor w h i l e present i n the body, was he 
absent elsewhere; nor w h i l e he moved i n the body, 
was the univ e r s e l e f t void of h i s working and 
Providence; but, t h i n g most' m a r v e l l o u s W o r d a s he 
was, so f a r from being contained*.by anything, he r a t h e r 
contained a l l t h i n g s i n h i mself ( eu^t'^CfcTo [A\s 
• J f i r e "Tiv«»y • <Swv^ e.»Ye 6e TV \Kot\rTot p^XXcv o<ur<>s )'.; 
9 
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and j u s t as while p r e s e n t I n the"whole of C r e a t i o n , 
he i s a t onoe d l s t i n o $ i n being from the u n i v e r s e , 
and present i n a l l things by h i s own power, - g i v i n g 
order to a l l t h i n g s , and over a l l and i n a l l 
r e v e a l i n g h i s own Providenoe,and g i v i n g l i f e t o 
eaoh t h i n g and a l l t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g the whole, 
without being inoluded, but being i n h i s own F a t h e r 
alone wholly and i n every r e s p e c t , - thus even w h i l e 
present i n a human body and himself quickening i t , 
he was, without inoonsistenoy, q.uiokening the u n i v e r s e 
as w e l l , and was i n every process of nature, and was 
outside the whole, and wh i l e known from the body by 
h i s works he was none the l e s s manifest from the 
working of the un i v e r s e as "well. UQw, i t i s the 
funotion of s o u l to behold even what i s outside i t s 
own body, by aots of thought, without, however, 
working outside i t s own body, or moving by i t s 
presenoe t h i n g s remote from the body. Never, t h a t i s , 
does a man, by t h i n k i n g of t h i n g s a t - a d i s t a n c e , by . 
th a t f a c t e i t h e r move or d i s p l a c e them: nor i f a man 
were to s i t i n h i s own house and reason about the 
heavenly bodies, would he by that f a o t e i t h e r move 
the sun or cause the heavens t o r e v o l v e . But he sees 
that they move and have t h e i r being, without being 
a c t u a l l y able t o i n f l u e n c e them. . Now, the Word of 
God i n h i s man's nature was n©t l i k e t h a t ; f o r he 
was not bound to h i s body, but was r a t h e r h i m s e l f 
w i e l d i n g i t , so that he was not only i n i t ^ b u t ^ ^ j L t ^ ^ i i 
was a c t u a l l y i n e v e r y t h i n g , and w h i l e vtemtsA to" 
the u n i v e r s e , abode i n h i s F a t h e r only. And t h i s 
was the wonderful t h i n g , that he was a t once walking 
as man, and as the Word was quickening a l l t h i n g s , 
and as the Son was dw e l l i n g w i t h h i s F a t h e r . So 
th a t not even when the V i r g i n bore him did he s u f f e r 
any ohange (a'Q^^- -rB * TC*/>(fevor-v 
h fe-V du To f I t<To v6*~t 
nor by being i n the body was/his g l o r y j d u l l e d , but on 
the c o n t r a r y he s a n c t i f i e d the body a l s o . F o r not 
even by being i n the un i v e r s e does he share i n i t s 
nature, but a l l t h i n g s , on the contrary, are quiok-
ened and sust a i n e d by him. (De I n c . X V I I ) . 
The argument i s t h a t the Word p r i o r to the I n c a r n a t i o n was: 
i . i n a l l t h i n g s by h i s own power, but not inoluded 
i n any of them. 
i i . t h a t a t the same time he was always i n the F a t h e r . 
At t h e i n c a r n a t i o n the Word was: 
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1. s t i l l c o n t a i n i n g the un i v e r s e and manifest 
i n i t . ' " • 
i i . l i v i n g a s man, though not being bound by h i s 
body but w i e l d i n g i t . 
i i i . e x t e r n a l to the un i v e r s e and abiding s t i l l i n 
the F a t h e r only. 
Undeniably there a r e some unresolved c o n t r a d i c t i o n s here, 
but o e r t a i n general oonoeptions of great value oan be 
extraoted. Athanasius has expressed divine immutability 
as change l e s s because nothing can be added to the di v i n e 
a o t i v i t y ( o f . Aquinas). (Phis i s the f u l l development of the 
conception which appeared i n the old Testament of God a s 
immutably a c t i v e . The p e r f e c t immutable a c t i v i t y i s always 
present i n the world, and t h e r e f o r e cannot be changed by 
i n c r e a s e or extension. Any approach t o pantheism, which 
tends to abnegate immutability, i s checked i n time by the 
i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the Word i s e t e r n a l l y i n the F a t h e r only -
t h i s a t the expense of a measure of oontradiotion. 
I f nothing oan be added to. the a o t i v i t y of the Word 
i t f o l l o w s t h a t he i s a l s o immutable i n the sense t h a t he 
I s not pa8sive to any i n f l u e n c e - he w i e l d s a l l . Therefore 
i f a t the I n c a r n a t i o n nothing has been added to the a o t i v i t y 
of the immutable Word, and no e x t e r i o r w i l l or i n f l u e n c e has 
intervened, then the I n c a r n a t i o n i s a ma n i f e s t a t i o n of the 
a o t i v i t y t h a t i s e t e r n a l l y God - "so t h a t not even when 
the V i r g i n bore him did he s u f f e r any change" ( s u p r a ) . 
Sinoe, then, the I n o a r n a t i o n i s a mani f e s t a t i o n of the 
immutable a o t i v i t y t h a t i s e t e r n a l l y God, then the God-Child 
i n the manger a t Bethlehem i s . not a s p e o l a l e x h i b i t i o n 
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prompted by d i v i n e h u m i l i t y , the God-Man dying on C a l v a r y i s 
not a 'tour de foroe' of d i v i n e l o v e and oompassion: they a r e 
the o l e a r e s t manif e s t a t i o n ever given to man of God' as he i s -
always, e t e r n a l l y , immutably. I n a sense i t i s true to 
Say t h a t the l i f e of Jesus. C h r i s t i s p r i m a r i l y the manifes-
t a t i o n of the immutability of God. 
Even assuming one a c c e p t s t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
passage from "De Ino a r n a t i o n e " , i t seems s t i l l t h a t Athanasius 
h a s ' l e f t h i s defence of i m m u t a b i l i t y weak i n that the deeds 
of the inoarnate God imply p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i z a t i o n -
t h a t i s , ohange. i f C h r i s t were man s o l e l y then i t would 
be so. Can h i s being God-Man a l t e r the p o s i t i o n and avoid 
.O -i 
the consequent m u t a b i l i t y of the d i v i n e Word? Whether or 
not Athanasius was oonsoious of the d i f f i c u l t y a t the time 
of w r i t i n g the "He Inoarnatione-" i s not apparent, -but he 
t r e a t e d i t i n l a t e r w r i t i n g s by an i n s i s t e n c e on the two 
w i l l s i n C h r i s t , one d i v i n e , one human. Thus the deeds of y 
C h r i s t a s man a r e the oonsequenoe of human w i l l i n g , but the 
human w i l l was a o t i n g aaoprding to,the promptings of the 
d i v i n e e t e r n a l w i l l , whose purpose i n the I n c a r n a t i o n , a s i n 
the whole d i v i n e a o t i v i t y , i s immutable. T h i s d o c t r i n e 
r e c e i v e d f i n a l form &t the Third C o u n c i l of Constantinople 
(A.D. 681) which was ooncerned to condemn the monothelite 
heresy: 
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We a l s o preach two n a t u r a l w i l l s i n him and two 
n a t u r a l operations, without d i v i s i o n , without change, 
without s e p a r a t i o n , without p a r t i t i o n , without 
confusion....and two n a t u r a l w i l l s not oonfcrary.... 
but h i s human w i l l f o l l o w i n g h i s d i v i n e and omnipotent 
w i l l , not r e s i s t i n g i t nor s t r i v i n g a g a i n s t i t , but 
r a t h e r subjeot t o i t . 
(Manei, Saororum Conoiliorum, X I 635, C 8qq. t r a n s . 
Bettenson, "Documents of the C h r i s t i a n Church", 
pp.128-9). 
I t i s noteworthy that i n e x p r e s s i n g i t s d e f i n i t i o n the 
Counoil r e f e r r e d f o r precedent to "the teaohing of the Holy 
F a t h e r s " i n g e neral, and to "the a l l - w i s e Athanasius" i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . 
4. S a i n t Augustine of Hippo. 
I t has been s a i d t h a t a l l the philosophy' of the p a s t 
two thousand y e a r s i s but footnotes to P l a t o . I t might be 
s a i d w i t h a s i m i l a r element of t r u t h t h a t a l l the theology, 
of i m m u t a b i l i t y of the past f i f t e e n hundred y e a r s i s but 
footnotes t o Augustine. P e r h a p s . i t was the r e s t l e s s n e s s 
of h i s youth, perhaps the i n c e s s a n t and wearisome contentions 
whioh enveloped h i s l a t e r l i f e , perhaps i t was h i s n a t u r a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l bent, perhaps h i s r e a o t i o n to the overthrow of 
the e t e r n a l o i t y , or perhaps i t was a l l these t h i n g s , t h a t 
clothed the conception of God's ohangelessness w i t h suoh 
r i c h n e s s f o r Augustine that never f o r long could he exclude 
i t from h i s thoughts. 
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The i n t e l l e c t u a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l conception by 
which Augustine"predominantly t h i n k s of God i s as 
the Being that i s not s u b j e c t to change: 'He t r u l y I s , 
because he i s unchangeable' (Be Nat.Boni X I X ) * I t 
was mainly the i n t e l l e c t u a l rieoessity he f e l t f o r 
Something_.Unchangeable as the b a s i s add background 
of things changeable, "that l e d him, more than anytning 
e l s e , out of Haniohaeism i n t o C h r i s t i a n i t y , and i n 
h i s aearoh f o r God he u s u a l l y r e p r e s e n t s h i s mind as 
p a s s i n g ever upwards, through the grades of things 
s u b j e c t t o change, t i l l i t a r r i v e s a t t h a t Being ' i n Whom 
there i s no variation 1..... 
(Bom.Cuthbert B u t l e r , "Western % - s t i o i s m " PartX,i.(«^ 
Wfr of .B.T.C..,Art.: Bieu, s a nature d'apres l e s 
Peres,.T.r7,|?<Lrs. /, IIQJ). • 
Augustine did not approach immutability as a s u b j e c t f o r 
s p e c u l a t i o n , but r a t h e r i t i s i n t r i n s i o to the thought which 
he brought to bear on any s u b j e c t . Because of the almost 
boundless range of h i s i n t e l l e c t ' , h i s w r i t i n g s provide a more 
comprehensive treatment of d i v i n e i mmutability, i t s meaning, 
i m p l i c a t i o n s , v a l i d i t y and worth, than has been provided by 
any one man before of s i n c e . H is knowledge of the S c r i p -
t u r e s and the e a r l i e r F a t h e r s ensured t h a t nothing of the 
m a t e r i a l they provided was f o r e i g n to him. And h i s study; 
before h i s conversion, of P l o t i n u s f u r n i s h e d him with an 
i n s i g h t i n t o the P l a t o n i o t r a d i t i o n * Moreover the s c h o o l 
of P l o t i n u s gave s e r i o u s study to the w r i t i n g s of A r i s t o t l e 
( o f . A.E.Taylor, 'Platonism' p. 16).; thus though Augustine 
was amongst the most I n s t r u m e n t a l of those who e s t a b l i s h e d 
Platonism i n a p o s i t i o n of i n f l u e n c e i n r e s p e c t to western 
orthodox theology, he was hot ignorant of A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m . 
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<* 
Augustine's b e l i e f s about imm u t a b i l i t y were not givtfSL 
i n a' systematic arrangement , as was to be the Schoolmen's 
manner. But there i s l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y I n c o l l e c t i n g t l ^ 
teaohing ^ and s e t t i n g i t i n an o r d e r l y frame. This wiX^i 
probably provide the d e a r e s t p r e s e n t a t i o n of his thoughi*. 
i . The Nature of Change. 
His conception of change bears s i m i l a r i t y t o that- of 
Novatian, and to the A r i s t o t e l i a n arguments which Aquinas 
was t o employ: the a b i l i t y to change i m p l i e s i n an objeot t h e 
p o t e n t i a l i t y of being other than i t now i s : 
F o r t h a t which i s changed does not r e t a i n i t s own 
being; and th a t which can be ohanged, although i t 
be not a o t u a l l y changed, i s a b l e not to be t h a t 
which i t had been; and hence t h a t which not only 
i s not changed , but a l s o cannot a t a l l be ohanged, 
alone f a l l s most t r u l y , without d i f f i c u l t y or 
h e s i t a t i o n , under the category of Being. Jo Tig i n 
(Augustine, 2e Trin.~J72 ; o f . Be F i d et Sym.IV.7; i n 
Joann. XXXVIII 1 0 ) . 
A l l change i s then a departure from r e a l being,.from the 
e t e r n a l ' i s 1 . 'Esse e s t immutabilie esse* seems to express 
the Augustinian view. But the remote supreme immutable 
being of A r i s t o t l e i s given no p l a c e . 
i i . I m mutability i n r e l a t i o n t o Time and E t e r n i t y . 
I m mutability i s often synonymous w i t h e t e r n i t y i n 
Augustine's thought. The f a c t that a l l created things had 
a beginning, and cannot t h e r e f o r ^ b e i n the f u l l e s t sense 
e t e r n a l , a t onoe c l a s s i f i e s them a s mutable: 
. . . . a l l t h ings that he has made, because he has made 
them out of nothing, are changeable. (Be Nat Boni I 1, 
p. 351) 
-54-
Likewise a l l t h a t has an end i s n e i t h e r e t e r n a l nor 
immutable, but s u b j e c t t o c o r r u p t i o n . The emphasis of some 
of the Greek F a t h e r s on <*<£>Q<^ £'<* i s i n c r e a s e d by Augustine. 
C r e a t i o n i s the beginning of a mutable existenoe, of which 
time, the symbol of change, i s ^extension and corrupt i o n i t s 
end.. They are the c o n t r a r i e s of immutability: 
F o r immortality i s t r u e i m m o r t a l i t y i n His case whose 
nature admits no ohange. That i s a l s o t r u e e t e r n i t y 
by which God i s unchangeable, without beginning, 
without end:; consequently a l s o i n c o r r u p t i b l e . -• 
. (Be T r i n . XV 5).pAnd the t r u t h 1 He s a y s , ' s h a l l make 
you f r e e 1 . From, what-, except from death, from . 
corruption,' from dhangeableness? Sinoe t r u t h remains 
immortal, inoorrupt, unchangeable.. But true immor-
t a l i t y , t r u e i n c o r r u p t i b i l i t y , t r u e unehangeableness, 
i s e t e r n i t y i t s e l f . ( I b . I V 18 ) . 
. God as having no beginning and being e t e r n a l l y i n c o r r u p t -
i b l e , i s t h e r e f o r e not s u b j e c t to time and c h a n g e ^ 
...... f o r t h e r e was no time before time began, and 
t h e r e f o r e i t did not happen to God i n time t h a t he 
should be Lord,since he was Lord Of the very times 
themselves-, which a s s u r e d l y did not begin i n time. 
( I b . V. 16 ) . 
Even God's knowledge of c r e a t i o n , i t s changes and i t s time-
bound nature does not i n v o l v e h i s knowing i n a time sequence: 
He does not pass from t h i s to t h a t by t r a n s i t i o n 
of thought, but beholds a l l ' t h i n g s w i t h absolute 
unohangeablehess; so t h a t of those t h i n g s t h a t 
emerge i n time, the f u t u r e , indeed, are not y e t , 
. and the present ar e now, and the past no longer a r e ; 
but a l l of these a r e by him comprehended i n h i s 
s t a b l e and e t e r n a l presenoe. Neither does he see 
i n one f a s h i o n by t h e e y e , ' i n another by the mind, 
f o r he i s not composed[of mind and body; nor does 
h i s ' present knowledge d i f f e r from t h a t which i t 
ever was or s h a l l be, f o r those v a r i a t i o n s of time, 
p a s t , present, and f u t u r e , though they a l t e r our kaov.le 
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knowledge, do not a f f e o t . h i s , 'with whom i s no 
v a r i a b l e n e s s , n e i t h e r shadow of tur n i n g * ( J a s . 1 . 1 7 ) . 
(Be C i v . Dei X I 21 of . I b . X I I 17) . 
i 
i i i . P recautions to be taken i n Btudying God's Hature. 
Aware of the o b s c u r i t i e s which d i s c u s s i o n s of i n f i n t e 
being so e a s i l y a c h ieve, Augustine refused on the one hand 
to consider as manifest what was incomprehensible, and on 
the other t o admit t h a t , because human comprehension i s 
f i n i t e , t h e r e f o r e any attempt to understand the being of 
God i s f r u i t l e s s : 
For- t h i n g s incomprehensible must so be i n v e s t i g a t e d , 
as that no one may th i n k he has found nothing, when 
he has been a b l e to f i n d how incomprehensible t h a t 
i s which he was seeking. (De T r i n . XT. 2<£ ) . 
The human mind has no b e t t e r occupation than to t r y , i n the 
l i g h t of f a i t h , to diaoern the nature of God. (of.lb.XV.27). 
i v . That God i s immutable.• 
Taking t h i s very s u b j e c t of the l i m i t a t i o n s of human 
comprehension and p e r f e c t i o n , together w i t h human awareness 
Of f i n i t u d e and change, Augustine argues f o r the I n f i n i t u d e 
of God: 
F o r as wisdom i s so c a l l e d from the being wise, and 
knowledge from knowing; so from being ( e s s e ) comes 
th a t which we o a l l essenoe. And who i s there t h a t 
is,more than he who s a i d t o h i s s e r v a n t Moses, 
"*T.am th a t I am r; and, 'Thus s h a l t thou say unto the 
c h i l d r e n of I s r a e l , he who i s hath sent me unto you 1? 
(Sx. I l l 1 4 ) . But other t h i n g s that a r e o a l l e d 
essences or Bubstanoes admit of aooidents, whereby 
a ohange, whether great or s m a l l , i s produced i n 
them. But there oan be no a c c i d e n t of t h i s kind 
i n respeot t o God; and t h e r e f o r e he who i s God i s 
the only unchangeable substanoe or essenoe, to 
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fflhom c e r t a i n l y being its&eV, whence obmea the 
name of essence, most e s p e c i a l l y and most t r u l y belongs. 
(Be T r i n . V 2.) 
There i s , a c c o r d i n g l y , a good Which i s alone simple, 
and t h e r e f o r e alone unchangeable, and t h i s i s God. 
(Be C i v . Dei 1C1 10 . j " 
Wherefore there Would be ho changeable goods, u n l e s s 
there were the unchangeable good. (Be T r l n . Y I I I 3 ) . 
These arguments from the p a r t i a l goods to a necessary p e r f e c t 
good, and the argument (quoted below, p. £a , Be-#e^b-.Bom. 
LXVtt 3 
Serm.jaayta^) f o r an unchangeable Form of a l l Forms, have 
a strong P l a t o n i o f l a v o u r . But there i s something nearer . 
to A r i s t o t l e i n : 
Yet n e i t h e r would t h i s be the f i r s t cause, f o r t h a t 
doubtless was.: a higher cause s t i l l , and l a y i n the 
unchangeable wisdom i t s e l f . (Be T r i n . I l l 3 ) . 
N.£jGod, then, i s immutable i n substance ( o f . a l s o Be T r i n . I 1; I I 
1 0 ) , and i s not s u b j e c t to a c c i d e n t ( o f . a l s o Ib.V 16,7 4) • 
Apparent change i n God i s due t o change i n the observer, not 
i n the Observed. 
Consequently, when GOd i s said, to change h i s w i l l , a s . 
when, e. g., he becomes angry with those to whom he was 
g e n t l e , i t i s r a t h e r they than he who a r e changed, and 
they f i n d him changed i n so f a r as t h e i r experience of 
s u f f e r i n g a t h i s hand i s new, as the sun i s phanged to 
i n j u r e d eyes, and becomes as i t were f i e r c e from being 
mild, and h u r t f u l from being d e l i g h t f u l , though i n 
i t s e l f i t remains the same as i t was. (Be Civ.Dei X X I I 
2 ) . • 
Not only i s God unchanging, but he i s incapable of change': 
nothing happens a c c i d e n t a l l y to God i n time, beoause 
he i s inoapable of ohange. (Be T r i n . V. 1 6 ) . 
God alone i s immutable being ( of.Ib.V 2, supra p. £z). 
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And consequently i f he alone i s immutable, a l l 
t h i n g s t h a t he has made, "because he h&g made them . 
' oat of nothing, are changeable. (De nat boni I I ) . 
The Being of God, s i n c e i t immutably i s , can have no 
contrary : 
I t r u s t t h a t i t i s now made patent to s p i r i t u a l 
minds $hat there cannot p o s s i b l y e x i s t any nature 
contrary to God. For i f he-iss - and t h i s i s a 
word t h a t can be spoken w i t h p r o p r i e t y only of 
God ( f o r t h a t which t r u l y i s remains unchangeably; 
inasmuch as t h a t which i s cEang'ed has been something 
which now i t i s not, and s h a l l be,something which- as 
y e t i t i s n o t ) , - i t f o l l o w s that God has nothing 
contrary to h i m s e l f . (De F i d . e t Sym. I T 7 ) . 
Never does Augustine t i r e of s t r e s s i n g the p r a c t i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of d i v i n e immutability f o r human l i f e . , Nor 
does he l o s e s i g h t of the God who i s immutably a c t i v e . But 
more f r e q u e n t l y he chooses to emphasise the r e s t f u l n e s s of 
d i v i n e immutability. I t i s worthy of note t h a t h i s confidence 
i n God's changelessness i s the foundation of his^whole 
t ^ o l o g y of moral law. • 
v. Immutability and the Holy T r i n i t y . 
The immutable is_ which c o n s t i t u t e s the p e r f e c t being of 
God i s not to be a s c r i b e d unequally to the Persons of the 
T r i n i t y : . 
I n God himself,, t h e r e f o r e , when the equal Son, or 
the Holy j S p i r i t equal to the F a t h e r and the Son, i s 
jo i n e d to* the equal Father, God does not become 
g r e a t e r than each of them s e v e r a l l y ; because t h a t 
p e r f e c t n e s s cannot i n c r e a s e . But whether i t be the 
Father, or the Son,.or the Holy S p i r i t he i s p e r f e c t , 
and God the Father the Son and the Holy S p i r i t i s 
p e r f e c t . (De T r i n . VI 8; c f . I b . I I 17).-
The r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Persons i s immutable: 
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Bat the only-begotten Son of God, what he i s , 
t h i s cannot be changed; he cannot be changed i n t o 
. anything e l s e , cannot be diminished, what he was 
he cannot bat be, he cannot bat be equal to the 
Father. (Serm.XC. 2, p. 529). 
The immutability of the Word: 
For he ^he/FWord}is a c e r t a i n Form, a Form not 
tsi» formed? bat the Form of a l l things Stormed; a 
form unchangeable, without f a i l u r e , without decay, 
without time, without p l a c e . . . e t c . . . (Serm.LXVII 
• 3, p. 459) 
Augustine has missed nothing put forward by h i s pre-
decessors , and has consolidated, co-ordinated and 
developed t h e i r conception of immutability. L i k e them 
he found i t a u s e f u l weapon ready to h i s hand i n 
combatting erroneous conceptions of God". He s t r u c k with 
i t a g a i n s t the two p h i l o s o p h i e s of whose f a l s i t y he, who 
had once numbered h i m s e l f among t h e i r ranks, was the most 
convinced - Ueo-Platonism and Manich£eism: 
They |the ITeo-PlatonistsJ saw indeed the f i x e d , 
l a s t i n g and i n d e f e c t i b l e t r u t h , where abide a l l 
the forms of a l l c r e a t u r e l y t h i n g s ; but they saw 
i t from a f a r ; they saw, but t h e i r camping ground, 
l a y i n e r r o r ; and so to t h a t mighty, i n e f f a b l e , 
and b l i s s f u l p o s s e s s i o n they found not the way. , 
(Serm.CXLI)«, * 
The Manichaeans would not d r i v e l , or r a t h e r , rave 
i n such a s t y l e as t h i s , i f they b e l i e v e d the 
nature of God to be, as i t i s , unchangeable, aril 
a b s o l u t e l y i n c o r r u p t i b l e , and s u b j e c t to no i n j u r y ; 
and i f , moreover, they h e l d i n C h r i s t i a n s o b r i e t y , 
that the s o u l which has shown i t s e l f , capable of 
being a l t e r e d f o r the worse by i t s own w i l l , and 
of being corrupted by s i n , and so, of being deprived 
of the l i g h t of e t e r n a l t r u t h , t hat t h i s s o u l , I 
say, i s not p a r t of God, nor of the same nature as 
God,, but i s c r e a t e d by nim, and i s f a r d i f f e r e n t 
from i t s Creator. (Be C i v . L e i X I 2 2 ) . 
I f t h e r e i s one point on whioh Augustine 'did not do f u l l 
j u s t i o e t o previous C h r i s t i a n s c h o l a r s h i p , i t i s t h a t h i s 
i n s i s t e n c e upon d i v i n e i m m u t a b i l i t y a s an immutable 
a o t l y i t y i s not pronounced• The conception was not f o r e i g n 
to. him, nor unwelcome., f o r i t has a plaoe i n h i s thought, 
(e.g. God i s "ever working, ever a t r e s t 1 * Conf . I 4 ) ; but 
never does he emulate the enthusiasm and prepocupation of • 
S.Athanasius. I f , a s Quick suggests, S c h o l a s t i c i s m i s s t a r v e d 
of the conception of d i v i n e * ^ t i v i t y , the oause probably l i e s 
withvS•Augustine and the i n f l u e n c e he exerted oh mediaeval . 
theology. 
This p a r t i a l omission may be i n t e n t i o n a l , s i n c e the 
Athanasian treatment, though most p r o f i t a b l e , seemed to 
l e a d to c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s and c o n t r a d i c t ions *» though 
Augustine was not a f r a i d of d i f f i c u l t i e s * I t i s best 
accounted f o r by a l l o w i n g that Augustine was most keenly 
i n t e r e s t e d , even preoccupied, i n developing another aspeot 
of the s u b j e c t , a development that was h i s g r e a t e s t 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the theology of d i v i n e i m m u t a b i l i t y , and 
one of h i s g r e a t e s t and most i n f l u e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o 
C h r i s t i a n l i f e and thought s i n c e h i s day. Already the F a t h e r s 
have been observed employing i m m u t a b i l i t y a s an i n c e n t i v e 
to the p u r s u i t of the s p i r i t u a l l i f e , w i t h argument analagous 
to C h r i s t ' s teaohing on t r e a s u r e i n heaven. Sbes* they were 
soratphing the ground, Augustine dug deep foundations and 
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b u i l t a g l o r i o u s s h r i n e . Not i n the immutable di v i n e > 
a c t i v i t y , but i n the immutable di v i n e r e s t f u l n e s s and 
peace he discovered hie g r e a t e s t r i o h e s . He b e l i e v e d t h a t 
the end f o r which humanity yearns i n i t s c e a s e l e s s questing 
i s peace, and that the true end of the good l i f e i s the 
p e r f e c t peaoe which i s found only i n the V i s i o n of the. 
immutable God* 
The s u b j e c t i s . such that i f we are to understand S* 
Augustine's accomplishment, and to comprehend theologioa'l 
movements of l a t e r generations i t must be given a f u l l e r 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n * 
I m mutability, the Good L i f e and the V i s i o n of 
God i n the thought of 3•Augustine* 
Any observer of man and h i s mind i s bound to n o t i c e 
the r e s t l e s s n e s s o f humanity, i t s p e r p e t u a l d e s i r e to a t t a i n 
whatever i t c o n s i d e r s w i l l y i e l d s a t i s f a c t i o n ; the repeated 
disappointments, the continued searoh* Augustine's w r i t i n g s 
witness to h i s shrewd observation of h i s f e l l o w s , and h i s 
"Confessions'? shew the keenness w i t h whioh he analysed h i s 
own mindr Consequently he was abundantly aware of man's 
hunger f o r whatever i t may be t h a t can bring contentment 
and r e p l e t i o n to the human so u l * l i s . own experience taught 
him both where i t could be found, and where i t could not* 
The m a t e r i a l and s u b - r a t i o n a l world could not supply i t . 
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Nor could i t be found i n the human mind and s o u l : -
I seek my God i n every c o r p o r a l nature, t e r r e s t r i a l 
or c e l e s t i a l , and f i n d him not: I seek hlB substanoe 
i n my own s o u l , and I f i n d i t not* ( I n P s s . X L I I 7 ar 
. Vulg. X L I 8, p.134). 
A l l t h a t p e r t a i n s to man b e t r a y s him by i t s falsehood, 
t r a n s ^ i e n c e and decay: 
I t seeks to f i n d a t r u t h not subjeot to change, a 
substance not oapable of f a i l i n g . { I b i d . 6 % Vulg. 
v.7. See Appendix I I I ) . 
A' ... The p a r t of our mind whioh deals w i t h temporal things. 
i s the lower p a r t ( o f . Be T r i n . X I I 3 ) ; the higher i s l e d by 
i t s reason t o seek ever upwards i n the hope of f i n d i n g that 
which w i l l appease i t s c r a v i n g : 
Then when they go on they look i n t o the nature of l i f e 
i t s e l f , i f they f i n d i t mere n u t r a t i v e l i f e , without 
s e n s i b i l i t y , such a s that of p l a n t s , they c o n s i d e r i t 
i n f e r i o r to s e n t i e n t l i f e , such as that of c a t t l e , and 
above t h i s again they plaoe i n t e l l i g e n t l i f e , such as 
that of men. And p e r c e i v i n g that even t h i s i s subj eot 
to change, they are compelled to plaoe above i t , a g a i n j 
that unchangeable l i f e , which i s not at one time f o o l i s h 
a t another time w i s e , 'but on the c o n t r a r y i s wisdom 
i t s e l f . For a wise i n t e l l i g e n c e , t h at i s , one th$t has 
a t t a i n e d to wisdom, was, previous to i t s a t t a i n i n g 
wisdom, unwise. But wisdom i t s e l f never was unwise, 
and never can become s o . And i f men never caught s i g h t 
of t h i s wisdom., they could never w i t h e n t i r e confidence 
p r e f e r a l i f e which i s unchangeably wise to one t h a t 
i s subjeot to ohahge. T h i s w i l l be evident i f we 
consider that the very r u l e of t r u t h by whioh they 
a f f i r m the unchangeable l i f e to be the more e x o e l l e n t , 
i s i t s e l f unchangeable: and they cannot f i n d such a 
r u l e , except by going beyond t h e i r own nature; f o r they 
f i n d nothing i n themselves that i s not subjeot to 
ohange. Now no one i s so egregiously s i l l y as to a s k 
'How do you know that a l i f e of unchangeable wisdom i s 
p r e f e r a b l e to one. of change? 1 For that v e r y t r u t h about 
whioh he a s k s , how I know i t ? i s unchangeably f i x e d i n 
the minds of a l l men, and presented to t h e i r common 
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contemplation* And the man who does not see i t i s 
l i k e a blind man i n the sun, whom i t p r o f i t s nothing 
that the splendour of i t s l i g h t , so clear and so near, 
i s poured i n t o his very eye-balls* (De Doot*Christ*I 8-9) 
4-—So not? the material world, nor the animal world, nor 
the r a t i o n a l world, nor anything that i s i n man, oan supply 
man with that which he ever seeks t o achieve. Having 
exhausted oreation -
therefore i t follows that i n no way oan l i f e be t r u l y 
blessed unless i t i s eternal* (De TrinVXIII 8) 
X And eternal being i s to Augustine the only r e a l being, 
the being that has no ohange, and which he believed to exist 
only i n God* I t i s God, and God alone, that man seeks: 
Let us, then, now seek the T r i n i t y whioh i s God, i n the 
things themselves that are eternal, ihoorporeal, and 
unchangeable; i n the perfect contemplation of which a 
blessed l i f e i s promised us, whioh cannot be other 
than eternal* ( l b . XV 4)*; 
A The end of a l l l i f e , and manrs only complete s a t i s f a c t i o n 
i s the Vision of God; 
But when the sight s h a l l have come whioh i s promised 
anew to us face to face, we s h a l l see t h i s not only 
inoorporeal but also absolutely i n d i v i s i b l e and t r u l y 
unchangeable T r i n i t y f a r more c l e a r l y and c e r t a i n l y 
than we now see i t s image whioh we ourselves are* (lb.XV 
23) • 
A T i t l a s t the soul's journey i s done. Not only has i t 
found the unchangeable T r i n i t y , the eternal redeemer, but 
i n place of i t s restless pursuit i t assumes some part of 
the divine repose: 
-63-
0 true p i e t y ; thy God endureth, fear not; he doth 
not perish, and through him, thou too dost not 
perish. (Serm.LXXIV 3, p.*475) • 
So the soul finds i t s fulness and i t s peace. No word 
was sweeter to the ear of SoAugustine than 'peace'; and who 
i s to c r i t i c i s e suoh a judgment? The Vision of God meant. 
blessed peace, and to win that priceless reward was worth 
s a c r i f i c i n g everything* 
The end or supreme good of t h i s c i t y £of God} i s 
ei-ther-peaoe-in«-teTnal^l±f-e^-OT~'e'teTna-l ITfe i n ' 
peace* For peace i s a good so great, that even i n 
t h i s earthly and mortal l i f e there i s no word we. 
hear with suoh pleasure, nothing we desire with 
such zest, or f i n d to be more thoroughly g r a t i f y i n g * 
(De Civ. Dei XIX 11; of. Ib.XIX 20). 
i 
Nothing oould be more sublime, nothing more severely 
p r a c t i o a l than t h i s aspeot of Augustine's thought. I t 
provides the map of l i f e which he lays before his disciples 
of a l l ages. A l l the vioissitudes of the journey through 
l i f e are r e a d i l y discounted by the soul that travels the 
road to the B e a t i f i c Vision, whioh is. the consummation of 
a l l man's longings, and which provides i t s . supreme 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the eternal peace, of the 
immutable God. 
For now thou a r t not without somewhat t o say to t h y s e l f 
i n answer to those who say,'Where i s thy God?* I hare 
now had the perception of something that i s 
unchangeable. ( I n Pss.XLII 10 ~ Vulg.XII); 
x-— Therein l i e s the whole purpose of the divine plan, the 
work of redemption, and the existence of man: 
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For thou has formed us f o r t h y s e l f , and our hearts 
are restless t i l l they f i n d r e s t i n Thee. (Conf.I l , p * l ) 
Augustine has shown not only the inoentive t o , and 
the d i r e c t i o n o f , the good l i f e , but has made i t the 
foundation of his teaohing on the contemplative l i f e * He 
i s the pioneer of Western mystioism; and the influence whioh 
he has thus exerted i s incalculable• The mediaeval mystical 
theologians, the counter-reformation doctors and d i r e c t o r s , 
and a l l who have learned from them, are i n deep debt to S* 
Augustine* He himself owed not a l i t t l e to the Greek Fathers, 
and to Greek philosophers, but he gave f a r moire than he 
received 1* Central i n his thought i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of the 
i 
f u l l significance of divine immutability. From him we learn 
not -only the theological .importance and ramifications of 
the conception, but i t s value i n providing l i f e w i t h a 
purpose, and as a p r a c t i c a l i n s p i r a t i o n to Christian 
devotion - to holy l i v i n g and holy dying* 
5* The Council of Chaloedon 
I n the Chaloedonian-documents the seal i s set on muoh 
that tjie Fathers had taught about, immutability, especially 
about the. Son* 
The "Definition"' asserts that the One Christ i s one 
Per so n acknowledged i n two d i s t i n c t and r e a l natures., 
t 
unoonfuaedly, t unchangeable, i n d i v i s i b l y , inseparably , 
(Def*Fid. apud Co.no*Chalo. IV).. / 
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i I t also reveals the Ghuroh's conception of her own 
nature as d i v i n e , and so immutable, so that her doctrine 
oan be described as 
unchangeable from the f i r s t ( otvt^^^ << £ * \ e v * °* )# 
( I b i d . I I I ) . 
Leo i n his "Tome* explains that the Redemption came 
about because God had willed 1 that man should have "the 
i 
dowry of immortality", and, despite the F a l l , that had to 
be accomplished, beoause God i s immutable (inoommutabilis), 
and his w i l l cannot alter.(Tome I I I ) . 
S.Cyril, who c l e a r l y shows the influence of Athanasius, 
says.,, i n discussing the two Natures i n C h r i s t , that even at 
the Inoarnation the Son remained unchanged!: 
But since God the Word -who came down from above and 
from heaven 'emptied himself, taking servant's form', 
and was called- 'Son of Man', s t i l l remaining what he' 
was, that i s , God - f o r he i s immutable and unalterable 
by Nature, ( i t y t f r r o s /"V0 |^ot'- <&v<*V^*i't«iT"os ^U&«V t^-riV), 
( C y r i l , Ad Joan)• 
4—-And there i s a sim i l a r passage i n the-"Third Epistle to 
Neatoriue": 
And we do not say either that the f l e s h was changed 
into the Nature of Godhead, or indeed that the in e f f a b l e 
nature of God .the Word was perverted i n t o that of f l e s h , 
f o r he i s immutable and unalterable («yfe.Trr«* yty 4 4-nt 
K<*i civ-*Woi'wrsj -tru VTt XSs \ f ever abiding t he same, 
according to the Scriptures* 
• «In neither case does C y r i l make any r e a l attempt to 
explain the apparent contradiction incurred i n what he has 
said. He takes us no f u r t h e r than Athaiasiue; indeed the 
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passage from whioh the second quotation i s taken was 
probably w r i t t e n with a f a i r l y exact reoolleotion of 
D 
Athariasius's "De Inoarnatione" XVII i n mind* 
B* The Sohoolmen» 
1* The- Scholastic.. Background* 
Plato, A r i s t o t l e and Augustine were the three .chief 
influences from the* past i n the mediaeval schools, and, 
much as t h e i r theologies and philosophies may d i f f e r 
otherwise, immutability plays a dominant part i n the 
thought of each* I t was inevitable that .a si m i l a r emphasis 
should characterize mediaeval thought* Saint Augustine was 
the i n i t i a l influence and secured a precedence whioh was to 
be r i v a l l e d , but, probably,, never taken from him* I t was 
largely through the widespread and intimate knowledge of 
Augustine's works w i t h t h e i r Platonic flavour that Plato 
was made a subject of reverent study* The stress on 
immutability and transoendent sovereignty thus provided 
p a r t l y accounted f o r , and was p a r t l y i n t e n s i f i e d by, the 
system of feudal sovereignty which governed the social l i f e 
of the age, and therefore the mental climate of the age* 
Thus i t i s not surprising to f i n d the Fourth Lateran Council 
(1215), provoked by the Albigemsian heresy w i t h i t s assertion 
that there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the God of the Old 
Testament and the' God of the New Testament,, placing 
"InoommutabiliB" i n the l i s t of divine a t t r i b u t e s at the 
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beginning of i t s declaration of f a i t h : 
F i r m i t e r credimus et s i m p l i e i t e r confitemur, quod UQUS solus est verus Deus, aeternus, immenSus et 
inooramutabilis, incomprehensibilis, omnipotens et 
i n e f f a b i l i s , Pater, et F i l i u s et Spiritus sanctus... 
(Ex I , o . l (IV Lat.Gaa.l-) ) • 
When, also, at the beginning of the Thirteenth Century, 
a new and dynamic influenoe was introduced i n t o western 
Christendom w i t h the appearanoe of the Latin translations 
of the metaphysical works of A r i s t o t l e , the concentration 
on the divine immutability received f u r t h e r reinforcement, 
and accordingly the documents of the period show the 
af f i r m a t i o n of 1215 repeated: 
... unicum Ileum, omnipotentem, aeternum et i n v i s i b i l e m 
et inoommutabilem. (Confessio f i d e i Michaelis Paleologi 
i p s i a .Clements IV, 1267. Denzinger 385) • 
... eoclesia ... f i r m i t e r o r e d i t . . . unum verum Deum 
omnipotentem, inoommutabilem/ et aeternum.•• 
(Ex Deoreto pro J a c o b i t i s , sive Bulla Eugenii IV 
"(Oantate Domino" 1441. Denzinger 598) • 
Dr.Quick has contended that i n oonsequenoe of these 
influences the balanoe which had been preserved between 
Hebraism and Hellenism i n Christian thought up "to the time 
of Augustine-was then l o s t , and that an unbalanced, too* 
Hellenic Christian theology became prevalent.. He maintains 
that the theologioal systems, and that of Aquinas i s mentioned 
as an example, created a cleavage between, on the one hand, 
"a conception of God not' only as impassive but as inactive", 
and who "because his nature i s ohangelessly perfeot, i s 
conceived as s t a t i c " (Quick,."Gospel of Divine Action", 
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Ch.IV, p.94); and, on the other, the s o t e r i o l o g i o a l 
theology of the age, based on the b e l i e f i n God incarnate 
and aotive i n a changing world*} 
^*The general r e s u l t was an anomaly i n the mediaeval 
thought of the -Incarnation* On the one hand the 
emphatic a f f i r m a t i o n that Jesus Christ was personally 
one with the changeless, impassible God led to a 
v i r t u a l denial of His human personality and t o 
conclusions which are manifestly inconsistent with 
. the f a c t of his sufferings as the gospel records them..• 
The idea of the divine act i n Jesus, so.absolutely 
central i n the. New Testament ,: seems to play. no. part 
i n the systematic theology of the time (Ib.p*96) • 
Clearly the t r i p l e influence of Augustine, Plato and 
A r i s t o t l e was responsible f o r the form taken by mediaeval 
thought, but i t i s debatable that the consequences were so 
harmful as Dr*Quiofc suggests* The problem of the immutable 
God who was incarnate was not new: i t i s indigenous to 
Christian theology* As has been, seen, the Fathers had long 
known and laboured with i t * At worst the Schoolmen may 
occasionally have l e t metaphysics overshadow t h e i r theology 
i n a way that threw up the paradox of the Incarnation i n a 
harsh l i g h t ; but there i s scarcely ground for maintaining 
that they conceived of the Godhead as immutable and 
therefore " s t a t i c " and " i n a c t i v e " . Aquinas, i n l i n e w i t h 
the Fathers and the Scriptures, conceived the unchangeableness 
of God as a kind of unohanging a c t i v i t y ; • not i n terms of the 
s t e r i l e , uncaring transcendenoe of Hellenic thought* The 
existenoe of God i s "aotus purus", an a c t i v i t y devoid of 
p o t e n t i a l i t y * Whether suoh a contention i s r a t i o n a l l y ' 
conceivable, or whether i t i s a contradiction i n terms, 
must be considered i n the succeeding examination of 
Aquinas.*8 philosophy; the important point f o r the present 
i s that Aquinas was s a t i s f i e d i n his own mind that his 
conception of God did not sunder the natures of Christ, 
nor banish the creation from the knowledge and care of i t s 
Creator* .Saint Bo nave n t u r j , even more notioeably than,. 
Aquinas, was concerned t o demonstrate the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the Godhead, the incarnate Son, and. the. world of 
sense and change* 
Nor i s i t s t r i c t l y accurate to ; assert that the 
mediaeval s a t i s f a c t i o n theories of the atonement were 
divorced from the idea of God as immutable,, and "wholly 
depend on the idea that Jesus Christ as the perfect man 
endured the f u l l penalty of human sins* and s a t i s f i e d the 
claims of God's j u s t i c e * " (lb.p.97). Saint Arts elm, the 
prime expositor of the s a t i s f a c t i o n theory-t writes rather 
of s a t i s f y i n g the claims of "God^s honour",, than of his 
j u s t i c e , and contends that the very reason why God's 
honour must be s a t i s f i e d i s because i t i s immutable: 
We should rather understand that he does t h i s from 
the necessity of preserving his honour, whioh 
neoessity i s obviously nothing else than the 
immutability of his honour (noh est a l i u d quam 
immutabilitas honestatis ejus)* (Anselm, "Cur 
Deus Homo?" I I 5 ) • 
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^——.Anselm does not base his theory only on the passible 
d i v i n g humanity, but also, i f less conspicuously, on the 
immutable d i v i n i t y . 
She influenoe of Greek conceptions of God le d , i n 
the middle ages, to an intense study of the transoendent, 
eternal and immutable q u a l i t i e s of divine existe-noe; but 
i t was not an exclusive study. Possibly i t was excessive 
th e o l o g i c a l l y , -but the Schoolmen were not theologians 
8imply; they were also philosophers. 
With'Augustine the age of great Christian explorers 
closed. Theological investigation was less notably 
inspired by the need to vindicate the f a i t h * to f l o u t 
sohismatios and to wrestle f o r souls. The Fathers were as 
hewer8 of stone, while the Sohoolmen were as ar c h i t e c t s . 
Christian philosophy and theology were now studied more 
f o r t h e i r own sake. Whereas the great treatises of the 
FatherB were f o r the most part apologetio or expository, 
the crowning treatises of the Schoolmen were theological 
syntheses and academic commentaries, and t h e i r , theses can 
mostly be found again and again already e x i s t i n g i n the 
w r i t i n g s of the Fathers. But the great mediaeval 
contribution to the development of the subject i s the 
thorough working out of the precise implications, and the 
establishment of them i n the f i e l d of exact thought and 
d i a l e o t i o . Theologically they supplied a much clearer 
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d e f i n i t i o n and a muoh stronger equipment f o r defence* 
Philosophically the b e l i e f s .were thought out i n r e l a t i o n 
to the profoundest known sohools of thought, and 
expressed i n current terminology* The strength of the 
scholastic corpus of arguments was not i n i t s own day 
tested by any c o n f l i c t on the grand scale, and i n the 
succeeding centuries the post-reformation philosophers 
did not allow the mediaeval thinkers t o meet them as 
v i t a l adversaries^ but condemned or ignored them from 
afar* But i n the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries the 
Schoolmen have been brought i n t o the l i s t s as protagonists 
of Christian philosophy, and the sturdiness w i t h whioh 
they.have been able to repulse a d i v e r s i t y of opponents 
t e s t i f i e s not only to the f a i t h which they upheld, but 
also to the qu a l i t y of the reasoning through whioh they 
expressed i t * The w r i t i n g s of the Fathers o'ould never 
haye won the sueoess i n the arena of modern philosophy 
which scholasticism i s so impressively achieving* . 
I n muoh of t h e i r work they borrowed and stole from 
* 
each other; thus Peter Lombard, reappears frequently i n the 
o 
work of l a t e r writers,; Saint Bernard's "omnia mutat.io 
quaedam mortis i n i t i a t i o est" (S•Bernard j Serm.in Cant.LXXX) 
re i t e r a t e s Augustine, and many wri t e r s a f t e r Bernard did 
no more than r e i t e r a t e him* Seiesors-and-paste was a 
common method of work, and i n consequence the immense 
output of w r i t t e n work i s an inaccurate guide t o the 
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o r e a t i v i t y of the period* But t h i s need be no belittleraent., 
since the purpose of a w r i t e r was often to. cor r e l a t e , to 
expound and to compile compendiums that were ingenious 
and erudite rather than o r i g i n a l * For such labours the 
present age has learned both respect and gratitude. I n 
i t s own f i e l d the o r i g i n a l work of the period i s nevertheless 
considerable, and provides most important material. She 
pr i n c i p a l i n s t i g a t i o n to o r i g i n a l thought was the recovery 
by the west of the metaphysical w r i t i n g s of A r i s t o t l e . She 
new doctrine's found there i m p e r i l l e d orthodoxy, and to 
protect and vindioate i t Saint Albert the Great undertook 
to harmonize the per i p a t e t i c philosophy with the doctrines 
of the 0 Churoh. The work which he began found i t B most able 
labourer i n Albert's p u p i l , Saint Thomas Aquinas. Not only 
did he accomplish the task, but executed i t i n suoh a 
manner as^establishad him as the greatest of a l l the 
Schoolmen. A study of hi s ex-position of immutability, 
and some .consideration of the rather d i f f e r e n t treatment 
given by Saint Bonaventure, w i l l give s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n 
of the mediaeval consolidation of the subject• . 
2j» Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
Appreciation of (the genius of Aquinas mounts as one 
recognises how deeply indebted he was to Augustine and 
A r i s t o t l e , yet how independent he was of both. I f , as i s 
said, Albert instructed his pu p i l to go to Augustine f o r 
his theology, and to A r i s t o t l e f o r his philosophy* then 
the p u p i l did not neglect the au t h o r i t i e s prescribed,' 
though occasionally negleoting the d i s t i n c t i o n * That while 
re-applying both i n a manner essentially, o r i g i n a l he should 
nave discarded so I i T t l e / o u t of Eis treasures tEings new 
and o l d , and the f i n a l achievement was'wholly his own, and 
in every way a wore of the Thirteenth Century* 
- • * - ' . 
For Aquinas immutability had a double claim to 
prominence* Not only, he believed, could i t be r a t i o n a l l y 
proved that God i s immutable; but also what was f o r him the 
most impressive proof of the. exists no e of God was i n 
r e a l i t y a demonstration of the necessary existence of a 
supreme immutable being* The proofs i n the "Summa oontra 
Gentiles" lead us f i r s t to an immutable being., then apply 
the name God* we are not f i r s t introduced to God, and then 
shown that he must be immutable* 
Everything that i s moved i s moved by something else* 
Moreover, i t i s evident to our senses that there are 
objects i n motion, as f o r instance the sun* Therefore 
such an objeot i s moved by something else* That whioh 
moves i t i s i t s e l f also either moved or not moved* i f 
i t be not moved we have reached a point where i t i s 
necessary t o posit an unmoved mover, and t h i s we c a l l 
God. I f , however, i t be moved, then i t s movement must 
be caused by something else whioh moves i t * 
Consequently we must either-proceed to i n f i n i t y or 
posit an unmoved mover; but we cannot proceed to 
i n f i n i t y , therefore we must posit a primal unmoved 
mover* (Sum* oon* Gent* l i b * I»oap^p^g} 
The proof i s , of oourse, A r i s t o t e l i a n * (Since our 
present purpose i s not to test t h e . v a l i d i t y of t h i s as an 
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argument f o r the existence of God there i s no necessity 
to examine the rather lengthy arguments by which Aquinas 
proves what he has assumed here * that every moving thing 
i s moved by another; and what he has asserted here « that 
i t i s not possible t o proceed to i n f i n i t y . ) : 
Before considering the other approach provided by 
.Aquinas, namely.the proof that God must be immutable., i t 
i s desirable to consider ®hat is t o be , understood by motion-
and change - that whioh could not exist i n an immutable 
being. . 
I n every change three factors are involved: (a) two 
extremes, the "terminus a quo" and the "terminus ad quem"; 
(b) a subjeot whioh throughout the occurrence of change 
remains i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f ; (c) a t r a n s i t i o n i n whioh 
the subject ceases to be conditioned by the f i r s t extreme, 
and begins to be conditioned by the seoond (con.Gentolib.il, 
oap.17)* Such an occurrence of change requires that the 
subjeot be d i v i s i b l e . The t r a n s i t i o n from being wholly 
conditioned by one extreme to being wholly conditioned by 
the other involves a transference i n the course of.which the 
subject i s i n part conditioned by one extreme* i n part by 
the other. Consequently i t must be .divisible i n t o parts. 
Aquinas puts forward t h i s argument i n his commentary on 
A r i s t o t l e ' s "Physios" (Phys.lib.VI,cap.iv,lect.5) , and 
points out/the argument applies only-when ohange i s 
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oonsidered i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n sense of l o c a l motion* . . 
I t would not apply to a l l that Plato, and often Augustine 
w i t h him, comprehended i n the application of the terms, 
applying motion to the functions of w i l l and i n t e l l e c t , 
besides simple continuous l o o a l motion* ( I t w i l l be 
1 
necessary to return to t h i s difference i n terminology)* 
To be mutable a subject does not need t o ohange or 
move , but only to.be Gapable, of change - to be i n . a .state, 
of p o t e n t i a l i t y * A man i n Birmingham i s able to t r a v e l t o 
Derby* I f he does he has been the subject of a change* He 
is no longer a man i n Birmingham, but a man who was i n 
Birmingham, but now i s i n Derby* The ohange which while 
he was i n Birmingham was potential' has been made actual* 
But even i f he stays i n Birmingham, he i s s t i l l a mutable 
man, because, he i s i n a state of p o t e n t i a l i t y ; he i s able 
to ohange i n t o a man who was i n Birmingham and now i s i n 
• * 
Derby* I t i s merely that a p o t e n t i a l i t y has not been made 
aotual;. but i t i s none the less r e a l a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r that 
He remains equally mutable whether he-goes to Derby or not* 
The essence of mutability i s p o t e n t i a l i t y * The p o t e n t i a l 
i s that whioh does not yet exist£ but whioh^ as the 
consequence of an aotion by an e f f i c i e n t cause, can oome 
into existence, or a c t u a l i t y * 
(The argument f o r the existence of God already quoted 
(p.73 j i s set out i n terms of p o t e n t i a l i t y and a c t u a l i t y i n 
"De Potentia": 
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A c t u a l i t y , s t r i c t l y speaking i s p r i o r to p o t e n t i a l i t y 
both i n nature ana i n time; although i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
instanoe of the passage from p o t e n t i a l i t y to a c t u a l i t y 
the p o t e n t i a l may be p r i o r i n time, yet since i t i s 
necessary that i t should be brought int o a c t u a l i t y 
through some being which i s already a c t u a l , i t i s also 
neoessary t h a t , s t r i o t l y speaking, the actual should 
be p r i o r t o the po t e n t i a l even i n time* Hence, since 
every body i s i n p o t e n t i a l i t y , as i t s motion makes 
evident, of necessity there must be an immobile eternal 
substance p r i o r to a l l bodies* (De Pot.q*6,a.6*o,trans* 
Patterson^* 
/ C — — The p o t e n t i a l i t y may exist i n the subjeot i t s e l f ( i n 
ipso) , as with the man at Birmingham, or i n something else 
( i n a ltero) which can ef f e c t a change i n the subject, as 
would be the case i f the man were kidnapped i n Birmingham, 
and conveyed t o Derby, as a consequence of the a c t i v i t i e s of 
his kidnappers. (ef*Summa Theologioa I.q.9*a»2.). P o t e n t i a l i t y 
i s the hallmark of muta b i l i t y * 
I t i s w i t h these principles i n mind that Aquinas puts 
forward three arguments to prove that God i s immutable: 
... i t was shown;...' that there i s some f i r s t being, 
whom we c a l l God; and that t h i s f i r s t being must be 
pure act, without the admixture of any p o t e n t i a l i t y , 
f o r the reason t h a t , absolutelyj p o t e n t i a l i t y i s 
posterior t o aot* Now everything which i s i n any Way 
ohanged, i s i n some way i n p o t e n t i a l i t y . Hence i t i s 
evident that i t i s impossible f o r God to be i n any 
way changeable* Secondly, beoause everything whioh i s 
moved, remains as i t was i n p a r t , and passes away i n 
pa r t , as what i s moved from whiteness to blackness, 
remains the same as to substance; thus ieieverything 
which i s moved, there i s some kind of composition to 
be found* But i t has been shown above (q*3*a*7) that 
i n God there i s no composition, f o r he i s altogether 
simple* Hence i t i s manifest that God cannot be moved* 
Thirdly, beoause everything which i s moved aoquired 
something by i t s movement, and attains t o what i t had 
not attained previously. But since God i s i n f i n i t e , 
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comprehending i n himself a l l the plenitude of 
perfection of a l l being, he cannot" aoquire anything 
new, nor extend himself to anything whereto he was 
hot extended previously? Henoe movement i n no way 
belongs to him* (S*T*I*q*9 >a*l*Vol*I,p*92) • 
Unless: one does not admit previous conclusions to 
whioh Aquinas r e f e r s , and on whioh these arguments are 
constructed, these proofs are convincing* But i t now seems 
necessary t o probe f u r t h e r i n t o the matter of ju s t how muoh 
Aquinas i s implying when he says God i s immutable* (That he 
i s without p o t e n t i a l i t y i s clear; but i s one therefore t o 
conclude that a l l a c t i v i t y i s excluded from the Godhead? I n 
the argument from the "Summa oontra Gentiles" a"Lready 
referred t o , Aquinas has equated the term God with the 
i 
A r i s t o t e l i a n term unmoved-mover* Does he,.then, wholly 
r e j e c t the Platonic self-moved mover? From the passage 
immediately foll o w i n g these three arguments from the "Summa 
Theologioa" i t i s clear he does not* He i s there ooncerned, 
on the basis of his three arguments, to refute the 
contention that God i s i n some way mutable, since Augustine 
could say of him, " S p i r i t u s Creator movet se, neo per 
tempus, neo per looum"* (S*T*loc*oit*); Aquinas's argument 
i s that Augustine i s there speaking a f t e r the manner of 
Plato, who said the prime-mover moved i t s e l f : "every 
Operation i s . called motion, i n accordance w i t h whioh even 
to understand (int e l l e g e r e ) to w i l l , and to love, are i n 
a fashion spoken of as motion"/ (Ibid.)«From t h i s i-s-tfe 
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clear that Aquinas, when speaking of God as the unmoved-
mover does not normally cover acts of w i l l , i n t e l l e c t and 
love by the term motion* To him i t seemed de a r that 
motion as applied by A r i s t o t l e , and as applied by Plato 
did not have an i d e n t i c a l application; but i f one bore i n 
mind t h e i r d i f f e r e n t usage, then there was no disagreement 
between the A r i s t o t e l i a n unmoved-mover, and the Platonic 
self-moved prime •mover. 
We should note that Aquinas seeks to show.*., that 
there i s no r e a l disagreement between A r i s t o t l e and 
Plato. The former, he t e l l s us, meant by motion the 
act of that which exists i n p o t e n t i a l i t y as such 
( f n . r e f . t o Con*Ge n t • l i b * I • o a p • 13) , a conception whioh 
applies only to bodies whioh occupy space and are 
d i v i s i b l e . Thus, i n his commentary on the "Physios" 
( l i b . V I I I . c a p . v i . l e c t . l S ) , he observes that Aristotle" 
speaks of the prime mover, as being unmoved 'ab^omni 
exterius mutations' ( f n * ^ ' 1 * 1 "rt Te> ZLvcwrrp<y n6<r*vr 0 -na^r 
Wfor \ucT*/h*Vfi • H e d o e B "this, says St .Thomas., 'not 
intending to exolude the type of motion termed 
operations which i s immanent i n the operator; even as 
i n t e l l e c t i o n i s called motion, and the appetite i s 
said to be moved by the appetible* Motion of t h i s sort 
* is_ not excluded from the prime mover of whioh he t r e a t s * * 
W*j bn the other hand, Plato, we are t o l d , used the term 
'motion* to s i g n i f y any operation, so that mental 
a c t i v i t i e s , such as knowing and opining, would rank 
as forms of motion* Aquinas adds that A r i s t o t l e himself 
has referred to t h i s difference of usage i n the 'De 
Anima*1 I t appears, then, that A r i s t o t l e ' s unmoved 
prime mover i s i d e n t i c a l with Plato's sel£»raoving • 
prime mover* (R.L.Patterson, 'The Conception of God 
i n the philosophy of Aquinas',pp*47-8. of*D.T.G*, 
Art: Dieu, sa nature eelon les Saolastiques,I*lV, 
pars. 1*1190 seqq. f o r a general treatment of the 
Schoolmen's attempts to reooncile and combine Platti) 
and A r i s t o t l e ) • 
I f t h i s represented Aquinas'8 thought on a l l occasions 
the matter would be c l e a r , but unfortunately, i n company 
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with A r i s t o t l e , he at time8 admits q u a l i t a t i v e and 
quantitative change under the head of motion besides 
l o c a l motion i n spaoe* Thus the d i s t i n c t i o n between Plato 
and A r i s t o t l e i s not so easily resolved as we might be led 
to believe, and i t seems that s t r i c t l y only mental 
operations are excluded from motion by A r i s t o t l e and 
included by Plato. Consequently Aquinas Ts p o s i t i o n i s not 
wholly. consist eat,, as, i s admitted by .8ome.,Neo,~Scholastios* -
But i t would be strange i f even i n the thought of an 
Aquinas there were not some obscurities and small fogs. And 
i n t h i s instance the main principles of Aquinas*s conception 
of the immutable God, the unmoved-mover, are out of jeopardy, 
and re a d i l y discerned. 
God i s the unmoved—mover, but since motion* as used here 
does not exolude mental operations there i s no implication 
that the Deity i s stagnant* Nor does the absence of 
p o t e n t i a l i t y incur a s t a t i c existence, since p o t e n t i a l i t y i s 
subordinate to a c t u a l i t y , having no fu r t h e r purpose than t o 
achieve the occurranoe of the actual; and also the e f f i c i e n t 
cause which effects the making aotual of a p o t e n t i a l i t y i s a 
l o g i c a l l y and temporally p r i o r a c t u a l i t y . The significance of 
a p o t e n t i a l i t y i s that i t i s the p o t e n t i a l of an aotual*' 
God, i n Thomiatio tnought, i s the unchanging fulness of 
a c t u a l i t y * The a c t u a l i t y neither increases nor deoreases, 
and i s subject to no a l t e r a t i o n * I t i s i n t h i s sense that 
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God is' immutable as being without p o t e n t i a l i t y (cf.S.T.I. 
q.9oa.l. supra Hp «7fe-7)) •God i s 'aotus purus*. Clearly f o r 
Aquinas immutability does not imply s t e r i l i t y , , , stagnation 
or i n a c t i v i t y * Thus i n t r e a t i n g of divine operations he i s 
prepared to writ e of God's "Striving".* But now i t seems that 
there i s the danger of completing a c i r c l e . Does not 
s t r i v i n g imply p o t e n t i a l i t y and motion? S.Thomas denies 
the i m p l i c a t i o n , asserting, that since God i s i n t e l l i g e n t 
his s t r i v i n g i s i n t e l l e c t u a l , that i s , an a c t i v i t y of the 
w i l l (Goh.Gent.lib.Leap.72i) • But oan there be a c t i v i t y 
of w i l l i n an unmoved mover?Aquinas says there cane 
(S.T.I.q.19.a.l.r.3.; De Veritate q.£3.a.l). He admits 
movement of the divine w i l l , , with the divine goodness as 
i t s object, but on the score of divine s i m p l i c i t y asserts 
the i d e n t i t y of both the divine w i l l and the divine 
goodness wi t h the divine essence; thus, i n e f f e o t , i t i s 
the divine essence whioh moves the divine essence. God i s 
self-moved, as Plato oontended, i f we are using motion 
w i t h i n the Platonic l i m i t s of the term,; i f we are keeping 
to the A r i s t o t e l i a n l i m i t s there i s no motion at a l l , and 
God i s unmoved. 
jActus purus* i s , then, of the divine essence* God 
is the consummation of aot. I s divine a c t u a l i t y or 
a c t i v i t y i n any way comparable w i t h human a c t i v i t y ? I t 
oannot be i d e n t i c a l , f o r the very need f o r postulating 
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a unique unmoved-mover derives from the r e a l i z a t i o n that 
ordinary causes are inadequate to acoount f o r the whole 
order of observed movement and change* There must be an 
ultimate mover of a d i f f e r e n t kind, or else a l l would be 
unmpvedc-movers, which i s both oontrary t o experience and 
absurd, or we are back w i t h the i n f i n i t e series* of caused 
change and motion, t h e . p o s s i b i l i t y of whioh we have already 
seen that Aquinas denies. I n short, one could take one's 
choice between saying a l l are gods, or that there i s no 
God* I f , on the other hand, the difference between divine 
and human a o t i v i t y i s such as to exclude any oommon ground, 
then an active God need be no more acceptable (than a 
stagnant deity* 
Before we oan proceed f u r t h e r some account of the 
pr i n c i p l e of analogy^ fundamental to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of S-Thomas'a work, i s necessary* He maintained a thorough-
going difference between the orders of being « "discontinuity" 
Gils on has termed i t ffchil.bf S'.Thoe.Aquinas^Eagl.trans.p 275) • 
Man i s not a.diminished version of God, he i s altogether 
d i s t i n c t . Nor i s he of the order of angelic, being, but, 
again, d i s t i n c t * 3?he lower orders of being do not merely 
mirror the higher, but each order i s proper to i t s e l f • .' 
Thus a random imputation of the functions and characteristics 
of one order to'a d i f f e r e n t order i s not permissible. The 
pr i n c i p l e f o r arguing from one to another i s not of 
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i d e n t i t y * but of analogy. Thus i n the matter i n hand 
Aquinas argues f o r a difference, but not a t o t a l 
difference, between divine, and human a c t i v i t y . They are 
analogous, and consequently one oannot either expect to 
be able t o comprehend the whole range of divine a c t i v i t y * , 
or t o be able to give a thorough i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . i n 
terms of human a c t i v i t y * Human i n t e l l e c t i s f i n i t e and 
li m i t e d i n accordance w i t h the order of existence t o which 
i t belongs, and i t s experience of a c t i v i t y i s of an a c t i v i t y 
that i s limited;, therefore f u l l understanding of that whioh 
is i n f i n i t e and perfect i s beyond both i t s powers and 
experience. 
The divine a c t i v i t y i s outside human experience i n 
respect of i t s operation* i t i s to be known only by analogy, 
and i s inoapable of positive d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of 
experience* An expression i n negative terms i s i n e v i t a b l e , 
but i t i s the most p r o f i t a b l e that the circumstances of 
divine and natural existence permit. S.Thomas, i n his 
discussion of the existence of God, never promised to give 
more than that: 
Now beoause we, oannot know what God i s , but rather 
what he i s not, we have no means of considering how 
God i s , but rather how he i s not. (S.T.I.q.3.prino., 
Vol*8.p.S8). 
God 's existence of • pure aot i s then i n some degree 
comprehensible from our own acquaintance w i t h act, and the 
whole of that acquaintance oan p r o f i t a b l y be brought to 
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bear on the task of understanding God; but i f the existence 
of pure act i n an immutable God remains a mystery we are 
not^to be dismayed. Aquinas has shown, even more precisely 
than Augustine, why we cannot expect more; and the very 
f a c t of the persistence of the mystery attests the v a l i d i t y 
of his exposition. Moreover, having c l e a r l y marked the 
l i m i t s to which we can go, he has, nevertheless, shown that 
the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f i n God as both immutable and active 
i s capable of considerable-exact r a t i o n a l developments, and 
has a sure f o o t i n g i n metaphysics as w e l l as i n revelation 
and purely s c r i p t u r a l theology* 
I n the "Summa Theologioa" (l*q*9.a*2*) Aquinas proceeds 
to show that immutability belongs to God alone, since a l l the 
rest of ex i s t i n g things are subject t o p o t e n t i a l i t y . He has 
thus arrived at an active God whose a o t i v i t y i s not wholly 
unlike that of human experience, and who i s at the same time 
unique i n being immutable* These oonolusions aooord closely 
w i t h muoh that i s most f r u i t f u l i n the Fathers* treatment 
of divine immutability, but whereas they constructed t h e i r 
arguments c h i e f l y on texts and t r a d i t i o n , Aquinas has worked 
from a more purely philosophical and speculative f i e l d * The 
value of the difference of approach, and s i m i l a r i t y of 
conclusion i s considerable* 
But there remains one most important problem: how i s • 
the unmoved-mover whose existence i s unchanging.* timeless 
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and active ^ and who e t e r n a l l y contemplates his own' 
essence, to be i d e n t i f i e d w i th the personal God gaught 
by Christ, w i t h the "Father" of the Lord's Prayer? I t i s 
worth notioing why^  t h i s gap i n the divine-human relationship 
i s so marked i n Aquinas• I t i s not, as might be supposed, 
that he was carried there by an adherence to S.Augustine, 
who had so.emphasised the gulf between nature and God as 
to expound a complete 'otherness' amounting to v i r t u a l 
contrariness* Aquinas'8 l o y a l t y was never of the kind that 
permits of being led where reason i s u n w i l l i n g t o go* 
With P l a t o , s i m i l a r l y , Aquinas refused to allow what his 
reason would not support, and i t i s i n part t h i s very f a c t 
which led him into his d i f f i c u l t y . Had he adopted the 
Platonic suggestion of the lower orders being mere shadowy 
figures of r e a l i t y a way out was offered, but the price was 
to give ground towards pantheism and Neo»Platonism* Aquinas'8 
d i f f i c u l t y i s the consequence of two of his greatest v i r t u e s 
as a philosopher: his r e f u s a l t o barter personal r a t i o n a l 
conviotions f o r primrose paths, and his adherenoe to his 
basic pr i n o i p l e that' man i s to be treated as the natural 
man of human experience, and not as an angel,a brute, a 
eemi*»deity or a wraith* I t i s i n accordance w i t h t h i s 
second characteristic that he gives such place i n his 
works to A r i s t o t e l i a n physics, incorporating the whole as 
welcome material for the study of t r u t h i n the sensible 
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universe - m a t e r i a l provided by an acute and independent 
observer* Thus wi t h man treated s t r i c t l y as man the gulf, 
between humanity and de i t y l i e s unconcealed, and the 
d i f f i c u l t y of bridging i t unmitigated* But the need of 
bridging i t i s a l l the clearer* Quick would suggest that 
i t i s a f a i l i n g of the Sohoolmen as a whole that they 
f a i l e d to bridge i t , and were i n large part unaware of i t s 
existence* 
Aquinas was c e r t a i n l y aware of the g u l f , and at pains 
to do the bridging* Already his assertion of eternal loving-
action i n God has been noticed, the love being bound w i t h 
the w i l l , and so. w i t h the divine essenoe* But f u r t h e r he 
made a direot attack on the problem* 
He knew that Avicenna had faoed a si m i l a r d i f f i c u l t y 
i n reconciling A r i s t o t l e ' s teaching with the Islamic 
conception of God, but, though following the l i n e of 
approaoh whioh he had used, Aquinas rejected Avicenna*s 
solution as inadequate f o r Christian conceptions* He began 
by acoepting the A r i s t o t e l i a n teaching that God ceaselessly 
contemplates his own essenoe, knowing only himself; but he 
then argued that i n knowing himself God knows a l l things, 
"nam intellegando se, i n t e l l i g i t omnia a l i a " (Com»Iffetaptiys* 
l i b • X I I . o a p * i x , l e o t . l 8 ) • Thus i n knowing himself God does 
rtce , 
not know only himself* i n that same plaoe he argues that 
an effeot i s more completely understood as i t s oause i s 
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eompletely understood. To know a oause pe r f e c t l y i s t o 
know i t s effeot p e r f e c t l y , so that f o r God, the F i r s t 
Cause, to know himself p e r f e c t l y i s for him to know a l l 
the r e s u l t i n g effects of the f i r s t cause* 
I n the "Be Veritate" (q.2.a.3.e) a s i m i l a r argument 
i s pursued. The observer of the universe observes order 
i n i t . With t h i s as data i t has been argued that there 
must be a c o n t r o l l i n g int. elligenoe to account, f o r the". 
order; therefore the c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e cannot be 
unaware of the things which i t controls* ,^ 
Lest the objection be raised to his arguments that 
f o r God to know things i s f o r him to be acted upon,, and 
so, i n a sense., changed from without, Aquinas points out 
that the resemblances of a l l created things pre-existed i n 
the divine essence. The resemblances therefore cannot be 
due to the created things. 
Another objection he foresaw was that the contention 
might be made that since nothing i s known except through 
the nature of being* and the creature-nature i s more not-
being than being, the oreation must be more unknown to God 
than known (Ib*q*2.a*3*ob.*16) • I n reply'Aquinas says that 
being, when spoken of absolutely, refers to divine being 
alone, and the creature's being inoreases or decreases as 
i t approaches God or recedes* God being i n f i n i t e and the 
oreature f i n i t e , the creature i s i n f i n i t e l y diBtant from 
~87~ 
God. This i s the reason f o r saying the creature i s i n 
larga part i n a condition of not-being. But the being 
that i t has, comes, nevertheless,, from God, and i s known 
to God* ' • 
Aquinas was at pains to refute one of the chief 
Averroist contentions also: 
Some' have erred on t h i s p o i n t , saying that God 
knows things other than himself only i n general, 
that i s , only as beings. (S.T.I.q.l4,a.6, Vol.1.p.192) u 
This constituted a denial that God knew persons and 
things i n d i v i d u a l l y . By appeal to the conception of cause 
Aquinas argues to the oontrary, that God has a proper 
knowledge of a l l things i n t h e i r p l u r a l i t y , not merely a 
knowledge of a l l being as a single existence* God i n knowing 
himself, he says, knows himself to be the cause of a l l other 
things, sinoe suoh he i s . por^ as has been seen, a l l effects. 
caused by God pre-exist i n him, and are wholly known by him 
sinoe i n knowing himself p e r f e c t l y he knows the oauses that 
are i n himself. Suoh effects may themselves beoome oauses, 
but since they are wholly known t o Godi as effeots they are 
also wholly known to him when they i n tu r n act as causes, 
and consequently t h e i r effeots are wholly known to God, 
and so on. .Thus i n eternally knowing himself God 
eter n a l l y knows the whole i n t r i o a t e and multiplying order 
of causes, and a l l t h e i r - e f f e o t s (Con.Gent.lib.I.oap.50). 
There i s a second argument that a perfect knowledge must 
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know both general things and the proper, or i n d i v i d u a l , 
thing8; i t oust know multitude and d i s t i n c t i o n * Since 
God's knowledge i s perfect he does know a l l ( I b i d * ) * 
Such i s the fashion i n which Aquinas proves God's 
intimate knowledge of man, and every detail, pertaining t o 
him,, to the very number of the hairs of his head, while 
yet remaining unchanged by his knowledge* I f there i s one 
c r i t i c i s m that springs t o mind i t i s that the repeated 
appeals t o causality suggest that man i s a machine 
actuated by a hierarchy of pre-existent oauses* We s t i l l 
seem to be j u s t outside the gospel world where man i s a 
free creature, and God a loving Father. This i s probably 
due to the coldness and impersonal severity of the 
language i n whioh S.Thomas, so r i g h t l y , beoause so 
i m p a r t i a l l y , worked out his philosophy. But cle a r l y to 
Aquinas, the man, the f r u i t s of his reasoning were at one 
wi t h his personal experience and love of God. He did not 
divide his l i f e i n t o compartments without intercommunication 
a shortcoming he might easily have acquired from A r i s t o t l e * 
His purpose was to kn i t together, not to segregate; and the 
God of the Aquinas who i s the author of the "Summa" and the' 
"Contra Gentiles" i s also the God of Aquinas the student of 
the gospels, of Aquinas the master of the contemplative l i f e 
of the Aquinas who wrote the "Tantum ergo". This, the test 
to whio;h he himself put his arguments, to which he put his 
bridge across the g u l f , was wonderfully severe* 
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3. Saint Bonaventure. 
D i s t i n c t and impressive approaches to the same 
d i f f i c u l t y , namely of bridging the gulf between an immutable, 
absolute God and the God who knows and loves man, are 
provided by S.Bonaventure • Having contended that God i s a l l -
i n t e l i i g e n t and a l l - i n t e l l i g i b l e i t follows,, he says, that 
God must know himself, and know himself i n t o t a l i t y i n one 
act of knowing. He then makes a short analysis of ordinary 
human knowledge from which i t appears that i n knowing an 
objeot the subject i s i n some way increased by the 
knowledge of the objeot veknown. But i n the oase of God's 
knowledge of himself no increase or addition occurs, since 
that which knows i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h that whioh i s known. The 
rel a t i o n s h i p i s unique: the thinking subjeotj i n thinking 
or knowing i t s e l f , i n some way r e f l e c t s i t s e l f . This 
knowledge of himself whioh God has, and whioh i s i d e n t i c a l 
with himself, Bonaventure c a l l s a 'Resemblance*• I n t h i s 
instance alone i s the Resemblance i d e n t i c a l w ith the 
o r i g i n a l , and the t o t a l i t y of what i t represents. From t h i s . 
i t follows that the Resemblance must be God,.derived from 
God, and equal to God; and such i s Bonaventure's contention » 
the Resemblance is God, the Son, the Word. "As God knows 
himself i n t e g r a l l y he has expressed himself i n t e g r a l l y " 
(Gilson,^Philosophy of S.Bon.Engl.trans.Ch.IV.p.143)• 
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He then explains that the operation of God includes 
both that whidh he w i l l s to do, and that which he could do 
i f he w i l l e d : thus a l l things that are, that s h a l l be, that 
oan be,, owe t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y to the being i n whose power 
i t l i e s t o produce them* The p o s s i b i l i t i e s are the ideas, 
the arohetypes, of a l l that i s or dould be produced* A l l 
these p o s s i b i l i t i e s are expressed by God i n the i n t e g r a l 
image of himself, and therefore exist .in the Word. The 
Word i s , then, at onoe the unique and i d e n t i c a l Resemblance 
of God, and also the source of the models, or ideas, of a l l 
things. I n him Creator and creation meet: 
Christ i s therefore at the centre of everything: 
God,, the perfect resemblance of God, the ho<me of 
the archetypes of a l l the p a r t i a l resemblances of 
God, He i s at the same time the tsaster who rules 
i n the height of heaven and who speaks i n the depths 
of our souls, ( o f . I n Hexaemeron."I*l3*t*5*)• 
I n a seoorid approach to 'the subject Bonaventure begins. 
by considering the implications of an aot of knowing* He 
argues that before an act of knowing there i s an i n t e l l i g e n o 
and i t s object* The act of knowing adds a concept of the 
object* There i s , then, conoeptivity or c r e a t i v i t y i n the 
act* To t h i s concept he applies his words 'resemblanceV, 
•word' and 'expression', implying always a generating 
a c t i v i t y * When the i n t e l l i g e n c e knows an object other than, 
or external t o , i t s e l f i t engenders a resemblance of that 
object* As has been seen, God, i n knowing himself, expresses 
«91-
himself i n a wholly i n t e r n a l aot « the Word* The Word 
having been so produced, or begotten, i n t e r n a l l y i s then 
known by God externally, and so resemblances of i t are 
engendered. These are the concepts of things known*(The 
implied time-sequence e x i s t s , of course, merely f o r the 
convenience of expression, and i s not r e a l j since the acts 
of knowing are of the eternal t o t a l i t y of divine knowledge.) 
These resemblanoes a r i s i n g from the archetypes or ideas 
existent i n the Word are the external r e a l i z a t i o n of those 
archetypes - are indeed the creatures, ( o f . 1 Sent.27,2,un. 
l o t . l ) . Thus i t would seem that f a r from the creatures 
being separated from the knowledge of the. immutable God, 
they are* inconceivable without t h e i r being known by God i n 
t h e i r e n t i r e t y . I n both arguments i t is the Word whose 
existence effects the connection between God and the 
creation ( I n Hex»l.l3.t.5)• Herein we are brought close to 
a p r i n c i p l e underlying Bonaventure's whole approach to the 
subject: 
To oonceive how the ' m u l t i p l i c i t y of creation could 
be f r e e l y originated from a single God, the oause of 
a l l things, dwelling i n i d e n t i t y w i t h himself, one 
must follow a path •••which i s the doctrine of the 
Incarnate Word. (Gilson, Op.cit.Ch*IV. pp.. 141-2) • 
Although the manner i n which Bonaventur'e bridges the . 
gap has now been b r i e f l y observed there i s point i n . 
following him a l i t t l e f u r t h e r , especially as he provides 
material of great importance f o r the discussion that must 
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l a t e r be made of divine immutability and the creation* 
Resemblance, he maintains, i s of two kinds. One i s 
where two or more things have a qu a l i t y i n common, as, f o r 
example, two men sharing the q u a l i t y of- t a l l n e s s * Such 
a 
common q u a l i t i e s do not exist between God and creatures* 
The second kind i s where, of the things resembling, one 
reproduces features of the other without having anything 
belonging, t o, i t • This,,.is.,, the rese mblanc e b etween copy -and 
model. The part each plays i s wholly d i s t i n c t : the copy 
exists i n i m i t a t i o n of the model, and the model i s 
exemplary i n respect to the oopy* This kind of resemblance 
can exist between God and creatures. Bonaventure, whose 
exposition of his theory i s a l i t t l e obscure at t h i s point* 
seems to achieve his end by a double use of t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
of exemplary resemblance* I n the f i r s t .place the archetypes* 
or ideas, are oopies of the divine model, and sinoe they are 
known by the divine i n t e l l e c t by an i n t e r n a l aot of knowledge 
(supra) , God's knowledge of them involves neither addition 
nor- ohange i n the existence of the divine i n t e l l e c t * The 
ideas are produoed d i r e c t l y i n the generating aot of 
divine knowledge, come wholly from God, are not d i s t i n c t 
from him, and are wholly known by him fQuaest.disp.de Soien. 
Chris-ti I I , Conol*t.5«) • i n the second place the ideas are 
the exemplars of which a l l things are the copies, and thus 
oreated things resemble God through t h e i r resemblance to 
the ideas* 
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But God i s the one, and only possible, i n f i n i t e being* 
Hon then does the oreation which resembles him manifest 
m u l t i p l i c i t y ? The Doctor answers that the perfeot 
s i m p l i c i t y of the i n f i n i t e makes possible the expression of 
an i n f i n i t y of i n t e l l i g i b l e acts* These expressions are 
designated by the ideas i n r e l a t i o n not.* . 
... to God himself| but i n r e l a t i o n to things; so a 
certain m u l t i p l i c i t y i s introduced not i n t o what 
"they are, or even i n t o What they s i g n i f y , but i n t o 
what they connote* I t i s as though the . m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of material things produced by the divine ideas oast 
a sort, of d i v e r s i f y i n g r e f l e c t i o n upon t h e i r u n i t y , 
with the r e s u l t that we believe by a quite natural 
i l l u s i o n that we f i n d already formed i n them a 
p l u r a l i t y which cannot r e a l l y exist sinoe i t implies 
the presence of matter* 
There l i e s the only d i s t i n c t i o n that oan be made 
between the ideas; a d i s t i n c t i o n of the reason i f i t 
i s true that there cannot be i n God any true r e l a t i o n 
of things, but a d i s t i n c t i o n founded i n things i f one 
i s oareful not'to hypostatise unduly the real r e l a t i o n 
of-things to God* (Gilson, Op*oit*0h»TV. pp* 15 2*3 i n 
r e f * 1 Sent .35 un» 3. oonol.t•!•) 
•1 
pPhus i n knowing himself God knows the ideas and the whole 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of things a r i s i n g from the resemblance of 
material things to the ideas* To know things to t h e i r l a s t 
p a r t i c u l a r d e t a i l and p o t e n t i a l i t y God has only to know 
himself, that i s , t o be God unchanged* Immutability has 
beoome the very ground of God's knowledge of the mutable. 
Bonaventure's emphasis on the non-temporal oharaoter of 
divine knowledge i s essential to these contentions. God's 
knowledge of things and changes i s not concurrent with t h e i r 
existence and change, but. the knowledge i s , i f the term may 
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be p e r m i t t e d , T t i m e l e s s l y a n t e r i o r r . God i s thus . 
conceived as able t o c o n d i t i o n the ohange o f t h i n g s 
w i t h o u t himself undergoing change, and s i m i l a r l y can 
know t h e i r c h a n g e a b i l i t y 0 His knowledge of them i s not 
compelled by them, but r a t h e r they are compelled by his 
knowledge, and t h e i r ohanges have no modifying e f f e c t on 
h i s knowledge of them. 
As w i t h S.Thomas, and as w i t h the e a r l y F a t h e r s , the 
conception of d i v i n e i m m u t a b i l i t y expounded by Bonaventure 
i s as d i s t a n t as possible from an a s s e r t i o n of d i v i n e 
s t e r i l i t y and stagn a t i o n . A c t i v i t y , and w i t h Bonaventure 
c r e a t i v e and generating a o t i v i t y , i s of the essence of 
i m m u t a b i l i t y . While the conception of pure a c t i n God i s 
d i f f e r e n t i n bot h Aquinas and Bonaventure from t h a t 
expressed by A r i s t o t l e the two C h r i s t i a n Bootars are 
themselves d i s t i n c t i n t h e i r . e x p o s i t i o n of i t . Nor i s t h i s 
a consequence of Bonaventure being preoooupied w i t h 
Augustine and Plato t o the exclusion of A r i s t o t l e . As 
Gilson has demonstrated, Bonaventure was not d i s i n t e r e s t e d 
i n A r i s t o t l e by any means, but was less i n f l u e n c e d by him. 
Thus h i s e x p o s i t i o n o f d i v i n e 'expression 1 i n terms of 
p r o d u c t i v i t y i s incomparable w i t h A r i s t o t l e , and d i s t i n c t 
from the faotus purus' of Aquinas. God's ohangelessness i s 
not a o o l d , d i s t a n t and d i s i n t e r e s t e d ohangelessness l i k e 
t h a t of 8one d i s t a n t s t a r , but i s the great assurance t h a t 
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what God i s he i s e t e r n a l l y ; and the God of whom the 
greatest Sohoolraeh were always aware was the God of the 
New Testament* Their p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s may lac k the 
glow of the gospel n a r r a t i v e s , but only i n so f a r as the 
philosopher must always deny himself the warmth of the 
prophet, and the appeal of the preacher* 
4. I m m u t a b i l i t y and tforstioism* 
By the end of the T h i r t e e n t h Century the main 
development of the C h r i s t i a n conception of i m m u t a b i l i t y 
<L. was complete, and i t s p o s i t i o n i n C h r i s t i a n theology determine 
f 
Thus w i t h a w r i t e r from the evening of Scholasticism., Suarez, 
we f i n d the treatment f a m i l i a r , and a k i n to the work t h a t 
has already been considered.(Suarez, Tom.I.Pars*l*lib.3, 
oap.3)• 
But i t was i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n t h a t the study of 
i m m u t a b i l i t y continued most v i g o r o u s l y , and i t was the 
In. 
mystics who were i n c o n t r o l * I t s importance t& r e l a t i o n 
t o the- devout l i f e and the V i s i o n of God had already 
appeared, and i t reappeared s i g n a l l y i n the l a t e r Middle 
Ages and a f t e r ; though never w i t h q u i t e the prominenoe 
i t had i n the works of Augustine. This was i n p a r t because 
the emphasis given by Augustine, coupled w i t h h is 
equal l y great in f l u e n c e on the thought of those who came 
a f t e r him, established as g e n e r a l l y accepted among l a t e r 
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mystics and asoetios what w i t h Augustine was a g l o r i o u s 
discovery* I t 'had become i m p l i c i t i n the m y s t i o a l theology 
of the V i c t o r i n e s , Aquinas and Bonaventure, and i t s 
presence i s f e l t from end t o end of the w r i t i n g s of the 
author o f "The Cloud of Unknowing" and of Ruysbroeok: 
and i f we possessed t h a t r e s t w i t h God, we should 
be r e s t i t s e l f w i t h him, and should have r i s e n to. 
his I f l t f t i n e a s and, beyond a l l steps of the'heavenly 
ladder, have become w i t h him i n h i s Godhead an 
essence i n repose. afnd an,et e r n a l blessedness* 
(Ruysbroeokj "Seven Steps of the S p i r i t u a l Ladder", 
" V I I A ) • 
A Such a passage i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n the Augustinian 
4 
t r a d i t i o n , but the tone i s of assumption r a t h e r than of 
contention* 
f>J^ j,». A f t e r the Middle Ages the t o r c h s t i l l burned on. I n 
the great Spanish school of Counter-Reformation teaohers 
on prayer, and i n the l a t e r schools of the west, always 
the i m m u t a b i l i t y , the e t e r n i t y of' God, and the beatitude 
of e v e r l a s t i n g r e s t i n God, were thoughts whose power was 
recognised; they are the dawn beyond the Dark Ni g h t , they 
are the ecstasy of the innermost Mansion * they are the .. 
reward of Abandonment* S.Francois de Sales opens the t e n t h 
book i n h i s t r e a t i s e "On the love of God" w i t h the famous 
quota t i o n from Augustine's. "Confessions" - "our heart i s 
r e s t l e s s t i l l i t f i n d s i t s r e s t i n Thee". Then, he expands 
the theme, e x u l t i n g i n the immutably blessed existence 
t h a t the soul i n heaven derives from i t s knowledge of the 
immutable God: 
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I n heave a the l o v i n g a t t e n t i o n of the blessed i s 
s t r o n g , oonstant and i n v i o l a b l e j and can n e i t h e r 
p e r i s h nor decrease; t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s ' a r e always 
pure, and f r e e from the mixture of a l l other 
i n f e r i o r i n t e n t i o n s * I n s h o r t , t h i s g r eat 
happiness of seeing God c l e a r l y , and of l o v i n g 
him unchangeably, i s q u i t e incomparable; ( S t * 
Pranoois de Sales, "On the Love of God", X 3)« 
B e l i e f i n God, the same yesterday, today and f o r 
ever, i s of the very substance of a l l the great C h r i s t i a n 
• expo s i t i o n s of mystiolsm and the journey t o the B e a t i f i c 
V i s i o n . I t s presence i s so o f t e n assumed t h a t our a t t e n t i o n 
i s r a r e l y a t t r a c t e d * But a short r e f l e c t i o n on what an 
impoverished residue of mystioism would remain were the 
dootrine of d i v i n e i m m u t a b i l i t y non-existent i s , perhaps, 
the best assurance) we can have of i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e , and 
p r a c t i c a l importance* 
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PART IV. DIFFICULTIES I f f THE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF 
. IMMUTABILITY.. 
I n f o l l o w i n g the development of b e l i e f i n d i v i n e 
i m m u t a b i l i t y c e r t a i n important d i f f i c u l t i e s i n any such 
conception have several times been, n o t i c e d , and d e t a i l e d 
• 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of them deferred. The p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
have a r i s e n i n connection w i t h the C h r i s t a i n b e l i e f s about 
Creation and the I n c a r n a t i o n . These problems, together w i t h 
a t h i r d - God^ i m m u t a b i l i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o the d e i f i c a t i o n 
of man - must now be studied. 
A. Creation and I m m u t a b i l i t y . 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o argue t h a t c r e a t i o n i n v o l v e s change 
i n God. Before the c r e a t i o n God ex i s t e d as a being who 
had not created, and who was not c r e a t i n g ; t a f t e r the c r e a t i o n 
he e x i s t e d as a being who had created and was s u s t a i n i n g 
c r e a t i o n : t h e r e f o r e c r e a t i o n i n v o l v e s a change i n God/. 
S i m i l a r l y c r e a t i o n i t s e l f i s a new act. Origen's argument 
(De P r i n c . I I I v 3-4} t h a t there were worlds p r i o r t o t h i s , 
and t h a t there w i l l be others a f t e r i t , even i f i t had won 
general agreement, does not a l t e r the p o s i t i o n , since each 
world, having i t s own i d e n t i t y , i s a new world, and t h e r e f o r e 
the e f f e c t of a new act. He does not argue f o r a continuous 
world c o - e t e r n a l w i t h God - a p o s s i b i l i t y allowed as reason-
able but unorthodox by Aquinas. 
One weakness which theologians have i n d i c a t e d i n t h i s 
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argument f o r change i n God i s t h a t i t assumes t h a t God's 
existence i s i n terms of time. There i s no meaning, they 
say, i n t a l k i n g of God 'before' and ' a f t e r ' c r e a t i o n , 
because time began w i t h and conditions c r e a t i o n , but does not 
c o n d i t i o n the existence of God. Augustine i s the great 
exponent of God's timelessness:" 
For as without any movement time can measure, 
he himself moves a l l temporal t h i n g s , so he knows 
a l l times w i t h a knowledge time cannot measure. 
And t h e r e f o r e he saw t h a t what he had made was good, 
when -he saw t h a t i t was good to' make i t . And when 
he saw i t made, he had not. on, t h a t account a twof o l d 
nor any way increased knowledge of i t , as i f he had 
l e s s knowledge before he made what he saw. (Augustine 
Be Civ. Dei X I 21). 
For there was not tim'e before times began, and 
. t h e r e f o r e i t d i d not happen t o God i n .time t h a t he 
should be Lord, since he was Lord of the very times 
themselves, which .assuredly d i d not begin i n time. 
(De T r i n . V 16; c f . XV 26). 
Augustine i s i n s i s t i n g on the d i f f e r e n c e between a c r e a t i o n 
t h a t i s w i l l e d i n time, and one t h a t i s w i l l e d from 
e t e r n i t y , and designed t o occur at a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n time, 
or at the beginning of time* or afr tho bofiinning o£ time-. 
As i t has been e t e r n a l l y decreed t h a t the e f f e c t should be 
produced i n time , t h i s does not impair the i m m u t a b i l i t y of 
God. No new act of w i l l independent of, or discordant " 
w i t h , the e t e r n a l w i l l has been introduced: 
But i n God the former purpose i s not a l t e r e d and 
o b l i t e r a t e d by the subsequent and d i f f e r e n t purpose, 
but by one and the same e t e r ^ l nnd unchangeable 
w i l l fce e f f e c t e d regarding the t h i n g s he created, 
both t h a t formerly^ so long as they were not they 
should not be, and t h a t subsequently, when they 
began t o be, they should come i n t o existence. 
(De Civ. Dei X I I 17). 
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The d i s c u s s i o n has now been c a r r i e d back a stage: the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n change and time are t o be resolved 
only by reference t o the e t e r n a l w i l l of God - an existence 
outside time, and t h e r e f o r e much less comprehensible t o 
man whose whole experience i s temporal, "Arid so they w i l l 
not cease from asking the causes of causes, u n t i l at l a s t 
you f l y t o the w i l l of God, the refuge f o r ignorance." 
So, w i t h some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , wrote Spinoza ( E t h i c s . 1, agjjsaa-
appendix). Many a metaphysical problem can be-cheaply 
and u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y solved by being wise about the i n s c r u -
t a b l e . But t h i s i s no reason f o r r e f u s i n g t o attempt 
deductions about the nature o f i n f i n i t e and e t e r n a l being: 
r a t h e r i t i s a warning ggainst f a c i l e assumptions. Aquinas's 
system of analogy i s a precau t i o n against t h i s very danger, to 
but he does not i n consequence f i n d a l l knowledge of the 
d i v i n e w i l l barred t o him. Indeed such q u a l i t i e s . o f 
e t e r n a l and d i v i n e existence as are here assumed are among 
those which Aquinas and many other cautious scholars have 
.found to-be the best assured, and the most worthy o f 
acceptance. B e t t e r advice than Spinoza's i s Augustine's 
precept (see p.£f*supra) t h a t Our human minds cannot be 
expected t o embrace an understanding of the whole of God's 
being, but t h a t what can be ascertained should be ascer-
t a i n e d and used p r o f i t a b l y . There i s , then, no d e c e i t ! 
or sharp p r a c t i c e i n pursuing an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the 
realms of the e t e r n a l w i l l of God so long as c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
are not upheld, and ob s c u r i t y . n o t passed o f f as demonstra-
t i o n . 
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The main p o i n t o f the argument i s t h a t God does not 
have t o accomodate h i m s e l f t o a novel circumstance. The 
c r e a t i o n i n i t s e l f need, or need not, he unique, "but the 
change from i t s "being w i l l e d t o e x i s t and i t s coming i n t o 
existence according t o the same act of w i l l i n g i s a change 
from non-being t o being i n r e l a t i o n t o the c r e a t i o n and 
i 
not a change i n the w i l l which has e t e r n a l l y w i l l e d . t h e 
existence e x a c t l y as i t has taken place. - I f an underground 
t r a i n begins i t s journey below ground, but l a t e r , reacheis., . 
a p o i n t where i t 3 journey i s continued on the surface there 
i s no cause f o r saying t h a t the r a i l w a y c o n t r o l l e r who 
ordered the t r a i n on i t s journey has'changed, nor i s there 
any reason t o believe t h a t he d i d not know t h a t at t h a t 
p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t the t r a i n would emerge on the surface. -
But the example must not be pressed too f a r or i t w i l l give 
e t e r n i t y the f a l s e appearance of being a long p e r i o d o f 
time. The c r e a t i o n was not w i l l e d from the bleginnifr-i,g of time, 
but the c r e a t i o n and the beginning of time were w i l l e d 
e t e r n a l l y - there i s n e i t h e r a long t i m e - l a g between the 
w i l l i n g and. the c r e a t i o n , nor are the two instantaneous, but 
the whole act of w i l l i n g i s d i s t i n c t from a time r e l a t i o n -
ship: i t i s independent o f , and superior t o , time. 
I t has been argued t h a t the a c t i v i t y , o f God being 
e t e r n a l l y - immutable mast needs i n v e s t the e f f e c t s which i t 
produces w i t h the colour of e t e r n i t y , and t h a t t h e r e f o r e • 
the world, as a product of the d i v i n e w i l l , must be in . some 
degree e t e r n a l . But the argument i s f a u l t y i n i t s f i r s t 
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premise, which assumes as necessary what i s not. There i s 
no t h i n g t o suggest that.God cannot e t e r n a l l y w i l l e i t h e r an 
e t e r n a l or a temporal e f f e c t . 
sWe are now confronted w i t h the problem of God's w i l l as 
e x i s t i n g i n a s t a t e of .absolute l i b e r t y , and of, God at the gas 
same time being immutable.' I t would seem t h a t the immutabi-
l i t y must exclude the freedom; or, on the other hand, t h a t 
as God i s e n t i r e l y f r e e t o create oi? not t o .create ( c f . 
Vatican Council, Canon 3j)e Deo Creante V), i s not immutable. 
This d i f f i c u l t y i s not l i g h t l y solved. But i t i s possible • 
t o see i n d i c a t i o n s of a way t o s o l u t i o n . F i r s t there i s 
the n a t u r a l tendency t o preseume a close s i m i l a r i t y e x i s t s k£ 
v 
between our own f r e e w i l l and God's; but from the Ijery nature 
of the case t h i s i s not l i k e l y - d i v i n e nature and human Ba=fe» 
bear s i m i l a r i t i e s , but are f a r from being i d e n t i c a l . Human 
l i b e r t y c o n s i s t s of an a c t i v e freedom enabling a man t o 
choose between a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n , or t o choose 
between a c t i o n and non-action: he employs h i s freedom i n 
s u b j e c t i v e acts which r e l a t e t o e x i s t i n g circumstances or 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . God's freedom i s subject t o the unique, 
ab s o l u t e l y simple, pure act, and i s "conditioned only by 
himself. Thus i t seems puobable t h a t what i n the p e r f e c t i o n 
of pure act and omniscience he w i l l s f r e e l y i s also immutable 
Since there can be no unforseenvl contingency which would 
render possible an improvement of t h a t which was w i l l e d 
( c f . Aquinas, Con.Gent. 1. 82). ' A second argument i s suggest-
ed by the f i r s t . The i m m u t a b i l i t y of the w i l l of God i s 
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conditioned by the w i l l o f God, and i s thus f r e e l y w i l l e d , 
and so i s i t s e l f «..9tenifestation of the d i v i n e freedom. 
A t h i r d argument based more on-the d i v i n e i n f i n i t y than the 
diwine s i m p l i c i t y , i s suggested' by Fx. Riekaby: 
The d i f f i c u l t y has i t s foundation i n t h i s , t h a t , 
w i t h i n our experience, every new e f f e c t ' involves 
some antecedent change e i t h e r i n the agent or i n the 
matter acted upon. The more powerful the agent, the 
le s s change i s r e q u i r e d , as when a strong man w i t h 
l i t t l e or no e f f o r t l i f t s a weight, which a weaker man 
would have t o s t r a i n h i m s e l f t o r a i s e from the ground. 
Hence we may f a i n t l y surmise how ' i n the l i m i t ' an t,.':.:•.' 
almighty agent would act w i t h o u t being i n the l e a s t 
a l t e r e d by h i s a c t i o n from the being t h a t he would 
have been, had he remained at r e s t . Not t h a t I take 
t h i s suggestion t o remove the whole d i f f i c u l t y . 
(Rickaby, "Of God and h i s Creatures" p 62 n . ) . 
I t would seem t h a t i n pursuing the subject t o t h i s r e l a t i o n -
ship of f r e e w i l l and i m m u t a b i l i t y i n God we have not a r r i v e d 
« 
at a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , but h ave t r a v e l l e d as f a r as i t i s 
prudent t o go - any f u r t h e r may bri n g us j u s t l y under the 
indictment of. Spinoza. 
Thus f a r the discussion has kept w i t h i n s i g h t of the 
path i n d i c a t e d by Augustine. . Aquinas o f f e r s h i s answers 
i n accordance w i t h - h i s own s t y l e of philosophy. Motion or 
change i s the act of t h a t which' i s already i n p o t e n t i a l i t y : 
since c r e a t i o n was gffom nothing theifce was nothing t o be i n 
a state of p o t e n t i a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e thefie was n e i t h e r motion 
nor change i n creation".. The th r e e f a c t o r s which Saint 
Thomas he l d t o be necessary.to every instance of change have 
already been noticed (p.*]U. supra). • I n c r e a t i o n none of 
them i s present: t&ere i s no "terminus a quo", nor a pre-
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e x i s t e n t s u b j e o t , and without a subjeot there oan be no 
process, so there can be no t r a n s i t i o n (Con.Gent.II 19). 
From t h i s argument Aquinas points out t h a t c r e a t i o n i s 
w i t h o u t ohange, and' t h e r e f o r e w i t h o u t succession,and t h e r e -
f o r e instantaneous. He gives a seoond argument i n support: 
i n c r e a t i o n , as has been seen, there are no two extremes, 
though f o r the purpose of argument non-being might be 
allowed as an extreme, so t h a t the extremes of c r e a t i o n 
are being and non-being. But between being and non-being 
there can be no mean, and t h e r e f o r e no succession ( I b i d . ) . 
uya<w< I n short,Aquinas refuses t o admit t h a t c r e a t i o n i s i n any 
U W<_;~ O* , j < way a ohange. 
Saint Bonayenture i s i n agreement, but d i f f e r s a l i t t l e 
i n terminology. He allows ohanges of two kinds: change w i t h 
movement, and w i t h o u t movement. He excludes ohange from 
non-being t o being from the oategory of movement, j u s t as 
Aquinas does, but because i n c r e a t i o n a form appears where 
there was none before, Bonaventure c a l l s i t a l t e r a t i o n , or 
a ohange w i t h o u t movement ( I I S e n t . I , i . 3.1.concl.fc.2, 
Gilson.pp 202-3). 
These arguments of t h e Sohoolmen are 'oonoerned t o 
show r a t h e r t h a t oreation' i t s e l f i s not a ohange, than 
t h a t God i s not changed i n the act of c r e a t i o n , but the 
two notions are c l o s e l y a l l i e d . Apart from o r e a t i o n there 
i s God simply. At c r e a t i o n there i s God and c r e a t i o n , 
not God and o r e a t i o n and a ohange. I f there were any 
such change i t must s u r e l y r e l a t e i n some way t o God, 
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sin'ce he alone p r e - e x i s t e d , and t h e r e f o r e alone had N 
the q u a l i f i c a t i o n necessary f o r change. Thus appears the 
importance of the d o c t r i n e , fundamental t o the thought of 
both men, of c r e a t i o n "ex n i h i l o ' J . ' But both Doctors give 
f u r t h e r reason f o r b e l i e v i n g God s u f f e r e d no change i n the 
act of c r e a t i o n . Bonaventure says t h a t c r e a t i o n adds 
nothing t o what God i s , and changes nothing, since i t i s 
h i s own a c t i o n f r e e l y w i l l e d . Aquinas includes i n h i s 
work the a s s e r t i o n which amounts not t o proving God d i d 
not change, but t o saying t h a t $ince i t has been said a l -
ready t h a t God i s immutable, and since i t has been seen 
already t h a t c r e a t i o n i n v o l v e s no change, there i s no 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the two contentions, and so God's 
i m m u t a b i l i t y s u f f e r s no challenge (De Pot. q.3. a. 1).' 
To a modern mind, accustomed t o t h i n k more i n terms 
©f r e l a t i o n s h i p s than d i d the e a r l i e r t h i n k e r s , a s i g n i f i c a n t 
argument against c r e a t i o n by an immutable God i s t h a t 
c r e a t i o n .brings God i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h creatures, and 
t h a t the very i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s an 
i m p l i c a t i o n of change. God i s aware of the a c t i v i t y of 
greatures, i t can be argued, and changes h i s own operations 
accordingly. Thus i t would.appear t h a t such a c t i v i t y as 
change i n creatures reacts i n the fireator,' i n t r o d u c i n g change 
t o the d i v i n e l i f e . But two f a c t o r s must be- taken i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n : t h a t the r e a l determining motive isj£ God 
h i m s e l f , arid he i s disposed d i f f e r n t l y j ^ according t o the 
good or e v i l conduct of the creatures; and t h ^ t the differenos 
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o f . d i s p o s i t i o n i s according t o the unchanging a c t i v i t y . 
of God, and such as h i s being demands of him - otherwise 
the basic values, good and e v i l , would be v a r i a b l e . 
Aquinas says t h a t : 
Thus there i s nothing t o prevent these names which 
import r e l a t i o n , t o the c r e a t u r e / from being prednio^ied 
of God t e r a p o r a n a l l y n o t by reason of any change i n 
him, but by Season of the change i n the creature; as 
a column i s on the r i g h t of an animal, w i t h o u t change/ 
i n i t s e l f , but by change i n the animal,. (S.T.I.2.3.a.7). 
This does not, as might appear, deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of any 
action, by God on the world-,., since " - r e l a t i o n " - applies t o 
seemingly novel r e l a t i o n s h i p s . God's a c t i o n upon the w o r l d 
i s according t o the r e a l i t y of h i s nature, and not on account 
o f any r e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p by which h i s nature might be 
supposed t o be supplemented. 
A more extreme form of the argument of changing r e -
l a t i o n s h i p would be of the same f a m i l y as the Hegelian 
theocy of i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s - t h a t what.everything is 
depends on i t s r e l a t i o n w i t h everything else; and i f one 
of those r e l a t i o n s h i p s changes, the t h i n g i t s e l f changes, 
so t h a t the Rock of G i b r a l t a r changes every time a newspaper 
i s s^d .in San Francisco, or that- every t i m e the t i d e 
t u r n s i t changes God. I n an Hegelian cosmos i t might be 
so,, but i n the cosmos of•Orthodoxy i t cannot be, .since God 
i s expressed as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t Being, and i s not dependent 
f o r what he i s on the existence of contingent t h i n g s , and 
t h e r e f o r e they cannot change him.. Further i t might be said 
t h a t the meaning of change as used i n t h i s connotation 
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i s at) f a r from any general t h e o l o g i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n as 
t o exclude i t from the normal connotation of i m m u t a b i l i t y * 
Another approach t o the problem i s possible s t a r t i n g 
from the d i s t i n c t i o n of necessary and contingent being^. 
God i s a necessary Being; the c r e a t i o n i s contingent* God 
was f r e e t o create or not t o create as he w i l l e d * . He 
w i l l e d t o create* To say t h a t because of the two contingencies 
t o oreate and not t o c r e a t e , he w i l l e d one and not. the 
ot h e r , and t h e r e f o r e he changed, seems an a r b i t r a r y 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between the contingencies. I t i s as i f one 
s a i d (ft. a person who had the- a l t e r n a t i v e s of talcing a road 
t o the l e f t or a road to the r i g h t and chose the road t o 
the l e f t has changed, whereas he would not i f he had turned 
t o the r i g h t . Let us suppose, then, t h a t he had turned t o 
the r i g h t , t h a t i s , t h a t God had w i l l e d not t o create* We 
then have God as a Being who was t o create and did not -
i n s h o r t , who changed. Thus i t i s equally arguable t h a t 
God would have changed i f he had not created. We are thus 
led t o the conclusion t h a t an immutable God can n e i t h e r 
oreate nor not c r e a t e , whioh i s absurd, or else i t means 
t h a t there cannot be an immutable being unless he i s an 
immutable being who w i l l s n o t . t o oreate and does n o t , or 
who w i l l s t o create and does. Since we are aware o f 
c r e a t i o n the former oannot be true,, so the l a t t e r must. 
Thus i t would seem t h a t c r e a t i o n i s even a witness t o 
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God's i m m u t a b i l i t y * The only other possible a l t e r n a t i v e s 
are t h a t God w i l l e d t o create and did not - again the 
existence of c r e a t i o n deprives the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
s i g n i f i c a n c e ; or else he did not w i l l t o c r e a t e , b u t 
created* I n t h i s case God would e i t h e r be o f i n s u f f i c i e n t 
power t o f u l f i l h i s w i l l , or else would be ohanged by 
some power e x t e r i o r to hi m s e l f who changed h i s w i l l . But 
as the evidence i s t h a t God did w i l l h i s c r e a t i o n , 
c r e a t i n g o f h i s own w i l l and power, the l a s t a l t e r n a t i v e 
i s rendered untenable, and we are l e f t w i t h the conclusion 
t h a t God both w i l l e d t o create and created, thereby 
e x h i b i t i n g not change but changelessness* 
B. The I n c a r n a t i o n and I m m u t a b i l i t y . 
.The q u e s t i o n . i s , can God who i s uncreated, pure s p i r i t 
and who i s e t e r n a l l y i n heaven pass some t h i r t y years i n 
the world as a man, l i v i n g among men, and s u f f e r i n g 
p a s s i vely at t h e i r hands, w i t h o u t having himself changed? 
C l e a r l y the answer would seem t o be negative* God cannot 
remain immutable and also be incarnate; indeed i f he was 
incarnate he cannot be immutable'at a l l * Here i s our 
dilemma - apparently God was e i t h e r not i n c a r n a t e , or he 
i s mutable* The Fathers did not see i t so, or would not 
se'e i t so. I t i s Athanasius and Augustine, the great 
protagonists of the d i v i n i t y of C h r i s t , who most f r e q u e n t l y 
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r e c u r t o the i m m u t a b i l i t y of the Word; 
God's Word i s one and the same, and, as i t i s 
w r i t t e n , 'The Word of God endureth f o r ever»^ 
(Ps.CXIX 89), not changed, not before or a f t e r 
other,.but e x i s t i n g the same always* (Athanasiue, 
'2 Or.XVIII 36,p.368; o f . 1 Or.XXXIX; 3 Or.XXXIV; 
De Ino.XVII etc.) 
But the only-begotten Son of God, what he i s , t h i s 
cannot be changed into, anything else, cannot be 
diminished, what he was cannot but be^ he cannot 
but. be equal t o the Father* (Aug.Serm.XG, p.529; 
ef.XXXVIII, LXVII.LXXIV). . 
K — Denying the dilemma leads t o paradox. The contention then 
i s t h a t the Son of God was incarnate and i s immutable. How 
f a r the paradox was apparent t o the w r i t e r s of the e a r l y 
c e n t u r i e s i s d o u b t f u l , but they are parsimonious i n -
attempts t o deal w i t h i t . Indeed i t i s only i n recent studies 
of fcenosis t h a t the problem has been given i t s due 
a t t e n t i o n . Some w r i t e r s seem t o have been unaware of the 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h e i r e x p o s i t i o n s i n v o l v e d , as Hovatian 
(De T r i n . X X I I ) ; others were content t o t r e a t the matter as 
a mystery of f a i t h . Athanasius was oonoerned t o d r i v e home 
ascertained t r u t h s , and leave the harmonizing of them t i l l 
more urgent matters were disposed o f , which was not i n h i s 
l i f e t i m e . As has been seen (pp. 4-^-1*^ supra) he .delighted 
at times i n a s o r t of p e r v e r s i t y which l e d t o a ( f a r from 
f r u i t l e s s ) r e v e l l i n g i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n and enigma<j. "De 
In c a r n a t i o n e " XVII being his masterpieoe of t h i s s o r t . . I t 
was l a t e i n the Fourth Century before suggestions of 
s o l u t i o n t o the paradox were forthcoming, though p l a i n 
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statements without comment were s t i l l numerous, and are . 
today f o r that matter, f o r the l a s t word i s s t i l l f a r 
o f f * Thus we can f i n d Augustine, one of the f i r s t t o 
seek a s o l u t i o n , also oontent to say: 
• • • f o r 'the Word was God'* So then thy God endureth 
unchangeable... he endureth, he is. born of a woman, 
but i n the f l e s h . (Serm*LXXIV*3tp.475)• 
# C .A more recent statement of the kind (1911) comes i n 
the course of a l e t t e r by Dom John Chapman. I t i s an 
excellent i n d i c a t i o n . of the size of the problem, and the . 
significance of the. mystery: 
His lore oosts him everything, e K e m t e v G«*I/T-C>V 
He gave up a l l his glory, a l l His i n f i n i t e Happiness, 
to bestow i t on us. gn the Holy T r i n i t y the Three 
Persons give without losing., and refund without 
being impoverished i n the perfect union of t h e i r 
oircumincessio « t r ^ f / O v P l 6 , < • But i n the 
Redemption God leaves a l l - without leaving i t «• 
Yerbum supernum prodiens, NEC.Patris liquens dexteram -
that he may win i t a l l f o r us* ( S p i r i t u a l Letters, 
LXXXIII 6. Capitals e t c Chapman's.) 
^ This passage shows the closeness of the subject to 
the Ice not io problem, a problem which i t i s not the purpose 
of t h i s essay to investigate f u r t h e r than i s s t r i c t l y -
necessary* Rather i s the essay intended as an investigation 
of .the meaning and implications of immutability, such aa 
would provide a necessary preliminary to kenotic studies. 
I t i s , though, of significance to the subjeot i n hand to 
suggest that too l i t e r a l an emphasis may often have been 
l a i d on the word a 8 i t i s used i n Philippians 
I I 7. S.paul's purpose i n the passage i s to draw a t t e n t i o n 
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to the manifestation of humility i n the Incarnation* 
S.Clement of Rome i n a passage of similar i n t e n t uses 
the word 'r*wv©<f/»ov«BJV. ( i Ad.Cor.XVI '2) . The general 
meaning i s the same, and one wonders i f Paul's £Kt-v^ se-^ 
i s not the word of a s t y l i s t i n a passage of high colour, 
rather than a calculated exposition of a doctrine that 
the Incarnation involved an 'emptying out', 1a laying 
aside', by the Word of that which apart from the Incarnation 
was h i s . That elsewhere Paul's use of .Kfrv*«J i s always 
.non-literal adds weight to the proposition ( c f . H a l l , 
"Kenotic Theory" pp. 57-70). 
The scholars of kenoticism are faced with the same 
paradox that was already clear i n the Fourth Century, that 
God has been inoarnate, yet has not changed. One solution 
they have offered (and increasingly hostile c r i t i c i s m led 
to increasingly mitigated forms of expression) i s that 
oertain divine a t t r i b u t e s , immutability included, were 
'emptied out', or were no longer a c t i v e l y used by the 
Son during h i s incarnate l i f e . Support f o r these 
unacceptable theories has dwindled almost away. Something 
of the sort seems to have occurred also to the minds of 
the theologians of the Fourth Century, and dwindled'away 
before i t ever reaohed w r i t i n g . What' did reach w r i t i n g was 
t h e i r reaction - a denial, however unhelpful in.solving 
t h e i r d i f f i c u l t y , that the a t t r i b u t e s of the Son were 
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either irapairedl or l i m i t e d by the Inoarnation: 
And as being the Word and Wisdom of the Father, he 
has a l l the a t t r i b u t e s of the Father, his e t e r n i t y , 
and his unohangeableness, and i s l i k e him i n a l l 
respects and i n a l l things, and i s neither before 
nor a f t e r , but coexisted with the Father, and i s 
the very Form of the Godhead* (Athanasius, Ad.Ep. 
Aeg.XVII,.p.232; of. 2 Or.XVIII; Augustine, De T r i n . 1 7 ) 
Having refused t h i s escape the Fathers were l e f t with 
the d i f f i c u l t y , and began to t r y to f i n d other ways out. 
Their consideration of the divine a t t r i b u t e s had already 
indicated one a l l e v i a t i n g consideration: God i s ubiquitous, 
and therefore his coming i n t o the world does not imply a 
new f i e l d of a c t i v i t y . This was only a small advance, but 
not to be scorned; 
Now the Word of God... was not bound by his body, 
but was rather himself wielding i t , so that he was 
not only in i t , but was actually i n everything. 
(Ath.De Inc. XVII)• 
/f. Augustine employs a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t form of the 
argument: 
aepart away. For he did not so come to us as to 
depart from the Father; nor did he so asoend as to 
change .his place. When'he assumed f l e s h , i t fihanged 
place; but God assuming f l e s h , seeing he i s not i n 
plaoe, doth not change his place• (Serm.XXXVIII 14; 
cf#16.p.384)• 
A i The same thought seems to underlie part of Anselm's 
"Cur Heus Homo?" ( 1 6 ) , Obviously the worth of t h i s 
argument i s very r e s t r i c t e d ; to apply i t to the Inoarnation 
i n general would be to say either that there always was 
an inoarnation, or else that there never was one at a l l * 
he D i v i n i t w changeth not, i s not shaken, doth not 
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Of more value i s the contention that we should look 
for the change wrought by the Incarnation not so much i n 
God as i n ourselves. Athanasius employs i t i n his 
discussion of d e i f i c a t i o n (Ad Adelph. I V . o f . i n f r a 
appendix, p*€®. )• Augustine i s more emphatic; 
What i s 'The Word was made Flesh? T The gold beoame 
grass, i t became grass f o r t o be burned; the grass 
was burned f but the gold remained; i n the grass i t perished not, yea, i t changed the grass* How did 
i t change i t ? I t raised i t up to heaven, and plaoed 
i t at the r i g h t hand of the Father* (Serm.EXIX. 4, 
p.466) • 
A Clearly there i s t r u t h here, but i t i s not a l l the 
t r u t h we want* However great the significance of the 
Incarnation f o r human'destiny, and although 1the gold 
remained'', there i s s t i l l the f a c t that God did become 
man, and that he returned to heaven taking w i t h him a 
i 
human body* The passage jus-t quoted from Augustine gives 
us the l i n e by which the Fathers progressed f u r t h e r when 
i t says ' i n the grass i t perished not', implying that the 
gold was i n t a c t i n the grass* I n short, the Incarnation . 
i s to be looked at not as the Son changing int o f l e s h , 
but taking, or ad clingy the f l e s h to himself. This i s the 
doctrine taught i n the .'Quiounque V u l t 1 ; 
not by the conversion of the Godhead in t o f l e s h , 
but by taking up of manhood in t o God* • 
/* -Chrysostora used t h i s argument i n reverse, not t o 
establish the immutability, but from the immutability to 
demonstrate the d i s t i n c t i o n of the natures i n Christ: 
«H4 
So when you.hear that rthe Word was made Flesh', 
be not disturbed, nor oast down* For the Essenoe did 
not ohahge (MfcTtVeisev ) to f l e s h * . , but 
continuing what I t i s , I t so took upon I t the form 
- of a servant... For sinoe there are some who say 
that a l l the circumstances of the Dispensation were 
ah appearance.... at once to remove beforehand t h e i r 
blasphemy, he has put 'was made'; desiring to show 
thereby not a change of substance, (away w i t h the 
thought^ but the assumption of very f l e s h ... I f 
they say that being God. he i s omnipotent so that he 
could lower (^rJ-^s-^x)'. himself to the substance 
of f l e s h , we w i l l reply to them, that he i s omnipotent 
as long as he continues to be God. (Chrysostom, Horn* 
i n Joan XI,pp.90-1) 
Augustine.uses i t as d i r e c t witness f o r immutability: 
They say, f o r instance, that the Son i s less than 
the Father, because i t i s w r i t t e n that the Lord 
himself said 'My Father i s greater than I ' . But the 
t r u t h shows that a f t e r the same sense the Son i s . 
also less than himself; f o r how was he not made 
less also than himself, who 'emptied jexinanivit/ 
himself', and took upon him the form of a servant? 
For he did not so take the form of a servant that 
he should los$ the form of God, i n which he was 
equal to the Father. (Augustine, Be T r i n . 1 7 ) . 
And i f I am asked how the Inoarnation i t s e l f was 
brought to pass, I r e p ly that the Word of God 
i t s e l f was made f l e s h , that i s , was made man, yet 
not turned and changed i n t o that which was made; 
but so made, that there should be there not only 
the word of. God and the f l e s h of man, but also the 
r a t i o n a l soul of man* and that t h i s whole should 
< be called God on account of God, and man on 
account of man* ( l b . I V 21; of. I 13). 
The problem i s now harrowed considerably* There i s 
no question.of change i n the divine nature of God the Son* 
I t i s now l e f t to deoide hosvthe two Natures are united 
i n the one Person of Christ - t h i s i s the kenotio problem 
proper, and l i e s outside the present f i e l d • The aspect 
that i s of importance here i s how f a r the union of natures 
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implies a novel, and therefore changed existence i n the 
divine nature;'and how can the aotual events and 
l i m i t a t i o n ^ of the l i f e of Christ be separated from the 
divine nature i n him* The answer i s that there was no 
ohange; but explanations of how that can be are 
incomplete*- For example, where the gospels reoord Christ 
exh i b i t i n g l i m i t a t i o n s the Fathers account f o r i t as the 
manifestation of. his humanity: 
• *. though human things are ascribed.to the Saviour 
i n the Gospel, l e t us, considering the nature of 
what he said and that they are foreign to God, not 
impute them to the Word's Godhead, but to hiy manhood* 
(Athanasius 3 Or. XXVII.41*p.416) 
p -But though t h i s may be a sa t i s f a c t o r y course i n some 
cases, i t i s not i n a l l * Christ's confession of ignorance 
of the mind of the Father i n Mark X I I I 32 i s the olassio 
example, and Augustine's attempt to deal with i t must be 
regarded as a f a i l u r e and rather a shabby f a i l u r e ; 
'Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not 
the angels which are i n heaven; neither the Son, 
but the Father'. For he i s ignorant of t h i s as 
making others ignorant; that i s , i n that he did not 
so know as at that time to show his disciples 
» ^*e. was labout to show themj :as i t was said to 
Abraham, 'Now I'know that fhou fearest God', that 
i s , that I have oause'd thee to know I t . (Augustine, 
De T r i h . I 12). 
And so the paradox of the Incarnation i s not solved i n 
the general arguments put forward by the Fathers,, although 
the problem has been l i m i t e d . But one or two i n d i v i d u a l 
arguments put forward by the Fathers are worthy of notice. 
-116-
Gregoryof Nyssa makes an attempt (Cat. Or. XVI) to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e between two meanings of 'weakness' 
and sometimes wi t h an extension of meaning" • But i t i s 
rather a lame attempt. 
Augustine, always l i k e l y to open an o r i g i n a l l i n e , 
proposes a solu t i o n to the whole d i f f i c u l t y with a 
fascinating analogy: 
Just as when we speak, i n order that what we have 
i n our minds may enter through the ear i n t o the 
mind of the hearer, the word which we have i n our 
hearts becomes an outward sound, and i s called 
speech;and yet our thought does not lose i t s e l f 
i n the sound, but remains complete i n i t s e l f , and 
takes the form of speech without being modified i n 
i t s own nature by change: so the Divine Word, 
though suffe r i n g no change 4» nature, yet became j * 
f l e s h , that he might dwell among us. (Augustine, 
De Boot .Christ. I 13). 
/ < JJhis i s of value, though i t cannot be a whole answer, 
fo r there i s i n speech a change: the thought exists i n a 
d i f f e r e n t manner i n the words - or rather, onoe spoken has 
a double existence, i n the mind and also i n the words. Yet 
i t i s one and the same thought, and therein l i e s the value 
•of the analogy. I t emphasises the i d e n t i t y of the Son, as 
existing apart from the Inoarnation, and as existing 
incarnate. I t i s a more e x p l i c i t exposition of Athahasius's 
"Not even when the V i r g i n bore him. did he suffer any 
change", andj as w i l l t r anspire, that i s probably the 
most f r u i t f u l of a l l approaches to the problem. 
(KTotTiiX/ 71 6' s )» a s "sometimes used with a proper sense, 
the 
t 
i i - • -. - ; 
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Mediaeval arguments, frequently based on the nature of 
the divine w i l l , and the meaning of ohange, are condensed 
by Suarez: 
From e t e r n i t y the w i l l of God, i n perfect knowledge 
and unchangeable constancy, ordered a l l things, which 
were brought about i n time. (Suarez, Sum.Comp. 1.1. 
lib.S«cap.3)• 
A He also i n s i s t s ( I b i d . ) that God can w i l l as he pleases, 
f r e e l y , without any addition to his r e a l i t y . What i s the 
value of this? The previous consideration of creation has 
shown the importance of an understanding of eternal acts 
of the divine w i l l and t h e i r f u l f i l m e n t i n time; and how 
the manifestations i n time do not give ground f o r 
postulating change i n Ciod, But the application to the 
Incarnation i s r e s t r i c t e d sinoe i t i s God himself who 
appears i n , and becomes subject t o , time. But i f eter n a l l y 
foreknowing a l l , he eternally w i l l e d the Incarnation, and 
a l l he knew i t involved -y i s not the Incarnation an aot i n 
every way consistent w i t h the w i l l of God, and therefore 
a manifestation of the w i l l and nature of God as i t i s and 
unchanged? But what of the human nature? I s i t not an 
addition? Can Suarez be j u s t i f i e d i n saying there was no 
addition to the divine r e a l i t y when God adds to himself a 
re a l human nature? I n the f i r s t place the addition i s 
smaller than might appear. To the a t t r i b u t e s which are 
generally thought of as essentially unchangeable i n God, 
as power, love, long-suffering, t r u t h * nothing has been 
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added. Ho one suggests that God inoarnate i s more 
i 
trustworthy, more loving, more knowledgeable by the 
addition of a human nature* I t i s the nature i t s e l f , 
i t s subjection to time, to natural laws, i t s passivity 
that i s the addition* I n these respects he seems less -
he has humbled himself* The humbling i s the novel 
introduction. Was he then not humble before? Since such' 
humility as i s i n men i s i n them by divine graoe^ and i s 
a vir t u e of the godly, i t must derive from God, and must, 
therefore be of his essenoe. I s he then more humble by 
dint of the Incarnation? No. For then the eternal humility 
would be of l i m i t e d degree, imperfeot, which i s impossible* 
Therefore the Incarnation did not involve an addition to 
God's hu m i l i t y . He humbled himself i n the sense of 
manifesting his hum i l i t y . The humiliation of becoming as 
a servant did not change him, but revealed him as he i s as 
God* That Christ i n s i s t e d on men arguing baok from t h e i r 
experience of him to an understanding of the Father 
(e.g. John.XIV 9) c l e a r l y indicated that his own d i v i n i t y 
was unimpaired. We have now arrived again at the a l l -
important t r u t h t o which the discussion of Athanasius'e 
ideas on immutability (supra pp*^^'5Z>) has already once 
led us. The Inoarnation i s a revelation of God as he eternally 
i s , and i s not a climax or speoial fe a t i n the divine 
existence* The c r u c i f i x i o n i s not God's supreme act 
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of love; but the ultimate revelation of the supreme love 
of God - of the love that i s God et e r n a l l y . The 
c r u c i f i x i o n i s God i n action* There i s no inorease t no 
cresoendo* The love i s eternal and unchanged. I t i s the 
revelation that i s b r i e f and increased. 
But a l l i s not yet answered. On the one hand there 
i s the divine omniscience, omnipotence, e t e r n i t y : they 
have not so achieved t h e i r supreme re v e l a t i o n , rather 
they seem to have been displaoed. On the other hand there 
i s the human body and blood of Christ, the weariness, the 
weakness, the dependence on the Father. These are new, they 
are not revelations of the ete r n a l , though.they may be the 
instruments of that revelation* How can one account f o r 
them? I n the case of the former, the so-called 'metaphysical 
a t t r i b u t e s ' , i t i s clear from the t r a d i t i o n of the Fathers 
and t h e i r successors, and from the evidenoe aooumulated i n 
the present investigation , that they were i n Christ, 
unchanged and unimpaired. (oZfipjHSZ, i n f r a ) . There i s no 
novelty i n t h i s conclusion. But i t does nothing t o uproot 
the obstacles which confront the study of the two natures 
i n the person of Christ. 
I n the case of the manifest human a t t r i b u t e s apparent 
i n the inoarnate Son i t i s possible again to say that they 
are euoh as God eternally w i l l e d , and that as he w i l l s 
according to his esse, they have t h e i r plaoe i n the 
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eternal esse, the 'actus purus' of God. As w i t h the 
oreation, t h e i r ooming i n t o existence i n time i s also 
aocording to the divine w i l l . 
I f i t be i n s i s t e d , as i t may by followers of 
certain secular philosophies, that such additions and 
acquisitions when they do occur are nevertheless changes 
i n God, i t must probably be allowed that they are; but 
only according to the tenets and terminology of those 
philosophies. The prime purpose of Christian theologians 
i n saying God i s immutable has been to maintain that he 
i s always essentially himself; and the Church i s not bound 
to every extension of the term that protagonists of 
pa r t i c u l a r philosophical systems may have advooated. 
Much of the d i f f i c u l t y inherent i n the idea of the 
incarnation of the immutable God ban be eliminated by 
accepting the Incarnation f o r what i t most oerta i n l y i s * 
a revelation. To determine what God i s l i k e , and then apply 
i t t o the person of Christ to see i f i t f i t s i s surely a 
clumsy treatment. A surer and more expeditious road i s to 
determine what God i s l i k e from the revelation of him i n 
Christ. He then appears as the God whose nature i s suoh 
t h a t , foreknowing a l l , he would w i l l t o create; and who 
having created, and creation having become needful of a 
redemption possible by divine incarnation, death and 
resurrection,would e t e r n a l l y w i l l the inoarnation and 
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redemption* Thus the incarnation sees God i n Christ, not 
as he has become to achieve a recently necessitated 
redemption, but as he i s eternally* "Not even when the 
Vi r g i n bore him did he suffer any change." 
The conclusion reached, then, by t h i s enquiry in t o 
the Incarnation i s t h a t , "neither the Incarnation nor 
anything else can involve any ohange i n God himself* God 
i s altogether immutable and impassible*" (ISasoall, "Christ, 
the Christian, and the Church"., I v, p.14). 
C* Deif i c a t i o n and Immutability. 
/^Note. Because the meaning and place of d e i f i c a t i o n 
i n Christian theology i s often obscure a rather lengthy 
investigation of the subject was necessary as an approach 
to t h i s section of the essay* To avoid a disproportionate 
digression t h i s preliminary investigation has been made 
into an appendix (^ppendix I , p«/5$ff.)* The conclusions 
there put forward are assumed i n the following paragraphs^"? 
Belief i n the d e i f i c a t i o n of man has a d e f i n i t e plaoe 
i n Christian theology. The t r a d i t i o n a l explanation of 
d e i f i o a t i o n i s that i n the ultimate state of beatitude 
the human soul i s united to God, being exalted to a 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n to i t s f u l l oapacity i n the l i f e of the 
Godhead, but without being i d e n t i f i e d therewith* Man 
becomes divine* 
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I f , then, man enters int o the l i f e of God i t would 
seem that not only i s man changed, but that God i s too, 
since his l i f e i s inoluding a new operation* Thus the 
divine immutability i s challenged* 
The problem i s , i n part, the problem of creation 
approached from the opposite d i r e c t i o n , and i n part the 
solution i s the same* There i s again the error of 
imputing time to the divine existence - Gott oannot enter 
a new rela t i o n s h i p * The great and revolutionary change 
here i s i n man, the change from temporal to eternal 
existence* This was the thought i n Hooker's mind when 
he wrote: 
This admirable union of God with man can enforce 
i n that higher nature no a l t e r a t i o n , because unto 
God there i s nothing more natural than not to be 
subject to any change* (Hooker, Eccl*Pol*V,lib«4). 
^ ^.Even so there i s involved a pontaot between God and 
time, but jf t s t as i t was seen that f o r creation God can 
etern a l l y w i l l an e f f e c t which occurs i n time, so, too* 
w i t h d e i f l o a t i o n he oan eternally w i l l the t r a n s i t i o n of 
souls from time to e t e r n i t y * S* John of the Cross points 
out ( s e e f p * t j S r J ) that d e i f i c a t i o n i s part of the eternal 
plan i n creation* 
I t i s here that the importance of denying an 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God and man i s apparent* I f man i s 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h God he does not reach a higher state of 
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existence than i f he participates i n the divine nature, 
f o r t o he i d e n t i f i e d w i t h i t would he t o oease to e x i s t . 
Nothing oan he added to God's nature, so to be 
i d e n t i f i e d would imply simply the a n n i h i l a t i o n of the 
soul's i d e n t i t y . Further, as the creation of the soul i s 
according to the divine w i l l and plan, i t s a n n i h i l a t i o n 
would involve a change i n God's w i l l , which i s impossible 
Does not God, though, i n w i l l i n g the d e i f i o a t i o n of 
souls by p a r t i c i p a t i o n , w i l l a change i n his own l i f e - a 
sim i l a r impossibility? I n answering t h i s a passage from 
S.Augustine i n whioh he denies that man's changing 
relationship w i t h God involves, change i n God, gives a 
valuable approach: 
I n us therefor-e some change does take place; f o r we 
were worse before we f l e d to him, and we become 
better by f l e e i n g to him; but i n him there i s no 
change. So also he begins to be our Father, when 
we are regenerated through his grace, since he gave 
us power to beoome the sons of God. Our substanoe, 
therefore i s ohanged f o r the b e t t e r , when we become 
his 8ons; and he at the same time begins to be our 
Father, but without any change of his own substanoe. 
Therefore that whioh begins to be spoken of God i n 
time,, and which was not spoken of him beforej i s 
manifestly spoken of him r e l a t i v e l y ; yet not 
. according t o any accident of God* so that anything 
should have happened to him, but d e a r l y according 
to some aocident of t h a t , i n respect to whioh God 
begins t o be oalled something r e l a t i v e l y . When a 
righteous man begins t o be a f r i e n d of God, he 
himself i s changed; but f a r be i t from us to say, 
. that God loves anyone i n time with as i t were a new 
love, which was not i n him before, w i t h whom things 
gone by have not passed away and things future have 
been already done. (Augustine, De T r i n . V 16). 
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The profoundest point of the passage comes at the 
end when we are reminded that the a o t i v i t y of the divine 
love does not a l t e r . God's love i s an i n f i n i t e and 
omnipresent a c t i v i t y . Hence wherever there i s the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s e x i s t i n g , i t e x i s t s . Nothing can be 
added to i t , there i s no p o t e n t i a l i t y , i t i s the wholly 
actual* Thus when the purgation of the soul makes the 
existenoe of divine love i n the soul possible, then the 
love i s there. I t i s of the nature, the a o t u a l i t y , of love 
so t o be* And so the love of God, and thus the l i f e of 
God, exists i n the soul* Were the love to act otherwise i t 
would be accepting l i m i t s , and so changing from the i n f i n i t e 
love i t i s . 
Again we encounter the importance of understanding God 
as being exactly what he has revealed himself to be* God 
is•such that he l e t s his perfected creatures p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
his divine nature* So he has revealed himself, and as he has 
revealed himself so he immutably i s * 
I s nothing, then, added t o God by the d e i f i c a t i o n of 
many human souls1? What oould be added? Presumably the 
sharing of his l i f e w i t h the souls* But i s suoh addition 
possible with an i n f i n i t e being? P l u r a l i t y i s of no 
significance. We must allow, then, that the addition of 
one postulates no more than the addition of many. And i n 
C A 
order of cause, being and time the f i r s t human soul/to . 
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share the divine l i f e without i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s the 
human soul of Christ* So we are led back to the 
Inoarnation, and the discussion i n the previous 
seotion. I n so far. as there i s change i n the Son by 
his taking a human body and soul, so f a r i s there 
change i n God by the d e i f i c a t i o n of man; and since 
the evidence indicated strongly that the Incarnation 
involved no change i n Qod, one i s i n a position to 
uphold a sim i l a r immutability when God de i f i e s his 
oreatures* 
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PART V. IMMUTABILITY IN POST"RENAISSANCE THOUGHT 
I n the centuries fol l o w i n g the Renaissance philosophy 
acquired an independence of the western Church such as 
had not existed f o r a thousand years. Students became 
increasingly engrossed w i t h the immediate world and manTs 
knowledge of i t , and decreasingly w i t h the less immediately 
perceived r e a l i t i e s . Metaphysios, and with i t the study 
of the being of God, l o s t the centre of the stage, and 
science, epistemology, humanism, ethics and p o l i t i c s were 
a l l , as time went by, to j o s t l e f o r i t s place. Theology 
too was a changed study. Intense i n t e r e s t was directed i n 
turn on pa r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s which were under dispute -
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , atonement, the papacy, contemplation, social 
aotion; and the rest were either disregarded, or 
unconsciously accepted i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l form. The 
divisions of Christendom localised energy, fostered 
parochial theology, and dissipated a b i l i t y i n r i v a l r y and 
statesmanship. I t was not an era f o r a new Augustine or 
Aquinas, and the m&^physical a t t r i b u t e s of God seemed 
hardly an urgent study f o r anyone; and i n any case f o r the 
Christian the Fathers and the supposedly unenlightened. 
Sohoolmen had done so much already. 
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Thus as far as the study of the immutability of 
God i s concerned we do not f i n d ourselves on new ground. 
With some thinkers, as the early Cartesians, a posi t i o n 
s i m i l a r to Augustine or of the Schoolmen was accepted 
w i t h l i t t l e c r i t i o i s m . 
By the name of Godj I understand a substance i n f i n i t e 
e t ernal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, a l l -
powerful, and by which I myself, and every other 
thing which e x i s t s , i f such there be, were created* 
(Descartes, Med.III. See Appendix I V . ) . 
A Perhaps the new age was less free of t r a d i t i o n than 
i t thought. With other thinkers an in t e r e s t i n g r e -
enaotment takes plaoe. Having acquired an independence . 
not unlike that of the Greek philosophers, they are found 
to have imitated them i n seeking a f i x e d p o i n t , an 
unchanging r e a l i t y , as the pole on which the universe 
turns, and to whioh appeal can be made f o r confidence 
i n t r u t h and the assessment of values. To investigate 
the significance of the inclusion or omission of some 
suoh notion of immutability i n the various conceptions 
of God offered by the post-Renaissance philosophers would 
be unprofitable, f o r the name God beoame variously 
applied, as denoting that part of a philosopher's 
hypothesis to which the author thought i t most appropriate 
I t i s the persistence with whioh some conception of 
immutability appears as an almost inesoapable oonoept i n 
the thought of one philosopher a f t e r another that i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
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One might expect the pantheistic, explanations of 
the universe to be the least l i a b l e to include an 
immutable existence, both because the usual appeal i s 
from the changing world to an immutable e n t i t y 'outside 1 
(an argument which postulates a double order of existence 
one of which i s transoendent, such as i s exoluded by the 
very nature of pantheism); and also because an 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God (or whatever term i s applied) w i t h 
the universe where ohange i s so abundantly manifest would 
seem* ipso f a c t o , to postulate change i n God; I f the 
pantheists had been given the task of including 
immutability i n t h e i r systems by hook or by crook, one 
can believe that they might have found a way; but the 
fao t i s that they did include i t while under no such 
obl i g a t i o n , and therefore, we must conclude, beoause 
they found i t neoessary to a r a t i o n a l exposition of the 
universe. The f i r s t of the great pantheists of the period 
Spinoza, i s a remarkable example. For him nothing exists 
outside God, whose being embraoes everythingjeaoh human 
mind being a constituent part of God's nature* And yet 
God i s not confounded w i t h the ohange and variableness 
of that which his nature embraces.* He i s timeless 
r e a l i t y , he i s perfect freedom, not beoause he can act 
a r b i t r a r i l y , but beoause he aots solely from the laws 
of his own nature, and there i s nothing external t o him 
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that can determine his aotions. X'hus he i s constant, 
and cannot be changed, he i s "immutable and eternal" 
(Spinoza, Ethics V 20, schol.p*268)• The delicate 
reasoning by which t h i s conclusion i s reached i s not 
important here, but i t i s important that i t was reached 
by di n t of sheer unprejudiced, conscientious reasoning* 
I n Hegel's pantheism the Absolute.occupies a 
posi t i o n roughly corresponding to the God of Spinoza. 
I t i s the ultimate r e a l i t y about whicjh, Hegel claimed, 
we can know something by the use of reason,, and from 
knowledge of the concrete f a c t s of l i f e , h i s t o r y and 
r e l i g i o n * Thus Hegel i n i t i a l l y concentrates a t t e n t i o n 
on human experience and what i t can t e l l us. I t i s , 
then, of no small interest that again we are led i n the 
d i r e c t i o n of immutability. I t i s no more than i n the 
d i r e c t i o n , f o r p l a i n l y immutability i n the f u l l sense 
oannot apply to a being of whom i t i s affirmed that the 
course of history i s not only the process by whioh man 
comes to a consciousness of t h i s being, but i s also the 
process by whioh the being comes to a oonsoiousness of 
i t s e l f . Hegel also has an argument that every t r u t h 
asserted involves the oontrary untruth. Thus, f o r 
example, b e l i e f i n free w i l l i s opposed by the b e l i e f 
i n determinism. Though eaoh appears true from the 
arguments f o r i t , neither can be wholly true beoause 
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of the existence of the other* There i s , then, a wider 
t r u t h involving both p a r t i a l t r u t h s * This likewise has 
i t s contrary t r u t h , and leads to a f u r t h e r synthesis, 
and so on, u n t i l the f i n a l t r u t h i s reached under which 
a l l p a r t i a l truths are subsumedo The f i n a l t r u t h i s the 
whole t r u t h about everything* This f i n a l t r u t h , a mental 
existenoe, i s the Absolute. Thus Hegel has argued to a 
t r u t h to which nothing oan be added nor anything taken away* 
I n short we have an unchanging existence of a kind - a 
single u n i f i e d r e a l i t y , comprehending w i t h i n i t s e l f a l l 
d i s t i n c t i o n s and ohanges. Again dispassionate reasoning 
has indicated that ultimate r e a l i t y i s stable. 
From these b r i e f considerations of the two leading 
pantheists, the tendenoy of whose philosophy one would 
anticipate as being hos t i l e to immutability, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s suggested that r e j e c t i o n of a conception 
of the cosmos as a oapricious conglomeration of f o r t u i t o u s 
events i s oonduoive to a philosophy i n which whatever i s 
accounted most r e a l i s t o be imparted w i t h some degree 
of impregnable s t a b i l i t y * I t remains to see i f , and how 
f a r , the thought of other post-Renaissance philosophers 
bears out t h i s hypothesis. 
Among the theis t s Leibniz i s of speoial in t e r e s t as 
expressing theism according t o a theory novel to 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y * Kid he escape the idea of immutability 
that characterised previous Christian theism, or did i t 
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s t i l l appear essential? Having proposed h i s world of 
monads, each in d i v i d u a l and self-contained, he had to 
account f o r t h e i r apparent i n t e r a c t i o n and co-ordination* 
This he accomplished by proposing a pre-established 
harmony* The course of each monad i s o r i g i n a l l y determined 
w i t h the existence of a l l other monads i n view, so that 
eaoh, i n f u l f i l l i n g i t s ooursej although subject to no 
outside interference,' p a r a l l e l s and r e f l e c t s the 
development occurring i n the other monads. Thus the world 
i s an harmonious order and not c h a o t i c A l l depends then 
on the pre-established harmony and i t s u n a l t e r a b i l i t y , and 
f o r t h i s God i s the assurance* So i t would seem that God 
himself i s changeless* Leibniz also maintained that 
necessary truths cannot be ohanged, even by God* I f by 
t h i s i t i s implied that there i s power superior to God's 
(and i t i s not a necessary i m p l i c a t i o n ) , the consequences 
are unimportant f o r the present disoussion, sinoe Leibniz's 
contention i s s t i l l that the ultimate r e a l i t y i s 
invested with s t a b i l i t y * Thus f a r , then., the hypothesis 
i s unimpaired: Leibniz having accepted the p r i n c i p l e of 
order i n the universe i s led on t o i n f e r an ultimate 
invariable* 
At t h i s p o i n t , and while considering theism, i t i s 
convenient to mention the Deists, who i n maintaining 
'par excellence' the divine order i n the world, banished 
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God to an abstract immutable existence, i n whioh divine 
a o t i v i t y was more or less reduced to saying the "Gol" 
that started the universe. 
The epistemology that characterised the period from 
the end of the Seventeenth Century to the l a t t e r part 
of the Eighteenth was so f a r removed from metaphysics as 
to bear l i t t l e on concepts of divine a t t r i b u t e s , though 
parts of Berkeley's writings included the study of theism. 
The increasing scepticism about the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
re l i a b l e knowledge d i d , of oourse, from the time of Looke 
onwards, react on the ideas of knowledge of ultimate being 
u n t i l the radioal scepticism of Hume made doubt more 
assured then oredence. Yet Hume himself contended i n the . 
"Dialogues concerning Natural Religion" that there was a 
clue to the divine existence i n the presence of constant 
and uniform laws i n the universe. Again i t i s the appeal 
from order i n the world t o a r e l i a b l e promoter of the 
order. 
The most persistent form of t h i s argument occurs i n 
treatises on ethics, where the need f o r a stable norm of 
good and e v i l , r i g h t and wrong, and of value, has 
repeatedly led thinkers to God, or some superior r e a l i t y , 
as a s u f f i c i e n t ground .for the permanence of the norms and 
values associated w i t h oonduct. Thus Looke made God the 
anonor of his ethics. But i t i s not to be assumed that 
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such recourse i s ine v i t a b l e . Hume found goodness t o 
reside i n that which gives to the spectator a pleasing 
sentiment of approbation. And l a t e r Huxley, Spencer and 
M i l l were to show other alternatives; though none of 
t h e i r theories has shown the resistance to o r i t i c i s m 
which must be allowed t o e t h i c a l theories founded on 
the s t a b i l i t y of divine values. 
Kant himself, whose philosophy was both a direot 
product of and reaction t o , the position reached by Hume, 
was led, so l e l y by his study of the moral law, to 
postulate an unknowable being, whom he c a l l s God, as 
the assurance that the law i n safeguarded. From his 
investigation of reason he maintained that f o r a 
conorete aot of knowledge not thought only, but thought 
and sense are required. From t h i s i t followed that 
beyond the phenomenal realm of sense knowledge could not 
go, and excursions into the noumenal world of pure 
i n t e l l e o t (should i t exist) oan only lead t o i n v a l i d 
conclusions. Thus i f God exists he i s unknowable. I s 
there any reason f o r believing that the noumenal world 
exist8 at a l l ? Kant thought there was. I n the phenomenal 
world a l l i s determined, but an aot oould be free i n the 
r e a l i t y whioh i t might possess i n the noumenal world. 
Thus freedom i s possible only oh the assumption of a 
noumenal world; and freedom i s necessary as the 
absolute precondition of the moral l i f e . Without freedom 
the moral law, whose existence Kant i n s i s t e n t l y 
upheld, would be devoid of meaning. Therefore the 
noumenal world ex i s t s . Although the- desire f o r 
happiness i s wholly d i s t i n c t from the content of the 
moral w i l l , y e t , as man i s now known to be of the 
noumenal as w e l l as of the phenomenal world, happiness 
must have some place i n the highest good - i t must also, 
and i n union w i t h v i r t u e * exist noumenally. And since 
i t cannot be attained i n t h i s world an endless l i f e must 
be postulated f o r i t s r e a l achievement. But what assurance 
i s there of the permanence of -the moral law, and the 
r e a l i t y of happiness i n eternal l i f e which i t brings i n 
i t s wake? Kant answers, God.. 
Consequently we must assume a moral World-Cause 
(an author of the world) i n order to set before 
ourselves a f i n a l purpose consistently with the 
moral law; and i n so f a r as the l a t t e r i s 
neoessary, so f a r ( i . e . i n the same degree and on 
the same ground) the former also must be necessarily 
assumed; i . e . we must admit that there i s a God. 
( C r i t . of Judgment, B377-380). 
Irhe i d e a l i s t content of Eant Ts philosophy l a r g e l y oocupied 
the minds of Fiohte and Schelling, and i n turn of Hegel, 
of whose, thought notice has already been taken. The 
l a t e r Nineteenth Century found much of i t s i n s p i r a t i o n 
i n Hegelianism, and i n Darwinian theories of evolution 
and development. I n the consequent actions and reactions 
humanism, attended by l i b e r a l i s m , prospered on the one 
hand, and materialism, attended by agnostioism and 
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atheism, prospered on the other. With the exception of 
some of the agnostios each i n i t s way sought t o establish 
some universal law or prooess as the assuranoe of underlying 
s t a b i l i t y ^ One reaotion came i n the shape of renewed concen-
t r a t i o n on t r a d i t i o n a l catholioism i n both the Roman and 
Anglican communions. There was the introduction of neo-
scholasticism, the r e v i v a l of study of p a t r i s t i o s , and, a t 
the t u r n of the century, the wider r e a l i s a t i o n of the s i g n i -
fioanoe of the Christian mystics. A l l these, i n the theolo-
g i c a l spheres whioh they influenced, re-emphasised the 
t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics, and the t r a d i t i o n a l dootrine of God. 
I n the Twentieth Century the movement continues^. Sot 
i t i s of in t e r e s t to consider one or two of the newer and 
more widely reoeived secular philosophies. Berg^son found 
the conception of ultimate r e a l i t y t o be a " v i t a l impulse" 
from which the world prooess springs. Physioal l i f e i s 
inseparable £oxm$ even i d e n t i c a l w i t h , time; and time and 
duration means invention, oreation, the continuous a l t e r a t i o n 
of the absolutely new.. Thus existence i s ohange. The 
universe consists of many ever-ohanging things, and the 
creative life-stream i s i t s e l f subject to spasmodic acceler-
ations and declines. Bergson attacked conceptions of 
change which postulated i n a changing thing two parts, one 
ohanging, one remaining unohanged. He denied the second 
part's existence, on the ground that when a l l the elements 
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which are changing i n a ohanging th i n g are eliminated there 
i s l i t e r a l l y nothing l e f t . There are not, then, i n the 
universe things which ohange, there i s only ohange. The 
fundamental r e a l i t y , which i s a u n i t y , i s to he oonoeived as 
a stream of ohange* 
Eere i s the oonoeption of r e a l i t y least akin, at f i r s t 
s i g ht, to the orthodox idea of a God who i s immutable as the 
fundamental r e a l i t y . But i f the stream of ohange i s t o 
remain a stream of ohange (as i t does with Bergson), i t has. 
some mark of the invariable upon i t . The position i s 
analogous to that of Heraclitus, who must allow his law that 
a l l things ohange to be i t s e l f unchanging—or i n v a l i d . I f 
Bergson were going to deny a l l permanence he must needs 
make the.whole of r e a l i t y and existence capricious, so that 
his philosophy would not be an aocount of exi s t i n g e n t i t i e s , 
but merely an account of the state of things at one p a r t i c u l a r 
i n s t a n t , and with no reference to anything beyond that i n s t a n t , 
for by then an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t system, or no system at a l l , 
might have arisen as a oaprioe of ohange. Bergson does 
not say t h i s , and has no i n t e n t i o n of saying i t . He maintained 
that there i s order even amid the change, and with his reten-
t i o n of order goes a ret e n t i o n of oertain invariables, such 
as the existenoe of the e r r a t i c stream of ohange i t s e l f , or 
Bergson*s philosophy and i t s laws of ohange. This might be 
regarded as a test oase of the proposed hypothesis that any 
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assertion of order i n the universe implies a s t a b i l i t y , 
i f not an immutability, responsible f o r the order. 
Consideration shows that from a l l . t h e philosophical 
discussions three alternatives seem to o f f e r themselves: the 
universe i s either chaos unoonfined, i n which case a l l i s 
ohanging, and there i s neither order nor anything unchanging; 
or the universe i s a ohanoe concatenation of purposeless; 
event8, whi.oh again exclude^ the unchanging; or else the 
universe has some order and r e l i a b i l i t y , i n whioh case there 
i s something stable - a law, a process, a being - whioh 
underlies the w o r l d - f i e l d . I n general terms i t seems f a i r 
to suggest that of these three alternatives the f i r s t has 
never been seriously upheld, not even by the pessimists, and 
b e l i e f i n i t would i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y be incompatible w i t h 
sanity; the second has been proposed by a few, notably extreme 
Darwinians; and the t h i r d oovers a l l the other.philosophers 
and t h e i r philosophies. 
Of the philosophies of the present day that of Whitehead 
i s the most prominent. Unfortunately the inherent d i f f i c u l t y 
of hie thought i s increased by an extensive terminology 
peculiar to himself, and an indigenous aptitude f o r obsourity. 
He divides the world of space and time i n t o a p l u r a l i t y of 
'processes' of an organio conception. Particulars are -
replaced by 'aotual e n t i t i e s ' or 'aotual occasions': these 
are sometimes desoribed as 'drops of existence', and they are 
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i n t e g r a l t o the whole order of prooess, being a d e f i n i t e 
achievement a r i s i n g from phases of prooess, and the forerunners 
of f u r t h e r process. They are the r e a l i t y of the spatio-
temporal universe, and are ever ohanging. There i s c l e a r l y 
a s i m i l a r i t y here between the thought of Whitehead, Bergson 
and Heraclitus, Bergson's stream corresponding t o Whitehead's 
process. But the likeness must not be taken too f a r , f o r 
Whitehead prooeeds i n a manner more resembling Plato's reaotion 
to the state of f l u x proposed by Heraclitus. i f a l l i s f l u x , 
or ohange, or prooess, there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge: 
t r u t h i t s e l f i s i n f l u x . Plato^s answer was the Forms. 
Whitehead's i s 'eternal e n t i t i e s ' . He explains that besides 
the change and enduranoe experienced i n the world there i s a 
fu r t h e r f a o t , namely ' e t e r n a l i t y ' , and t h i s i s charaoteristio 
of a l l the eternal e n t i t i e s . For example, a oertain colour, 
perhaps a t i n t of yellow, may be present i n a flower, and 
depart when the blooms die. When the plant blooms next year 
the t i n t w i l l be there again. I t w i l l be the same t i n t . 
Although i t has not endured i n the sooiety of aotual e n t i t i e s 
whioh made up the flower i t has i n no wise ceased to e x i s t . 
S i m i l a r l y shapes recur i n aotual e n t i t i e s . Their existence 
i s independent of the actual occasions i n which they appear. 
Colours, sounds, geometrio oharaoters, these are the eternal 
objects or e n t i t i e s . Whitehead defines them thus: 
Any e n t i t y whose conceptual recognition does not 
involve a tfeoessary reference to any d e f i n i t e 
actual e n t i t i e s of the temporal world i s oalled 
an 'eternal object'. 
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They are eternal and do not lose t h e i r i d e n t i t y by ingress 
i n t o actual occasions, even though the aotual oooasion 
may involve a r e a l union between many eternal e n t i t i e s . 
I n short, they are fundamentally unchangeable, and corres-
pond to universale, and to Plato's Forms. 
Having explained the order and recurrence manifest i n 
the world w i t h the eternal e n t i t i e s , Whitehead s t i l l f e l t 
the need t o seek an e n t i t y that would constitute the meta-
physical s t a b i l i t y of the universe. This e n t i t y he o a l l s God. 
B r i e f l y h i s argument i s that there are certain l i m i t a t i o n s 
i n the process of the universe, as tha t the creative prooess 
i s that whioh i t i s and no other, though i t might have been. 
Also there have emerged standards of value. ( I n t h i s he 
approximates t o the et h i o a l appeal t o immutability). From 
.these two considerations i t seems that the whole course of 
events has developed under the d i r e c t i o n of a p r i n c i p l e 
composed of conditions and standards of value.This i s God. 
No reason oan be given f o r the nature of God, since he i s 
the ground of r a t i o n a l i t y ; but as the ground of l i m i t a t i o n 
i n the ultimate a c t i v i t y he i s the assurance of s t a b i l i t y of 
the prooess and i t s values, i n one respeot God appears to be 
d i s t i n c t l y mutable, i n that i n "Process and Reality" aWhitehead 
makes an addition t o the ooncept of God's primordial nature. 
This i s the Jtaonsequent nature' whioh arises from his reaotion 
to the world, and i s an int e g r a t i o n of physical f e e l i n g , 
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derived from the physical world, int o his primordial nature: 
"God, then, i s to be conceived as originated by conceptual 
experience with his process of conception motivated by 
consequent physio a 1 experience i n i t i a l l y derived from the 
temporal world." 
Thus above the f l u x of the spatio-temporal world of. 
aotual e n t i t i e s Whitehead maintains the existence of e t e r n i t y 
and immutability i n the order and i d e n t i t y of the eternal 
e n t i t i e s , and f i n d s the assurance of s t a b i l i t y i n the e n t i t y 
he oalls God. This, the mo3t recent of philosophical systems 
i n the grand manner, makes a direct appeal f o r the neoessity 
of immutability, and the conservation of order, i n the 
superior realms of existenoe. I t s mark of i d e n t i t y i n t h i s 
respeot i s the sharing of them between the oonoeptions of 
eternal e n t i t i e s and God, whereas the general tendenoy has 
been to allocate a l l to one r e a l i t y only. 
Whitehead's philosophy was thought out against the 
background of modern mathematical and s o i e n t t f i o research, 
amd i n that sense i s foreign to t r a d i t i o n a l Christian thought. 
Thus the sympathy which i s seen to exist between them i s the 
mora impressive. Christian theology r e l i e s f o r i t s premises 
on reason and r a t i o n a l l y aooeptable revelation, and i t has 
often been claimed that the r a t i o n a l has been devoured by the 
revealed u n t i l nothing remains but the smile on the face of 
the t i g e r . How i s i t , then* that the most thorough of 
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modern r a t i o n a l philosophies i s not at loggerheads with 
t h i s old and corrupt s u r v i v a l of past ages? How i s i t 
that Whitehead and a l l the other post-Renaissance 
philosophers to whom ear have turned have found t h e i r steps 
going either a l i t t l e way or f a r i n the di r e c t i o n of the 
Hebrew-born Christian conception of an immutable God? I s 
i t not that the theology i s not so warped? That the 
r a t i o n a l has not been forgotten? and that the revelation 
has aooorded w i t h and advanced that whioh i s f i r s t seen i n 
the h a l f - l i g h t of human experience? Onoe allow that God 
reveals, and there i s no oause to wonder that the revelations 
of an immutable God accord w i t h deductions and syntheses, 
founded on experience of the phenomena of his creation. 
On the other hand, i f i t appears to the Christian that 
immutability i s a p r o f i t l e s s a t t r i b u t e to asoribe to God, 
l e t him r e o a l l that the majority of thinkers of the last 
400 year8 have spent no small part of t h e i r time t r y i n g to 
f i n d some r e a l i t y , some being, to whioh they could asoribe 
the ideas of s t a b i l i t y and of the a8suranoe of order, and 
of an ultimate unchangeable, from whioh t h e i r experience and 
reason would not permit them to esoape. 
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PART 71. THE NATURE AMD' VALUE OF IMMUTABILITY. 
A. B e l i e f i n I m m a t a b i l i t y . 
The f o r e g o i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have shown th a t b e l i e f 
i n some s o r t of immutable being or norm, u s u a l l y i d e n t i f i e d 
with, u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y , i s fundamental i n most p h i l o s o p h i e s . 
P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e both found i t e s e n t t f i a l ; and i t s 
remarkable p e r s i s t e n c e through systems of every k i n d among 
post-Renaissance philosophers l e d to t h e c o n c l u s i o n that 
e i t h e r one admits an i n v a r i a b l e , or one f o r f e i t s any absolute 
standards or guaranteed order i n the cosmos. A few p h i l o -
sophers have upheld the l a t t e r p o s i t i o n : an imposing 
ma j o r i t y the former. 
. T h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence to show that C h r i s t i a n i t y , 
i n p o s t u l a t i n g immutability as c h a r a c t e r i s i n g i t s conception 
of u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y , God, i s not t r y i n g simply to honour 
c e r t a i n b i b l i c a l t e x t s , nor to deck i t s d e i t y w i t h absolute 
a t t r i b u t e s as a consequence of o v e r - e n t h u s i a s t i c and i l l -
c onsidered p i e t y . Nor has i t flisregardeld reason, nor been 
su b j e c t to a c a p r i c i o u s r e v e l a t i o n . The C h r i s t i a n p o s i t i o n 
c e r t a i n l y appeals to r e v e l a t i o n but i t a l s o employs reason 
to maintain the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the r e v e l a t i o n , and to 
support i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . A p l a i n testimony to t h i s was 
seen i n the work of Aquinas, who both argues f o r immutability 
from the S c r i p t u r a l record of d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n , and who 
p r e v i o u s l y , i n s t a t i n g h i s arguments f o r the very e x i s t e n c e 
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of God, had shown f i r s t the n e c e s s i t y of p o s t u l a t i n g the 
e x i s t e n c e of an immutable being as ultimate i n the order of 
e x i s t e n c e . 
The reasons, excluding r e v e l a t i o n , f o r which p h i l o s o -
phers and theologians have a s s e r t e d the n e c e s s i t y f o r an 
immutable f a c t o r i n the cosmic order, tteagah v a r i o u s i n 
approach and expression, are b a s i c a l l y few. P l a t o , and many 
a f t e r him, grasped the need of an assurance t h a t t r u t h i s 
constant, f o r without that knwoledge i s impossible. Every 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l system r e a l l y assumes t h i s , i n t h a t i t p r o f e s s e s 
to be exposing the t r u t h . I t was n o t i c e d as a weakness i n 
Bergson that he seemed not to appreciate t h i s f u l l y . Both 
P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e employed forms of cosmological argument, 
a s s e r t i n g the n e c e s s i t y of an uncaused p r i n c i p l e of order 
to account f o r a cosmos which experience showed as c h a r a c t e r -
i s e d by c a u s a t i o n and order. With the argument f o r order 
are a l l i e d a l l the suppositions of permanence of n a t u r a l 
laws. The s c i e n t i s t makes the i n f e r e n c e when he assumes 
t h a t the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s by which n a t u r a l phenomena 
are governed are s t a b l e , it i s the escape from chaos, and 
a b a s t i o n to. the appeal f o r the v a l i d i t y of knowledge. 
C l o s e l y r e l a t e d i s the l a s t great reason - the need 
f o r p o s t u l a t i n g the v a l i d i t y of r i g h t and the laws of 
conduct. This i s the e t h i c a l approach, and, as has been 
seen, v e r y few exponents of e t h i c s have been able to avoid 
i t , and the few who have, such as Hume, have a very small 
f o l l o w i n g i n the matter. I t s potency was most notably 
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seen i n the part i t played i n the thought of Kant. E i t h e r 
one mast allow t h a t goodness, j u s t i c e and h o l i n e s s are. 
e s s e n t i a l l y and permanently nobler than, and contrary to, 
that which i s e v i l , unjust, d i a b o l i c a l , or e l s e allow some 
conception i n which i t would "be p o s s i b l e f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n 
to he l o s t , or the v a l u e s i n v e r t e d - i n short, i n which r i g h t 
and wrong conduct were v i r t u a l l y meaningless terms, and i n 
which any true assessment of values was r u l e d out. 
Such are the p r i n c i p a l reasons f o r which the exis t e n c e 
of an immutable r e a l i t y has most f r e q u e n t l y been proposed. 
I t remains to consid e r what has been implied by the term 
immutability, and e s p e c i a l l y what i t shouid imply i n C h r i s t i a n 
theology. The f i r s t meaning that comes to mind i s u s u a l l y 
of an unchanging, and therefore completely i n a c t i v e and 
s t a t i c . e x i s t e n c e . But no philosopher who has a s c r i b e d immu-
t a b i l i t y to a being r a t h e r than to some such inanimate 
e x i s t e n c e as a law, has ever meant quite t h i s . The nearest 
approach to i t was the God of A r i s t o t l e ; but as has been seen, 
A r i s t o t l e allowed s e l f - c o n t e m p l a t i o n as compatible w i t h that 
immutable e x i s t e n c e , and l a t e r Aquinas showed j u s t how much 
could be developed from t h a t concession. But concession i s 
the wrong word: l i m i t , or extreme, would be b e t t e r . Thus 
A r i s t o t l e was y i e l d i n g nothing i n p o s t u l a t i n g self-contempla-
t i o n as p e r t a i n i n g to h i s immutable God; he was expounding 
what he meant by an immutable God. The most extreme form, 
then, of pagan and s e c u l a r philosophy w i t n e s s e s to a c t i v i t y , 
without change i n an immutable God. 
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I n Old Testament and G h r i s t a i n theology there appeared 
from the very beginning an i n s i s t e n c e on a c t i v i t y i n God as 
compatible w i t h "belief i n God's ehangelessness. I n the 
F a t h e r s the treatment developed from bare statement i n the 
e a r l y c e n t u r i e s , to e l a b o r a t i o n , and then contention and 
e x p o s i t i o n by the time of Athanasius, and f u l l e r e x p o s i t i o n 
i n the days of the Schoolmen. Sfith the a i d thus provided, 
and w i t h the t e n e t s of the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h as data i t i s 
now necessary to attempt an e x p o s i t i o n of what i t would seem 
the C h r i s t i a n i s to understand by immutability when he 
a s c r i b e s i t to God. 
I n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e the e x c l u s i o n of change, and the 
i n c l u s i o n of a c t i v i t y appears c o n t r a d i c t o r y . But two consid-
e r a t i o n s make f o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The f i r s t i s that we are 
concerned w i t h an i n f i n i t e absolute being. ( e f . M a s e a l l , 
" C h r i s t , the C h r i s t i a n , and the Church'.', 1 v,p,14.) The 
second i s t h a t the C h r i s t a i n conception r e l a t e s to a personal 
God, and not to a metaphysical a b s t r a c t i o n . There i s t r u t h 
i n the statement t h a t : 
The immutability of God, as r e l i g i o n conceives i t , 
i s more l i k e the s t e a d f a s t n e s s of a good man-, than 
the u n a l t e r a b l e p r o p e r t i e s of a t r i a n g l e . 
(Matthews, "God i n Christen thought and 
experience 1 p. 255)/ 
but Dr. Matthews has overstated the case, because, as has 
appeared, the C h r i s t i a n theology i n c l u d e s the metaphysical 
approach, and i t may not be dlsragarded. E r r o E 1 a r i s e s not 
from allo w i n g metaphysics t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l p l a c e , but from 
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i s o l a t i n g them; f o r t r e a t e d alone the metaphysical approach 
tempts one to propose a hypothesis as to what God mast he 
l i k e / ^ £ 4 e * e ^ and that l e a d s to the d i f f i c u l t t a s k of f i t t i n g 
the hypothesis to the e s t a b l i s h e d b e l i e f s about God, and tlie 
f a c t s of the I n c a r n a t i o n . With the other approach one i s 
able to assemble the b e l i e f s and f a c t s , and know th a t they 
present, without any guessing or i n t r i c a t e reasoning, what 
the immutable God i s l i k e . I t w i l l then, remain to d i s c o v e r 
how such a c t i v i t y i s compatible with immutability. D i s c u s s i o n 
on these l i n e s has already been made on pp iff«S~Q and ttS-J 
which need not be repeated beyond i n s i s t i n g again that the 
I n c a r n a t i o n and c r u c i f i x i o n do not c o n s t i t u t e a d i v i n e 
'tour de f o r c e ' i n h u m i l i t y and love, but are a supreme reve-
l a t i o n of d i v i n e h u m i l i t y and love as i t e t e r n a l l y i s . God 
i s such a being as e t e r n a l l y w i l l s to be i n c a r n a t e and to 
die to redeem c r e a t i o n i f c r e a t i o n so needs redemption; A 
comparison, n e c e s s a r i l y crude, could be made w i t h water 
flowing i n a channel. I f at one point the channel widens 
the water w i l l f i l l the wider space, i n c r e a s e i t s surface 
area, and so on; but the water has not changed i t s nature. 
I t has acted according to i t s nature. Had i t continued i n 
a narrow stream i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h a t i t maintained i n the 
narrow channel, i n defi a n c e of the laws c o n t r o l l i n g the flow 
of l i q u i d s , then i t would have chamged, by remaining, appar-
e n t l y , the same. So God w i l l s to a c t i n a l l circumstances 
according to tfe© nature. The circumstances are not imposed 
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upon him, and oannot compel him. A l l depends on h i s w i l l , 
and t h e r e f o r e h i s essence * t h a t which he immutably i s . Were 
he not to be i n c a r n a t e he would be remaining apparently the 
same, whereas a c t u a l l y he would have ohanged i n the w i l l and 
love t h a t are h i s essence. Thus there i s i n God's a c t i v i t y 
i 
no a o t u a l i s a t i o n of a p o t e n t i a l i t y , f o r nothing i n h i s nature 
has become a o t u a l j h i s essence has been r e v e a l e d as i t i s 
e t e r n a l l y . The p o t e n t i a l i t y and contingency i s i n the 
r e v e l a t i o n , not the t h i n g r e v e a l e d , and that God can e t e r n a l l y 
and immutably w i l l the p o t e n t i a l and contingent has al r e a d y 
been seen i n the d i s c u s s i o n of c r e a t i o n . Thus, i n the 
In o a r n a t i o n , or i n any other r e v e l a t i o n , God s u f f e r s n e i t h e r 
a c t u a l i s a t i o n nor p o t e n t i a l i t y ; i n s t e a d there i s r e v e a l e d 
t h a t whioh i s a l r e a d y ( o r , more aoourately, e t e r n a l l y ) 
a c t u a l - the 'aotus purus 1 - God's a o t i v i t y a s i t i s . 
The key l i e s i n the statement of Athanasius, a l r e a d y 
overworked i n t h i s essay, t h a t "not even when the V i r g i n 
bore him did he s u f f e r any change". I f t h i s i s taken a s 
c o n s i s t i n g of two t r u t h s i n apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n i t i s of 
s m a l l p r o f i t . I f i t i s taken as a premise f o r a l l d i s c u s s -
ions of immutability, e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to the I n c a r n a t i o n , 
i t s value i s g r e a t , f o r -
As God i s h i s e x i s t e n c e , so i s he h i s a c t i o n . And h i s 
aotion i s h i s e x i s t e n c e ( M a r i t a i n , " P r e f . t o 
Metaphysics",17 2, p. 112). 
I t i s by examination of the a o t i o n that we understand the 
e x i s t e n c e r a t h e r than v i c e v e r s a . The immutability of God, 
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then, might be defined as an e t e r n a l , unchanging, d i v i n e 
a c t i v i t y whioh could be manifest i n r e v e l a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y 
i n the I n o a r n a t i o n and l i f e of God the Son, i n e x a c t l y t h a t 
manner i n which i t was manifested, and no other* 
One does not pretend t h a t on the b a s i s of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n 
a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n the C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f i n immuta-
b i l i t y , a r e e l i m i n a t e d , only that some are e l i m i n a t e d , and 
most a r e diminished. The g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y of a l l concerns 
the metaphysical a t t r i b u t e s of God i n C h r i s t - h i s i m p a s s i b i l -
i t y , omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscienoe. I n r e s p e c t to 
them God would seem to have changed i n being i n c a r n a t e , f o r 
they a r e not obvious i n C h r i s t , and seem by h i s very aooeptance 
of the l i m i t a t i o n s of f l e s h to be excluded or oonoealed 
r a t h e r than r e v e a l e d . The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t they were l a i d 
a s i d e has a l r e a d y been d i s c r e d i t e d (pp.iM-n(>) . Of Impass-
i b i l i t y i t may be s a i d t h a t i n the. I n c a r n a t i o n nothing was 
imposed on the d i v i n e w i l l , whose purpose was e x a o t l y 
accomplished.. I f C h r i s t was s u b j e c t to the w i l l of men, i t 
was by a v o l u n t a r y a c t on the p a r t s of both F a t h e r and Son. 
God was never the u n w i l l i n g o b j e c t , and t h e r e f o r e i n the 
B t r i o t and proper sense, never p a s s i v e . Omnipresence l o s e s 
most of i t s d i f f i c u l t y when considered as being an a t t r i b u t e 
of C h r i s t as God, and hot as man. S u r e l y t h i s i s not an 
unacceptable b e l i e f , any more than the assumption t h a t God 
was absent from the whole of c r e a t i o n when h i s presenoe was 
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i n one sense l o o a l i s e d i n the burning bush* S i m i l a r l y 
omnipotence can be r e s t r i c t e d to the d i v i n e nature i n C h r i s t . 
With omnisoienoe we a r e i n a anion t h i o k e r wood. As Gore 
peroeived, f o r God i n C h r i s t t o be immutably omnisoient and 
f o r C h r i s t to be possessed of a t r u l y human l i m i t e d knowledge, 
i s a s deep a s any mystery of the i n c a r n a t i o n . Here the 
approaoh advocated i n c o n s i d e r i n g immutability, t h a t isi$ 
arguing from the a t t r i b u t e as re v e a l e d i n C h r i s t t o the f u l l 
oharaoter of the a t t r i b u t e , i s l e s s e f f e c t i v e . We oan s a y 
th a t the immutable a c t i v i t y of God i s a s rev e a l e d i n the 
a c t i v i t y of the inoarnate Son; but can we say t h a t the 
omniscience of God i s a s rev e a l e d i n the ignorance of the 
incarnate Son? Obviously not. The way out most ready t o 
hand with t h i s , a s w i t h other metaphysical a t t r i b u t e s l i e s 
i n the d i s t i n c t i o n of the natures i n . C h r i s t , remembering a t 
the same time t h a t any wholesale p a r c e l l i n g out of apparently 
incompatible a t t r i b u t e s between the two filatures only pushes 
the question back to how the ^ t u r e s oan be united i n the 
one Person. This i s oonspiouously true of omniscience. To 
kenoh'c 
a s s e r t then t h a t that i s a matter f o r the $eo&fe&c s c h o l a r 
to s e t t l e may be convenient, but i t i s an evasion, not a 
i s o l u t i o n . 
B. The Value.of I m m u t a b i l i t y to C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
To the Church and her theology the b e l i e f i n immut a b i l i t y 
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haa a l l the v a l u e s which we have j u s t seen i t bears f o r the 
philosopher, and much more b e s i d e s . There i s the same worth 
derived from the confidence i n purpose, s t a b i l i t y and order 
as underlying the cosmos and i t s laws - t h e i r only p o s s i b l e 
v a r i a t i o n being i n m i r a c l e s and i n the u l t i m a t e ending of 
1 
the world, events s u b j e c t to the same good and immutable 
w i l l on which the e s t a b l i s h e d order depends. Fundamental 
f o r t u i t o u s n e s s and oaprioe, those s t i m u l a n t s of d e s p a i r 
and anarchy, are r u l e d out. The o e r t a i n t y of the r e a l i t y 
of t r u t h and the good, with the consequent making absolute * 
of the moral law, so that r i g h t and wrong, good and e v i l can 
never be interchangeable, and t h a t the assessment of conduct 
i s not a matter of opinion, and t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s of the 
Judgment a r e u n a l t e r a b l y deolared, a l l t h i s i s neoessary f o r 
the C h r i s t i a n l i f e to e x i s t r a t i o n a l l y a t a l l . Thus man 
knows how he stands i n r e l a t i o n to God, and t h a t change i n • 
that r e l a t i o n s h i p oan come only from h i m s e l f ^ - God w i l l not 
ohange. F o r one e f f e c t of i m m u t a b i l i t y i s t h a t i t immediately 
exolude$ any anthropomorphic conception of God , s i n c e being 
immutable he i s n e c e s s a r i l y s u p e r i o r .to the human and mundane. 
He i s immortal and transcendent. I t was t h i s aspect of 
i m m u t a b i l i t y t h a t was underlined i n the r e v e l a t i o n s of the Old 
Testament days. And with i t , f o r the C h r i s t i a n , goes the 
confidence t h a t God i s e t e r n a l l y a l l he has shown himself 
to be i n the g r e a t e r r e v e l a t i o n of the I n c a r n a t i o n . The love 
and p a t i e n c e , the oare f o r i n d i v i d u a l s o u l s , the a s s i s t a n c e 
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to the repentant s i n n e r , the sympathy w i t h the meek and 
"broken-hearted - these were not the g l o r i e s of one s h i n i n g 
hour, they were the epiphany of the immutable God. 
The i n c a r n a t e l i f e oontinues i n the world i n the Churoh, 
the Body of C h r i s t , i t s nature depending s o l e l y on the 
immutable w i l l of God. Thus the Churoh h e r s e l f i s i n v e s t e d 
w i t h a changelessness. Her existenoe i s founded on C h r i s t ' s 
v i o t o r y over e v i l , a v i c t o r y t h a t a s being d i v i n e i s e t e r n a l , 
and thus the Churoh, her l i f e i n s e p a r a b l e from t h a t of. the 
immutable V i o t o r , i s h e r s e l f i n v i o l a b l e and e t e r n a l . L i k e w i s e 
as the Body' of C h r i s t , and indwelt by the Holy Ghost, she ~ 
partakes of the immutability of the divine nature. The grace 
and b l e s s i n g s mediated by the Churoh to man cannot be undone. 
The Saoraments oan never change i n t h e i r power. S i n s f o r g i v e n 
through the Churoh a r e f o r g i v e n e t e r n a l l y . The o f f i c i a l l y 
pronounced dootrines of the Church a r e not s u b j e c t to v a r i a t i o n 
or a l t e r a t i o n . 
What appears a t f i r s t as a r a t h e r t e c h n i c a l and a b s t r a c t 
conception i s now appearing again, as i t has a l r e a d y appeared 
from time to time i n the course of t h i s study, w i t h a proneunoed 
p r a o t i o a l importance. There i s i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the 
moral law and a l l conduct, f o r the Church and i t s m i n i s t r a t i o n s , 
and e q u a l l y f o r o e f u l i s i t s bearing on p e r s o n a l devotion, and 
each i n d i v i d u a l ' s framing of h i s own l i f e . Man seeks the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the d e s i r e s and longings of which h i s experience 
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of h i s own nature makes him aware. The course of h i s 
l i f e i s l a r g e l y the aojirse he ohooses a s the most l i k e l y , or 
the most a t t r a c t i v e , or t h e most a c c e s s i b l e , f o r the 
attainment of t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n , i n seeking s a t i s f a c t i o n 
among the rewards the world has to o f f e r , man f i n d s only 
the t r a n s i t o r y , and seeks i n v a i n : 
Lay not up f o r y o u r s e l v e s t r e a s u r e s upon the 
e a r t h , where moth and r u s t doth consume, and 
where t h i e v e s break through and s t e a l ; but l a y 
up f o r y o u r s e l v e s t r e a s u r e s i n heaven where 
n e i t h e r moth nor r u s t doth consume, and where 
t h i e v e s do not break through nor s t e a l . 
(Mb. V I 19-20). 
What man i s seeking i s the permanent f r u i t i o n of a l l h i s 
d e s i r e s , a t t a i n a b l e only i n the immutable e x i s t e n c e of 
heaven. His s a t i s f a c t i o n i n t h i s l i f e l i e s i n the hope of 
e t e r n a l b l i s s i n the l i f e to come, the f u l n e s s and peace 
of e t e r n a l l i f e . Never did Bishop Frank Weston show h i s 
understanding of man's nature, d e s t i n y , and need b e t t e r 
than when he began a r e t r e a t w i t h the words: "Think of God as 
E t e r n a l Quiet - the S t i l l One - ,the->^ 
^Changeless One. L e t us o f f e r a l l our r e s t l e s s n e s s , 
our unquiet h e a r t s to Him." ( t n His W i l l " p. $ 9 ) . 
High i n the l i s t of man's d a i l y needs i s the confidence 
i n God's immutability, and of h i s own p o s s i b l e end i n the 
p e r f e c t i o n of d i v i n e s a t i s f a c t i o n and peaoe. To every 
devout and p r a y e r f u l s o u l , a s w e l l a s t o r e l i g i o u s , i t i s 
the p e a r l of great p r i o e . 
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The t r u t h of t h i s showed p l a i n l y i n Nineteenth Century 
England. I t was an age of oontinual and r a p i d change. 
eoonomioally, e c c l e s i a s t i c a l l y , i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , s o c i a l l y . 
I t may have been prosperous, and i n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c s comparatively t r a n q u i l , , hut the e s t a b l i s h e d custom 
and manner of l i f e was su b j e c t e d to innumerable new t i d e s 
and c u r r e n t s . Man, n a t u r a l l y d e s i r i n g peace and s t a b i l i t y , 
was u n s a t i s f i e d by the r e s t l e s s n e s s of h i s environment. The 
r e s u l t among the r e l i g i o u s l y minded was an i n o r e a s e i n the 
a p p r e c i a t i o n of the i m m u t a b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y of God, 
and of e t e r n a l l i f e w i t h God. As a f a c t o r t h i s played i t s 
p a r t i n the resurgence of the r e l i g i o u s l i f e i n the Anglican 
Churoh, and, a t the end of the oentury, i n the growing 
a p p r e c i a t i o n of the works of the mystioB* But i t s most 
d i s t i n c t e f f e o t i s on the hymns of the century, prom about 
1830 , when the a g i t a t i o n f o r s o c i a l reform was at i t s height, 
God'8 ohangelessness and f a i t h f u l n e s s assumed a prominent 
plaoe, e s p e c i a l l y i n those hymns which q u i c k l y aoquired a 
wide p o p u l a r i t y . H.P.Lyte (1^1-1847) wrote such l i n e s as} 
Change and deoay i n a l l around I s e e ; 
0 thou who ohangest not, abide w i t h me. (Eng.Hym.363 
, V . 2 , I I 3-4) , 8j&£ 
P r a i s e him s t i l l the same f o r ever. (E.H.470 v 2,1.3). 
(iSoi-ifjo) 
To Newman^ i n what was a poem by design r a t h e r than a hymn 
we owe 
So long they power hath bl e s s e d measure i t s t i l l 
VA-11 lead me on. (E.H.425 v 3,11.1-2). 
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W. Chalmers Smithjhas: 
We blossom and f l o u r i s h as l e a v e s on the t r e e , 
And wither and p e r i s h - but nought changeth thee. 
(B.H. 407 •-3,11.-3*4).. 
And Bishop Biofcersteth^erids the hymn "Peace,perfeot peace" 
with: 
I t i s enough: e a r t h ' s " s t r u g g l e s soon s h a l l cease, 
And Jesus o a l l us to heaven's p e r f e c t peace. 
' (E.|S|. 468,v.7.) . . 
There are others, e.g. E.H. 375 v. 5,381 vv.4-5, 426 v.3. 
And so we see the b e l i e f i n the i m m u t a b i l i t y of God p l a y i n g 
a prominent part i n a people's d a i l y e xpression of t h e i r 
hopes and needs. 
The same thing i s to be found, too, i n the l i t e r a t u r e 
of the period, as when Mrs. Dean s a y s , 
* I don't know i f i t be a p e c u l i a r i t y i n me, but I am 
seldom otherwise than happy w h i l e watching i n the 
chamber of death, should no f r e n z i e d or d e s p a i r i n g 
mourner share the duty w i t h me. I see a repose 
t h a t n e i t h e r e a r t h nor h e l l pan break, and I f e e l 
the assurance of the endless and shadowless h e r e a f t e r -
the E t e r n i t y they have entered - where l i f e i s boundless 
i n i t s duration, and love i n i t s sympathy, and joy in. 
i t s f u l n e s s . " (Emily Bronte', , rWuthering Heights", 
Ch. XTT1. Pubd. 1847). 
And then there i s Sydney Carton's speech on the s c a f f o l d * 
Off The Value of "Immutability f or the World Today. 
I n c o n s i d e r i n g the value of i m m u t a b i l i t y t o the world 
today we pass from the r a p i d l y changing scene of the Nine-
teenth Century to the more profound d i s l o c a t i o n j o f the 
Twentieth. Unlike the V i c t o r i a n age d e v a s t a t i n g war and 
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the f e a r of oatastrophe a r e not only not absent, but 
comprise the a o t u a l environment of the l i v e s of the people. 
Also i n t e r e s t i n r e l i g i o n has dwindled and decayed. Gonoern 
at change and r e s t l e s s n e s s has given plaoe to an u n w i l l i n g 
desperation, and a widespread want of assurance i n the 
permanence of v a l u e s - indeed, i n the permanence of anything. 
Man's experience i s of p e r p e t u a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , and he i s 
bewildered a t f r u s t r a t i o n and the absence of r e a l hope a f t e r 
years of e f f o r t and endeavour. He i s u n c e r t a i n what i s worth 
having, and i s sometimes i n c l i n e d to b e l i e v e i n nothing a t 
a l l beyond the n e a r e s t t r a n s i t o r y p l e a s u r e the moment oan 
provide. This has accounted f o r the r a p i d r i s e to popular-
i t y of the present s u b j e o t i v e , and almost hedonistio v e r s i o n 
of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . 
J u s t as i t was the hymn-writers of the Nineteenth 
Century who expressed the f e e l i n g of t h e i r age, i t i s the 
daamatists and poets who have l a i d bare the mind of the 
Twentieth Century. T. 3, giiot»s p o r t r a y a l of the f r u s t r a t i o n 
and sense of emptiness i s the outstanding example, and a 
few l i n e s must s e r v e to i n d i c a t e h i s . d i a g n o s i s : 
The endless c y c l e of i d e a and a c t i o n , 
E n d l e s s i n v e n t i o n , endless experiment^ 
Brings knowledge of motion, but not s t i l l n e s s ; 
Knowledge of speeoh, but not s i l e n c e ; 
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word, 
(from "The Rock".) 
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* But E l i o t i s not alone* Never was such an aunndanoe 
of poems about purposeless l i f e and death, tombs, empty 
houses and d e s p a i r : 
You are dead, you are dead, and a l l the dead are 
nothing to u s , 
There's nothing, nothing, nothing, not a b r e a t h beyond: 
0 give up every hope of i t , w e ' l l wake no more, 
We are the world and i t w i l l end w i t h us: 
The heart i s not a d o c k , i t w i l l not wind a g a i n , 
The dead a r e but dead, there i s no use f o r them, 
They n e i t h e r oare, nor care not, they are only dead. 
( S a o h e v e r e l l S i t w e l l , "Agamennon's Tomb", l a s t 7 l i n e s ) . 
Yet time t r u n d l e s t h i s one to the rag-and-bone man, 
While that other may 
Reverberate a l l along 
Man'8 craggy ciroumstance • 
Naked enough to keep i t s d i g n i t y 
Though i t eye God askanoe. 
(Bay Lewis, from "Few. things can more inflame")* 
y f There could be no end to such quotations. Even the 
very form of much of the poetry t e l l s i t s t a l e . 
But the poets are not unaware of what i s wanting, l'hey 
have ideas of what they seek; and i t i s that which we have 
seen i s found i n conjunction w i t h a f a i t h i n the immutability 
of God. I t i s s t i l l n e s s , confidence i n eome r e a l i t y or 
e x i s t e n c e transoending the chaos of the Twentieth Century 
world: 
Let a l l these so ephemeral things 
Be somehow -permanent l i k e the swallow's tangent wings: 
Goodbye to you, t h i s day remember i s Christmas, t h i s morn 
They say, i n t e r p r e t i t your own way, C h r i s t was born. 
(MaoNeice, end of "AD Eclogue f o r C h r i s t m a s " ) . 
Round t w i s t s o ld E a r t h , and round, 
S t i l l n e s s not y e t found. 
(R. Hughes, end of "The Walking Road"). 
And of oourse much of E l i o t ' s work shows the same f e e l i n g ? 
I n such an age the value of the C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f i n 
God's imm u t a b i l i t y , and i t s consequent i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
the Church, t r u t h , s c i e n o e , the laws of conduot,. and the 
hope of the b e a t i f i e d s o u l s h a r i n g the d i v i n e l i f e , i s not 
e a s i l y under-estimated* The b e l i e f can have no b e t t e r 
advocate thaft S.Augustine who, himself l i v i n g i n days 
of world upheaval, w i t h the old order changing and doubt 
on every horizon, h i m s e l f beset by s u c c e s s i v e storms of 
c a r e , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and l o s s , but r e a l i z i n g b e t t e r than 
any other man the r i c h n e s s f o r humanity i n God's 
immutability, saw not despair and f r u s t r a t i o n as the end 
of a l l t h i n g s , but r a t h e r l i f e i n the kingdom of God's 
ohangelessness, w i t h i t s e t e r n a l c o r o l l a r i e s of peaoe and 
r e s t : 
3fhe end or supreme good of t h i s c i t y £of God) i s e i t h e r 
peace i n e t e r n a l l i f e , or e t e r n a l l i f e i n peaoe* For 
peaoe i s a good so g r e a t r that even i n t h i s e a r t h l y 
and mortal l i f e there i s no word we hear with such 
p l e a s u r e , nothing we d e s i r e w i t h suoh z e s t , or f i n d 
- t o be more thoroughly g r a t i f y i n g . (De C i v , Dei XIX 1 1 ) . 
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APPENDICES. 
APPENDIX I . 
The D e i f i c a t i o n of man ( r e f e r r i n g t o page 15© of t h e s i s ) • 
There are passages i n the New Testament, and i n the 
Fa the r s , wh ich imply t h a t the l a s t s t a te o f b e a t i f i e d man 
i s , i n some sense, t o •beoome God 1 . E x a c t l y what i s meant, 
and p r e c i s e l y what i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n put on such 
passages by orthodox: d i v i n i t y , i s not r e a d i l y apparent* 
Discuss ion by scholars seems g e n e r a l l y t o be oonf ined t o 
f o o t n o t e s i n t r e a t i s e s on o ther sub jec t s* As any shar ing 
o f the d i v i n e nature by human souls must r a i s e the ques t ion 
of a change i n God, some at tempt must here be made to 
determine any genera l t r e n d t h a t may e x i s t i n C h r i s t i a n 
thought on d e i f i o a t i o n * This appendix i s aimed t o do t h a t 
i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r Par t I V , Seot ion C* p . A2f by c o l l e c t i n g 
passages which are of va lue f o r the d i scuss ion o f 
d e i i f i c a t i o n , and to provide a b r i e f commentary upon them* 
(a) D e i f i o a t i o n i n Pagan Thought. 
"For a Greek t h e exp lana t ion of a t h i n g must always be 
sought i n what i s above i t , not i n what i s be low." ( I n g e , 
i n "Ph i losophy" , V o l . X , 1935, p . 1 5 0 ) • This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
o f Hel lenic , thought l e d t o va r ious oonoeptions o f 
d e i f i c a t i o n . The S to i c w r i t e r Herophi lus i s quoted by 
Or igen (Com* i n Pss. f r a g 1) as d e f i n i n g God as "an 
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iramortal r a t i o n a l being" - a d e f i n i t i o n which leaves the 
door wide open f o r man t o en ter i n t o the d i v i n e l i f e * 
P l o t i n u s teaohea d e i f i c a t i o n p l a i n l y : 
A l l our a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t e d upon the stage next 
above us . We become t h a t o b j e c t ; we o f f e r ourselves 
t o i t as a ' m a t t e r 1 which i t i n f o r m s ; we are on ly 
p o t e n t i a l l y . o u r s e l v e s * (Quoted by I n g e , l o o . c i t . p » 1 4 7 ) . 
I t i s a l so t r u e t h a t , e s p e c i a l l y i n the s i x t h 'Snneads' , 
he i n s i s t s on the u l t i m a t e i d e n t i t y o f ourselves w i t h 
the u n i v e r s a l B e i n g , and speaks o f separate 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y as an i l l u s i o n f r o m which we should f r e e 
ourselves* ( I n g e , l o c * o i t * p » 1 4 8 t i of *p*15l) • 
The Hermetic w r i t i n g s : ; pa r t P l a t o n i o , pa r t O r i e n t a l , 
obscure i n t h e i r o r i g i n , coming f r o m Egypt about the 
beginning of the C h r i s t i a n e r a , are oharaoter i sed by a 
bold i n s i s t ence on man's d i v i n e end: 
He tha t i s bo rn by t h a t b i r t h i s another (pe r son ) ; 
he i s a god and son of God. f Corp .Herm*XII I 2 , p .241 ) 
This i s t h e Good; t h i s i s the consummation f o r those 
t h a t have got gnos i s . ( to become d i v i n e . } (Corp.Herm* 
I 26a. See appendix V . ) 
P h i l o marvels a t the n o t i o n of d e i f i o a t i o n , but none the 
l e s s , expounds i t d e f i n i t e l y , i f o a u t i o u s l y ( de p o t * i n s © , 2 4 ) 
He w r i t e s o f a d i v i n e spark put i n man by God and ever 
i nc r ea s ing u n t i l i t j o i n s w i t h the nature o f God. This 
mention of a spark i n the human s o u l i s i n agreement w i t h 
the thought of many w r i t e r s * L a t e r H e l l e n i s m , i n f l u e n c e d by 
eontaot w i t h O r i e n t a l dua l i sm , beoame i n c r e a s i n g l y d i squ i e t ed 
by a d i s t r u s t i n ma t t e r , i n the b o i y and i t s pass ions , as 
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be ing e v i l , and sub j ec t t o e v i l and f a t e . The only 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o e v i l and mat ter was God, and i n a t any 
r a t e some people the re was be l i eved t o be a d i v i n e spark 
t h a t could r e t u r n t o God t a k i n g the soui j iv i th i t . On t h i s 
l i n e o f thought some concept ion o f d e i f i c a t i o n was almost 
i n v a r i a b l y a r r i v e d a t ; the Gnostics had many v a r i e t i e s t o 
o f f e r . The d i v i n e spark was t o j f i n d a place i n C h r i s t i a n 
theo logy t oo ( o f . I n g e , " C h r i s t i a n M y s t i c i s m " , appendix G)• 
Roman po ly the i sm l e n t i t s e l f r e a d i l y t o an increase 
of the immortals f r om among the ranks o f the grea te r m o r t a l s . 
The whole concept ion here i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m the 
H e l l e n i c , but of s i g n i f i c a n c e as w i t n e s s i n g t o popular 
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h ideas o f d e i f i c a t i o n : the age o f the New 
Testament w r i t e r s was one whioh embraced, or a t l e a s t 
t o l e r a t e d , emperor w o r s h i p . T e r t u l l i a n d i d not r e s t r a i n his 
sneers: 
I s h a l l shew t h a t J u p i t e r a l so was as w e l l a man as 
born o f a man,, and so , i n o rder , t h a t the whole swarm 
of h i s descendants were as m o r t a l as they were l i k e 
the seed whence they sprung. ( T e r f l u l l i a n , A p o l . I 1 0 , o f 11] 
But even t h i s i s ec l ipsed by Vespasian's deathbed g i b e : 
Vae, puto Deus f i o l 
^ „ C i c e r o g ives a s c h o l a r l y t r ea tmen t , and regards the 
most blessed s t a t e as a t t a i n a b l e i n t h i s l i f e , but as always 
being d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t of the gods by remain ing m o r t a l : 
. . . a l i f e o f happiness t h a t v i e s w i t h and resembles the 
d i v i n e exis tence and leaves us i n f e r i o r t o t h e 
c e l e s t i a l beings i n n o t h i n g e lse save i m m o r t a l i t y . • • 
( C i c e r o , De n a t . deorum I I I x i 153, p . 2 7 1 ) • 
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Ideas of d e i f i o a t i o n were, t h e n , f a m i l i a r t o t h e 
wor ld i n which C h r i s t i a n i t y f i r s t grew* -
(b) The Old Testament. 
I n a few i n s t a n c e s , no tab ly i n the Psalms, the t i t l e 
' gods ' seems t o be g iven t o men: 
God s tandeth i n the congregat ion o f God; he judge th 
among the gods. (Ps .LXXXII 1 ; o f . 6; L I ) . 
The Hebrew has Q'n^S f o r "gods", a word whioh can a l s o 
mean judges . The LXX has i n each case, whatever the 
o r i g i n a l meaning the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f a m i l i a r t o e a r l y 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , dependent p r i n c i p a l l y on the LXX, i s c l e a r . 
As w i l l appear,, those scho la rs who f i n d the meaning o f t i ' n ^ x 
as understood by the LXX t r a n s l a t i o n i n c r e d i b l e , and 
t h e r e f o r e wrong, are some way f rom the mind of the F a t h e r s , 
who d i d no t seem t o f i n d the express ion s u r p r i s i n g at a l l . 
(o) The New Testament. 
The ' l ocus c l a s s i o u s 1 i s 2 Peter 1 4 : -
t h a t ye may become par takers o f the d i v i n e nature 
i s t oo b r i e f t o e x p l a i n i t s e l f mufih. The emphasis on 'may 
beoome* makes the p a r t i c i p a t i o n a f u t u r e , u l t i m a t e 
p o s s i b i l i t y ; i t i s by grace ( v v . 2 - 3 ) and not by any human 
r i g h t o r present f i t n e s s «• indeed a l l depends on the 
K b ( v t~i v o l 
The d i reo tness o f the passage i s impress ive , though i t 
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increase of v i r t u e i n t h i s l i f e f v v . 6 - 7 ) . « o t ^ w / a c 
i s a s t rong word i n t h i s c o n t e x t , and the w r i t e r c l e a r l y 
means at l e a s t a r e a l and considerable s h a r i n g . Thus w h i l e 
the passage alone would be i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y , say, 
some o f the more o r a t o r i c a l expressions used by Athanas ius , 
i t could o n l y be denied as a witness t o d e i f i o a t i o n by 
d i s t o r t i o n * S. John o f the Cross says of i t t h a t t he 
i m p l i c a t i o n i s s i m p l y , 
f o r the sou l t o have p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n God , 
( S p i r . C a n t . X X X V I I I 4 ) . 
That seems an acceptable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
A t the same t ime the passage,is a ' l o c u s o l a sa i cus ' 
because of i t s s i n g u l a r i t y - there i s no th ing else qu i t e 
l i k e i t i n the New Testament. But b r i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
revea l s an a f f i n i t y w i t h much of the Johannine theo logy 
( e . g . J n . I 12-15; ( ^ J n . I I I 2 j X V I I 21-22 o f . ff.7/-}pvLpr^j) , 
. . - V / < ^ 
and o f the Pau l ine ( e . g . h i s t reatment o f et^y.*. Xftt-roo f 
and the l i f e ev "[ft t-Tw ) . A a d i t i s f a r f r om be ing 
d iscordant w i t h the whole New Testament concept ion of t h e 
I n c a r n a t i o n and i t s meaning f o r mankind!* • 
(o) The F a t h e r s . 
The express ion o f t he e a r l i e r Fathers tends towards 
b l u n t a s s e r t i o n w i t h o u t d i scuss ion of i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
Theophilous (C&80) says: 
-163-
Hoarf) should r e c e i v e as reward f rom him {Godl 
i m m o r t a l i t y , and should, become God* (Theophi ious , 
Ad A u t o l . I I 27 , p . 9 2 ) . 
Pseudo-Just in (2nd cen tu ry ?) s t a t e s t h a t the power 
of God leads morta ls t o i m m o r t a l i t y , humans to d e i t y 
(Or . ad Gent. 7 ) , though a more wary note had been s t r u c k 
e a r l i e r by J u s t i n ( A p o l . I 26) • Irenajus gave a f u l l e r 
t r ea tment : man progresses towards God, bu t 
For we cast blame upon h i m , because we have not 
been made gods f r o m the beg inn ing , but a t f i r s t x 
merely men, then a t l e n g t h gods, ( i r e n a u s , Adv.Haer, 
I V x x r v i i i 4 ) , 
and: 
. . . man rece ives advancement and increase towards God. 
For as God i s always the same, so a l so man, when 
found i n God, s h a l l always go on towards God. ( I b . I V x i 2 ) . 
.Thus I renaus j u s t i f i e s the S o r i p t u r a l a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the term 'gods 1 t o men: 
And we have proved t h a t no one else i s c a l l e d God i n 
the S c r i p t u r e s , but the Fa ther o f a l l , and the Son, 
and those who have the a d o p t i o n . ( I b i d . IV p r e f . ) . 
—-Already a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c word has appeared - ' a d o p t i o n 1 • 
I renaus never a l l ows a l l b a r r i e r s of d i f f e r e n c e between 
God and b e a t i f i e d man t o be removed; he never asser t s 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , but a l l o w s the g rea t g u l f between God and 
man ( I V 38 4 , I V 11 2) t o narrow u n t i l man achieves h i s 
h ighes t as an adopted son: 
So t h a t he would become the Son of man f o r t h i s 
purpose, t h a t man a l so might become the son of God. 
(Adv. Haer. I l l x 2 ) . 
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# The. d i f f e r e n c e between God and the adopted sons i s 
the d i f f e r e n c e tha t e x i s t s between God and the Churoh: 
. . . those who have rece ived the adop t ion (adoptionem 
pe rcepe run t ) ; bu t these are the churoh ( e o c l e s i a ) . 
For she i s the synagogue of God, whioh God - t h a t 
i s the Son h imse l f - has gathered by h i m s e l f * 
( l b . I l l v i 1 ) . 
ft But i t i s a d i f f e r e n c e t h a t does not exclude man f r o m 
i n o o r r u p t i o n and i m m o r t a l i t y , and permi ts speaking o f him 
as Tcommixtus? w i t h the Word: 
For t h e Word beoame man, t h a t man u n i t e d w i t h the 
Word (oommixtus Verbo Dei) , and r e c e i v i n g h i s 
a d o p t i o n , might become the Son of God. ( I b i d . I I I 19 1) 
ftpo-r-fc f r o m the word**$ommixtus7 whioh i s not pleasant 
t o the ears o f a l a t e r age, a l l Irenaeus wrote i s founded 
on our g e n e r a l l y acoepted i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s - the Johannine 
idea of sonship , the ideas of the I n o a r n a t i o n ' t ha t Nioaea 
was l a t e r t o r a t i f y , the s c r i p t u r a l idea of i m m o r t a l i t y . 
Irenaeus has o n l y unde r l ined the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t a son 
shares the f a t h e r ' s l i f e , but t h a t t h e y are not i d e n t i f i e d 
t he r eby . To aohieve t h a t bea t i t ude i s the g o a l o f man's 
l i f e i n the Churoh, and whether the Old Testament chooses 
to c a l l him god when he gets there i s of sma l l moment, 
s ince i t i s as obvious t h a t the term i s i n some degree 
s u i t a b l e , as i t i s obvious tha t the D e i t y has not been 
deposed or r i v a l l e d . The evidence i n d i c a t e s t ha t some k i n d 
o f change i n God i s by no means r u l e d o u t . Poss ib ly i t i s 
even i m p l i e d . 
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I n the West where close acquaintance w i t h emperor 
worship probably aoted as a d e t e r r e n t , the s u b j e c t was, 
u n t i l Augus t i ne , g i v e n no more than secondary c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
T e r t u l l i a n (supra) soorned the pagan concept ions , but 
seemed t o approve the C h r i s t i a n * W i t h T a t i a n he i s 
responsible f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e o f a 
d i v i n e spark i n the human sou l i n t o C h r i s t i a n thought* As 
Sr . Inge has shown, the d o o t r i n e gained considerable 
support among L a t i n w r i t e r s up to the R e f o r m a t i o n . 
(Eokhart was t o be condemned f o r s a y i n g , 
There i s something i n the s o u l which i s b o t h uncreated 
and impossible of c r e a t i o n : were t h i s t r u e o f the 
whole sou l t h a t would be unoreated and i n c r e § t a b l e * 
, That something i s the i n t e l l e c t . 
A Mediaeval or thodoxy was not a f r a i d of i d e a s . o f 
d e i f i c a t i o n * as w i l l appear, but would not a l l o w t h a t man 
a t c r e a t i o n was a l ready possessed of something d i v i n e and 
uncrea ted . I f such were ever h i s i t was aoquired by v i r t u e 
o f the I n c a r n a t i o n * ) Emphasis was l a i d by some on the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f man's i m m o r t a l i t y , an a t t r i b u t e whioh they 
asser ted i m p l i e d d i v i n i t y : 
For thou ( w i l t ) have become God . . . because t hou 
hast been.made d i v i n e , s ince thou has been bego t t en 
i m m o r t a l . ( H i p p o l y t u e , X 34 V o l * I I , p*178)• 
Novat ion (Be Tr in .XY) asser t s s i m i l a r l y t h a t C h r i s t bestows 
i m m o r t a l i t y , and th rough t h a t j d i v i n i t y . H i l a r y p l a i n l y 
seemed aware t h a t too much might be read i n t o these 
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u n q u a l i f i e d s ta tements , and w i t h an eye on the e r r o r s o f 
heathendom, s tressed t h a t the i m m o r t a l i t y i n v i r t u e of 
which men are o a l l e d gods, sprung not f r o m a d i v i n i t y 
of t h e i r own, b u t f r o m God, t o whom a l l i m m o r t a l i t y belongs* 
The Greek w r i t e r s who suopeeded Irenaeus gave d e i f i o a t i o n 
a more considerable place i n t h e i r work than the L a t i n s * I t 
was l e s s s t a r t l i n g i n an H e l l e n i c and o r i e n t a l environment* 
Clement says t h a t by. d i v i n e a i d the sou l seeks t o become 
God, and i s never separated f r o m him* (S* clement o f Alexandr i a , 
Strom* V I 14, p*370). Again i m m o r t a l i t y and i n c o r r u p t i o n are 
mentioned by h im: 
To be i n c o r r u p t i b l e i s to, p a r t i c i p a t e i n d i v i n i t y 
(qf£€rys>er;(W. (hnl>~fr\T** ^ t t f t X t w kr&-c£ ) ; bu t r e v o l t f r o m 
the knowledge of God b r ings c o r r u p t i o n . ( I b . V 10, 
V Q l . X I I , p.259) 
Or igen ' s t each ing i s s i m i l a r : 
They see t h a t f r o m him there began the un ion of the, , 
d i v i n e w i t h the human nature x& &~i}»iirtrrj *o*jL^*toxfytA. 
$v6(s- ) , i n order t h a t the human, by opmmunion 
w i t h the d i v i n e ( &*r^d-r^f>«' ) 
might r i s e t o be d i v i n e , not i n Jesus a lone , but i n a l l 
those who not only b e l i e v e , b u t en te r upon the l i f e 
whioh Jesus t a u g h t , and whioh v e l e v a t e s r t o f r i e n d s h i p 
w i t h God and communion f i f** ' 4>i\l*.v Kotc -rfjv T T ^ S 
^Kfe^Vov' Ko-cxAi^'ot^) w i t h him every one who l i v e s 1 
aooording t o the precepts o f Jesus. (Or igan , Cont . 
C e l s . I l l 28 , V o l . X X I I I , p . 1 1 0 ) . 
A — — I f t he re i s any i n c l i n a t i o n t o put a moderate 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on i r enaeus ' s words , as those o f an e a r l y and 
exuberant w r i t e r whose Scho la r sh ip was l i m i t e d , Origen 
oompels a change o f es t imate ; f o r ins tead of t o n i n g down 
what i r ena^uS^sa id , he surpasses him* He does not appear 
I . • - • J. 
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even t o r e s t r i c t the d i v i n e communion t o the adopted 
sons, bu t admits a l l "who enter upon the l i f e whioh Jesus 
t a u g h t " . Elsewhere ( O r i g e n , Gomm* i n Joan* I I ; I I I 19) he 
says many become gods, and f u r t h e r , ( I b i d * XB 29) advises 
mankind t o s top be ing men, and set about becoming gods* 
How much does o r i g e n wish t o convey? That man has 
f u l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Godhead? No* He d i r e c t l y denies 
t h a t man i s e>po&J<s«6s -r£> tQ-y* c ^ ( m j 0 a n * X I I I 25)* 
E q u a l l y c l e a r l y he be l i eves t h a t man i s capable of s h a r i n g 
some p a r t of tha t whioh i s proper t o God and not t o 
c r e a t i o n , shar ing t o an ex ten t t h a t works a grea t change i n 
man, and w o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , i t seems, i n d i c a t e a change i n 
God. 
D e i f i o a t i o n i s g iven i t s most p e r s i s t e n t and en thus ias t ic : 
t reatment by Athanas ius ; there i s soarce ly one o f h i s 
w r i t i n g s i n whioh i t does not f i n d a place* His l i f e - l o n g 
study of the I n o a r n a t i o n i s f e l t , and i t l ed him to develop 
the t eaoh ing o f Irenaeus and Origen t h a t the I n c a r n a t i o n o f 
the word i m p l i e s i n e v i t a b l y some degree of d i v i n i t y f o r 
man. The Son i s u n i t e d t o the Fa ther : by the I n o a r n a t i o n 
the Son shares our n a t u r e , so we en ter i n t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of sha r ing w i t h the Fa ther : 
. . . f o r as the L o r d , p u t t i n g on the body, became man, 
so. we men are made gods ( 6 ^ * _ f * c ^ t r U K e r © * z ) by the 
Word as being taken t o him th rough hie f l e s h , and 
henoeforward i n h e r i t l i f e e v e r l a s t i n g . (3 Or*XXYI 34 , 
p . 4 1 3 ; o f XXV 23) • 
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He i s the Father 's^Wisdojn and Word ,o.f whioh a l l 
t h i n g s partake (_ . K ' ^ X 6 " ^ HSLYTJ. ) T 
i t f o l l o w s tha t , he, b e i n g . t h e d e i f y i n g and , v 
e n l i g h t e n i n g power o f ^ t h e Father ( ^ -ro ffeoit***"' KS»C 
$HTI6TLK*V roV iTdx/eos ) 9 i n whioh a l l t h i n g s are v 
d e i f i e d and quiokened navr* ^ T O ' t i m 
£jc,iroi^ H,Tw.i) 9 i e not a l i e n i n essence f rom the 
F a t h e r , but Go-es sen t i a l . (De Syn. L I , p . 4 7 7 ) . 
And we are d e i f i e d {, Qfconv>c*ui**&*, ) n o t 
by p a r t a k i n g ( p & r a < > ^ ) of the body of 
some man, but by r e c e i v i n g the Body of the Word 
h i m s e l f . (Ad Max. I I , pp*578-9; o f . 3 Or . XXXIV). 
• 
Occas iona l ly he speaks o f d e i f i c a t i o n by p a r t a k i n g 
of the S p i r i t (3 Or. X X I V ) , but probably he means the 
s p i r i t o f the Son (Be Dec. Syn .Nio . X I V ) . I n t he same 
passage the re i s an i n s i s t e n c e t ha t the ve ry purpose o f 
the I n c a r n a t i o n i s the d e i f i c a t i o n of man. This i s to be 
found elsewhere, t o o , i n h is w r i t i n g s : 
He was inoarnate t h a t we .might become d i v i n e n 
(De I n c . I I V 3; o f . 1 Or. . X X X V I I I ; Ad A d e l p h . I V ) . 
The t&rm f o r d e i f i o a t i o n w h i c h Athanasius nea r ly 
always uses i s ^&t>rrbte-*j -9 and he c l e a r l y means i t i n 
no f i g u r a t i v e sense. God the Son shares the l i f e of men, 
so men share the l i f e of God, they are "made d i v i n e " - o r 
can be . They are f r e e d f r o m the conf ines o f m o r t a l i t y and 
c o r r u p t i o n . Was i t not f o r t h a t tee very purpose t h a t the 
Son took f l e s h ? I s not t h a t t he essence of the New 
Testament message? To Athanasius the answer was c l e a r as 
d a y l i g h t . Who should w i s h t o disagree? Approaching the 
sub jeo t w i t h Athanasius we f i n d no th ing t o f r i g h t e n u s . 
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"He was iaoarna te t h a t we might become d i v i n e " - of 
course I Then why i s i t t h a t t h e epigram i n i s o l a t i o n 
s t r i k e 8 us as , at, l e a s t , unguarded? Why i s 2 Peter I 4 
always a l i t t l e s u r p r i s i n g ? P a r t l y , perhaps, because, 
l o a t h though one be t o admit i t , one r a r e l y wears the 
thought of Athanas ius ; but ' c h i e f l y because the words 
' d e i f i o a t i o n ' , #e«m>cfc-~& a n ( j -the l i k e , seem t o 
ou t run <the normal bounds o f - o r t h o d o x y and S c r i p t u r e . 
But as i s beooming apparent , the Fathers use the word w i t h 
a r e s t r i c t e d oonnota t ion : i t i s more t o der ive l i f e f r o m 
God, a l i m i t e d bu t s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n , than any k i n d 
of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I t i s the Son who i s a t the F a t h e r ' s 
r i g h t hand, no t the sons o f Zebedee. Athanasius may say 
we are 
^ ( . . . sons o f God because o f the Word i n us (3 Or.XXV 25) 
but "gods" t o him who was f a m i l i a r w i t h p a t r i s t i c h a n d l i n g 
of the LXX was a less notable word than "sons". To have the 
"Word w i t h i n us" i s not an a t t r i b u t i o n o f e q u a l i t y : 
'As Thou, F a t h e r , are i n me . . . e t c . ' , does not 
s i g n i f y t h a t we were t o have i d e n t i t y w i t h h i m . 
(3 Or. XXV 2 5 ) . 
The impetuousness t h a t sometimes charac te r i sed the 
Cappadocian Fathers l e d them t o extravagant e x p o s i t i o n s o f 
the Athanasian theme. Gregory of Nazianzus w r i t e s , 
. . . i n order t h a t I too might be-made God so f a r 
as he i s made Man. (Greg . Haz . , Or.XXIX 19, p . 3 0 8 ) . 
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Gregory of Nyssa i s not over -cau t ious w i t h the 
t e rm du^msf lx-wfet^s (Ca t . or.XXXV 33t); B a s i l w r i t e s of 
"being made l i k e t o God, and h ighes t o f a l l , the b e i n g 
made God ( &&>v y )« ( B a s i l , Be S p » S a n c t . 
X X I I I , p>16) i n a sense tha t i m p l i e s r a t h e r more than a 
l i m i t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n . This exceeds r e g u l a r p a t r i s t i o 
express ion , and was not taken up g e n e r a l l y ; indeed C y r i l 
saw f i t t o reoa11 t h a t the name "gods" i s app l i ed t o SeaT 
by grace , not by r i g h t , and does not e x a l t him t o a sphere 
above h i s nature (Be T r i n . D i a l . I V 520 C) ; and Chrysostom 
soaroely concerns h imse l f w i t h d e i f i c a t i o n a t a l l . 
both 
Augustine i s a t pains ^ to preserve a proper b e l i e f i n 
d e i f i c a t i o n , and a l so t o p r o t e c t i t f r o m excesses. His 
a t t i t u d e shows a combinat ion o f excitement and oau t ion : 
Lovest thou the earth? thou s h a l t be e a r t h . Lovest 
thou God? what s h a l l I say? thou s h a l t be a god? I 
dare not say i t of myse l f , l e t us hear the 
S c r i p t u r e s : T I have s a i d , Ye are gods, and a l l of 
you sons o f the Most H i g h ' . (Augus t ine , I n Ep.Joan. 
Hora.II 14, p . 4 7 5 . ) . 
He o a r e f u l l y p r o t e c t s the r e a l JEthanasian c o n t e n t i o n t h a t 
b e a t i f i e d man par takes o f the being o f God - "we s h a l l be 
f u l l o f h im" (Be G i v . Dei X X I I 30; c f . i n Pes. C X V I I I ) ; 
and t h a t d e i f i c a t i o n i s consequent upon, and inseparable 
f r o m , t h e I n o a r n a t i o n : 
The Word h imse l f was pleased f i r s t t o be born o f men, 
t h a t thou mightes t be born o f G o d . . . t h a t he should, 
make ["men) i m m o r t a l . . ( I n Joan.Horn. I I 15 .p .30 . ) 
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He f u r t h e r supp l i e s what h i s predecessors had n o t , 
namely exact express ion : , 
I t i s one t h i n g t o be God, another t h i n g t o be 
a par taker of God* God by nature cannot s i n , but 
the pa r taker of God rece ives t h i s i n a b i l i t y f r o m 
God. (De CiV. De i X X I I 3 0 ) . 
Empha t i ca l ly man does not become i d e n t i o a l w i t h God: 
The s o u l i t s e l f , t o o , though i t be always wise 
(as i t w i l l be e t e r n a l l y when i t i s redeemed), 
w i l l be so by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the unchangeable 
wisdom, which i t i s no t ; f o r though the a i r be 
never robbed of the l i g h t t h a t i s shed abroad i n 
i t , i t i s not on t h a t account the same t h i n g as 
the l i g h t . ( I b i d . X I 1 0 ) . 
! . . . 
Augustine rebukes the p r i d e o f those who t h i n k o the rwise : 
99* t h a t whereas God was made man f o r us , man may 
acknowledge h imse l f t o be , hot God, bu t man. For 
whoso w i she th t o appear God, when he i s man, does 
not i m i t a t e h i m , who, being God, was made Man* 
(Serm. I X X X V I I ^ p . 5 1 8 ) . 
He a lso mainta ins (Be T r i n . V 16) tha t man's a t t a inment 
of f u l l b e a t i t u d e does not i ncu r any change i n God. (For 
d i scuss ion of t h i s see t e x t ,^p*'23-^.) 
I n the suooeeding c e n t u r i e s d e i f i c a t i o n beoame a. 
commonplaoe i n C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f , as i s shown by the 
S c o t i s t s bas ing one o f t h e i r arguments f o r the c e r t a i n t y 
of an I n c a r n a t i o n , even i f the re had been no F a l l , on 
2 Peter I 4 ; f o r by no o ther means, they s a i d , oould man 
be brought t o share the d i v i n e nature* 
As t he b e l i e f grew i n f a m i l i a r i t y , so i t a t t r a c t e d 
s u i t a b l y less a t t e n t i o n . A t the same t ime i t found i t s way 
i n t o the Church's l i t u r g y . One o f the o f f e r t o r y prayers o f 
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the Mass, der ived f r o m the Leonine Saoramentary f o r . Chr is tmas , 
a document v a r i o u s l y ascr ibed t o each oentury f rom the 
f o u r t h t o the seventh ( o f . For tescue , 'The Mass*, pp .118-9 , 
3 0 6 ) , asks as the wine and water are mixed i n the c h a l i c e , 
t h a t : 
we may be made par takers of h i s d i v i n i t y , who 
vouchsafed! t o share our humani ty . 
The post-communion c o l l e a t f o r 3 . C y r i l of Jerusalem i s 
oonoluded i n the words of 2 Peter I 4 ; and the M a t t i n s 
o f f i c e whioh Aquinas compiled f o r t he Feast o f Corpus 
C h r i s t i conta ins t h i s : 
There i s n o t , nor ever was, a n a t i o n so grea t 
t h a t has gods so n igh as our Cod i s present t o u s . 
> For t he on ly -bego t t en Son o f God, w i s h i n g t o make 
us pa r takers of h i s d i v i n i t y , took upon h i m s e l f our 
na tu re , t h a t be ing made man he n i g h t make men gods, 
( i s t l e s s o n , 2nd nocturia =• Aquinas , Lesser works , No.57) 
The genera l d i s cus s ion of the s u b j e c t was o a r r i e d i n t o 
the middle ages by such impor tan t f i g u r e s as John Sootus 
Erigena (De Nat . De i I I I 9) , bu t w i t h the w i d e r aoceptanoe,,, 
and a f t e r the s teadying i n f l u e n o e of Augus t ine , the s tudy 
of i t becomes less adventurous* I n disoussions of 
bea t i tude the Schoolmen g e n e r a l l y p r e f e r r e d suoh terms as 
contemplat ion o f God,, union w i t h God, or knowledge of God, 
t o d e i f i c a t i o n . But the b e l i e f i n a r e a l sha r ing o f the 
d i v i n e l i f e was c a r e f u l l y r e t a ined* G i l s o n , i n expressing 
Bonaventure 's e x p o s i t i o n of b e a t i t u d e , w r i t e s , 
The t o t a l un ion o f t he s o u l and God oannot t h e n 
he aohieyed here below: y e t somewhere i t must be 
ach i evab l e , unless the d i v i n e ' w o r k i s doomed t o 
e t e r n a l i n c o m p l e t i o n ; and i t w i l l be achieved i n 
an enjoyment of God i n which t h e knowledge acquired 
by the i n t e l l e c t w i l l make poss ib le and complete 
the joys of the w i l l * (^Phil . of S. Bonaventure* X I V , 
pp . 4 6 5 - 6 ) . 
Among the myst ics of the middle ages the exoitement 
i s l e ss suppressed. The author of "The Cloud of Unknowing" 
w r i t e s i n "The E p i s t l e o f P r i v y C o u n c i l " , 
I t ma t t e r e th no t now t o t h e e , but t h a t t h y b l i n d 
behold ing of t h y naked be ing be g l a d l y borne up 
i n hast iness o f love t o be k n i t t e d and oned i n 
grace and i n s p i r i t w i t h the precious Being o f 
God i n him8elf on ly as he i s , w i t h o u t more. (Ch. I I ) . 
K I n "The Kingdom of t h e Lovers o f God" Ruysbrpeok has 
s i m i l a r passages ( e . g . Cap. X X V I ) , but i n h i s amazing 
discourse on the Seventh Step i n "The Seven Steps of the 
Ladder of S p i r i t u a l Love" he w r i t e s w i t h a boldness or 
reck lessness , u n p a r a l l e l e d . Having spoken of the " f r u i t i o n 
of the sou l i n b e a t i f i o a t i o n , meaning by f r u i t i o n God's 
possession of the s o u l , and the s o u l ' s possession of God, 
he c o n t i n u t e s : 
I n f r u i t i o n , indeed , we are a t r e s t ; f o r i t i s on ly 
God t h a t ac t s when he ravishes f r o m themselves h i s 
l o v i n g s p i r i t s , t r ans forms them,, and p e r f e c t s them 
i n the u n i t y of h i s S p i r i t . There in we are a l l a 
s i n g l e f i r e of l o v e , whioh i s g r e a t e r than a l l t h a t 
was ever oreated by God. Each s ing le s p i r i t i s a 
g lowing coa l which God has l i t f r om the f lame of h i s 
i n f i n i t e c h a r i t y ; and a l l of us are gathered up i n 
one b u r n i n g and i n e x t i n g u i s h a b l e f i r e w i t h the Fa ther 
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and the Son, i n the uni t y of the Holy S p i r i t , 
where even the divine Persons are, as i t were, 
rapt from themselves i n the unity of t h e i r 
essence into a bottomless abyss of simple 
beatitudeo Therein i s neither Father nor Son, 
nor Holy S p i r i t , nor any created t h i n g , but 
only one eternal essenoe which i s the substance 
of the Divine Persons. There we are a l l created 
anew; i t i s our supersubstantial essence. There 
a l l f r u i t i o n i s consummated and perfected i n 
essential beatitude... Then from the Father and 
.the Son proceeds i n unity of nature the Holy 
S p i r i t , t h i r d Person of the T r i n i t y . He i s the 
i n f i n i t e love of both, wherein each i n love and 
f r u i t i o n e t e r n a l l y embraces the other, and also 
a l l of us,, forming, as i t were, but one l i f e , one 
love, one f r u i t i o n , ( l o p . c i t . ) . 
K — — Ruysbroeok i s indeed upholding the d e i f i c a t i o n of 
man, but i n his treatment he seems to have destroyed the 
T r i n i t y , and obliterated human I d e n t i t y . (The statements 
about the T r i n i t y are discussed by Taylor, i n t r o . pp.4-8). 
On both these scores the passage must be accounted 
i r r e g u l a r ; but i t serves to make clear the confidence w i t h 
whioh the doctrine of d e i f i o a t i o n was accepted, and also, 
by contrast, the extent to whioh the majority of exponents 
did not go. 
Af t e r the Reformation i t was s t i l l p r i n c i p a l l y the 
mystios who furnished expositions of the doctrine. A much 
clearer understanding of i t than Ruysbroeok's i s given i n 
the exact scholarship of S. John of the Cross. His 
oharaoteristi'o term i n the matter i s " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " -
man i n the b e a t i f i e d state participates i n God. By 
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pa r t i o i p a t i o n he means a l i f e united w i t h that of the 
Holy T r i n i t y : 
For since- God grants £the soulj the favour of 
a t t a i n i n g to being de'iform ana united i n the Most 
Holy T r i n i t y wherein she beoomes God by 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ••• (S. John of the Cross, Spir. Cant. 
XXXGIII 3) . 
H——The p a r t i c i p a t i o n , then, i s such as to enable deified 
men to be called gois: l i f e i s derived wholly from sharing 
the divine l i f e , , and S. John oan speak: of souls as, 
t r u l y gods by p a r t i c i p a t i o n , equals of God and 
hie companions. ( I b i d XXXVIII 4 ) . 
„ .But never does he teach i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of men and God, 
as the word' "companions" shows. God and man; each retains 
his i d e n t i t y . The ultimate d i s t i n c t i o n i s that: 
souls possess these same blessings by p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
as he possesses by nature. ( I b i d ) . 
That which God seeks to do i s to make us Gods by 
pa r t i c i p a t i o n as he i s God by nature. (Points of Love 
No. 28). 
.^__-Jlian i s exalted by God to be equal w i t h a l l that God 
is by nature. (Here S. John i s following Augustine closely; 
of. Be Civ. Dei, XXII 30, supra, v » l j l ) • This i s possible 
because i t i s part of God's eternal plan - "that which God 
seeks t o do" e> and the manner of i t s accomplishment i s 
re a d i l y explicable i n terms of S, John's psychology. Such 
an explanation i s t o be found i n "The Hark Night of the 
Soul", I I Iv 2. There the Saint, assuming points that he 
has already oontended, as that the soul's proper journey 
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i s an ascent to God, and that one of the f i r s t stages 
of the journey i s t o oease seeking s a t i s f a c t i o n through 
the senses and to seek i t i n God alone, t e l l s how the 
soul forsakes i t s "own human way and operation 1 1 f o r the 
"operation and way of God"* This expression he then 
explains i n terms of the three parts of the soul, as 
scholastic terminology gives them - understanding, w i l l 
and memory. 
(a) Understanding. I t i s fundamental to Si John'.s whole 
psychology that once the soul i s purged i n the Dark Night 
of. the Senses of sensual domination of the soul, i t i s 
then capable of subjeotion to domination by Sod alone. ^  
This i s already the beginning of a union between God and 
the soul, since they are i d e n t i f i e d i n purpose. Thus of 
the soul's understanding he can say i t "no longer comes 
through i t s natural l i g h t and vigour, but through the 
Divine Wisdom wherewith i t has become united"* God's 
understanding and man's are beooming the same, having 
t h e i r common source i n God. 
(b) W i l l . The w i l l , s i m i l a r l y purged, i s now compelled 
solely by the Divine Love, " i t no longer loves w i t h i t s 
natural strength a f t e r a lowly manner, but wi t h strength 
and p u r i t y from the Holy S p i r i t . " Thus the work of the 
Holy S p i r i t i n man i s no longer oonfiaed by the sensual 
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i n the human w i l l , , and so can have free course: the w i l l . 
and love i n man i s therefore solely God's and the same as 
God's. 
(a) Memory. The memory likewise i s concerned not w i t h 
worldly data, but only with the divine and "has become 
transformed i n t o eternal apprehension of glory", 
apprehension, that i s , of that which God apprehends. 
Thus with logio and l u c i d i t y S. John explains how 
the soul enters upon union w i t h God, a union which reaches 
f r u i t i o n i n the l i f e of the world t o come ( c f • Sp.Cant. 
XX2LVIII 4 ) . As an explanation of how the union can e x i s t , 
and how i t comes about, t h i s passage from the "Dark Night" 
i s without p a r a l l e l i n Christian l i t e r a t u r e . His main 
points are: 
1. That union i s possible. 
2. That union i s w i t h the Holy T r i n i t y . 
3. That i t i s a complete union of l i f e and operation, 
but not of i d e n t i t y . 
4. I t i s by p a r t i c i p a t i o n - roughly what we have 
elsewhere called sharing. 
5. That the change i s i n the soul that participates; 
whereas God continues according to his nature. 
6. Any change there i s i n God i s of rel a t i o n s h i p (with 
man) only. 
7. That i n any case that relationship accords with 
the eternal divine plan i n creation and redemption* 
8. That r i g h t l y approached from the ri g h t premises i t 
i s a l l l o g i c a l and comraohsense. 
K I f there i s any point under-emphasised i t i s the 
importance of the Incarnation f o r d e i f i c a t i o n through the 
union of the two natures i n Christ, and the divine 
adoption of men as sons and heirs through Christ. But that 
i s because we have concentrated on one paragraph only i n 
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So Jojm's w r i t i n g s , and not on the theses which underlie 
his whole work* 
There i s l i t t l e more t o be said. The theology of 
divine union has expanded l i t t l e i f at a l l i n the la s t 
500 years. The mystics have s t i l l maintained t h e i r place 
as chief expositors, and often i t has provided t h e i r 
f i n e s t passages (of. de Sales, "Love'of God", X 5-7). 
Among recent wr i t e r s should be mentioned Bom Columba 
Marmion, and Dom John Chapman (esp. "Spir. Letters", 
LXXXVII), and useful referenoes, and i n the l a t t e r case 
disoussion, are to be found i n Westcott's "Epistles of 
S. John,"and Inge, "Christian iflystioism", appendix C. 
One i s l e d , then to.conclude that the d e i f i c a t i o n of 
man i s i n t e g r a l to Christian theology. I t has i t s origins 
i n the Old Testament for more c e r t a i n l y i n the LXX) and 
New Testament, and i t s parallels i n the pagan b e l i e f s of 
educated Greece, Rome, and Egypt. The Fathers, from early 
unquestioning assertions progressed -to discussions and 
d e f i n i t i o n s . Their evidence was based on Scripture, and 
on reasoning about the Incarnation'and redemption* By 
pointing t o the immutability, incorruption and immortality 
of the b e a t i f i e d soul i n eternal l i f e they confirmed t h e i r 
b e l i e f i n a true sharing of the divine nature. But they 
did not i n the main say, or intend to say, that man i s 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h God. The r e l a t i o n i s that of adopted sons, 
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or of God to his Church* The b e a t i f i e d l i f e i s derived 
C_- f 
from God, and man i s not o|^oou«foc w i t h God (Origen)* 
The extravagances of the Cappadocians were not followed 
up; Eckhart was condemned, and Ruysbroeok i s i s o l a t e d , 
and, i f he i s taken l i t e r a l l y , has involved himself i n 
heresy by his lack of caution. 
Cautious the theologians were, but not t i m i d . Their 
point i s clear. The ultimate state of the redeemed soul i s 
d e i f i c a t i o n . Athanasius showed that i t s achievement was 
the purpose of the Incarnation; Augustine showed i t s 
necessary place i n Christian theology; S. John of the 
Cross showed the wherefore and commonsense of i t a l l * 
Man, then, i s capable of d e i f i c a t i o n . And d e i f i c a t i o n 
i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , not i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h God* As Origen 
showed, th i s i s a great change i n man: does i t imply a 
change i n God?' L i t t l e has been said on that subject, exoept 
that Augustine said, "No" (De T r i n . V 16). 
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APPBNDIX I I * 
The Archbishops' Report on the Doctrine of the 
Churoh of England (1938)• 
Concerning the a c t i v i t y of God the Report states: 
I t i s an essential feature of the B i b l i o a l Revelation 
that i t presents God as indeed the l i v i n g God .... 
t h i s conception stands i n contrast w i t h the leading 
conceptions entertained by Greek philosophers or 
Indian sages, who a l i k e tend to oohceive God as a 
Being of s t a t i c perfection, abiding f o r ever i n the 
f r u i t i o n of his own blessedness. The B i b l i o a l 
conception i s greatly t o be preferred. 
(Reportjl.A.XI, p.42). 
This statement oould be misleading; f o r i t implies that 
the B i b l i o a l Revelation does not express the divine 
existence at a l l i n terms of ohangelessness, and i t assumes 
that immutability and l i v i n g a o t i v i t y oannot exist together 
i n God. The present investigations favour the suggestion 
that neither i s true. The B i b l i c a l Revelation, as reoorded 
i n both Testaments, does express GodTs existence as change-
less (though not s t a t i c ) as w e l l as aotive. And the whole 
course of Hebrew and Christian theology witnesses to the 
oo-exietenoe of ohangelessness and eternal a o t i v i t y i n 
God. The Christian conception i s oer t a i n l y d i s t i n o t from 
the Greek here, but soaroely i n oontrast; thus the great 
theologians were able t o p r o f i t from Greek thought without 
jeopardising the i n t e g r i t y of the Hebrew-Christian t r a d i t i o 
Whereas the careful avoiding on pages 41-2 of the Report 
of the word "immutable" does desert the t r a d i t i o n . -
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APPENDIX I I I . 
Saint Augustine, " I n Psalmos" X L I I 6 (as Vulg. XLI 7 ) , .£ 
(quoted on page ^'of t h e s i s ) . 
"Nicene ana Post-Nieene Fathers" Vol. V I I I omits part of 
the commentary on t h i s verse, and so could not he quoted. 
The L a t i n reads: 
Aliquam quaerit incommutabilein veritatem, sine 
defectu substantiam. 
APPENDIX IV. 
Descartes, "Meditations" I I I (quoted on ^.fZjat t h e s i s ) . 
I n the f i r s t and second L a t i n editions of the "Meditations" 
(1641 and 1642) the attributes eternal and immutable were 
not included i n t h i s passage. They f i r s t appear i n the 
or i g i n a l French t r a n s l a t i o n made by the Dae de Luynes i n 
1647, while Descartes was s t i l l a l i v e . The inclusion of 
the attributes probably had the assent of Descartes himself; 
and i n any case i t shows the mind of h i s early followers. 
APPENDIX • V. 
"Hermetica" I 26 (quoted on page /&ja± t h e s i s ) . 
I n Scott's edition the word O-fc-^ Q-*]^ ! i s put i n single 
square brackets, indicating that i n h i s opinion i t was not 
i n the o r i g i n a l text (see h i s introduction p.24). There 
seems good reason at. a l l for excluding, the word.; Dr.Kirlc 
describes Scott's action as " w i l f u l " ("Vision of God", 
p.53, fn. 2). 
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APPENDIX VI. 
Contraptions and Translations. 
Contraptions. The follow i n g contractions are used i n the 
thesis: 
A-N.L. Ante-Nioene Library. 
D. T.C. Diotionnaire de Theologie Catholique. 
Denzinger H.Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum et 
Definitionum. 
E. R.E. ' Enoyolopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 
H.D.&. Ed. Hastings, Dictionary of the Bible. 
L.F. A Library of Fathers. 
N.P-N.F. Nioene and Post^Nioene Fathers. 
Translations. The following i s a l i s t of translations 
used i n quotations i n the thesis. Their 
use of Capital l e t t e r s f o r pronouns has not 
always been followed. Where page references 
are given i n the thesis they are to these 
t e x t s . 
S.AMBROSE 
De Fide N.P-N.F• 
S. THOMAS AQUINAS 




of God i n the Philosophy of 
Aquinas'. 
Edn.by Fathers of the English 




. Ad Adelphium 
Ad Episoopos Aegypti 
et Lybyae 
Ad Maximum 




Orationes adversus , 
Arianos I , I I , I I I N.P-N.F. 





















3. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO 
Confessiones. 
De, C i v i t a t e Del 
De DOctrina Christiana. 
De Fide et Symbolo " 
De Nature Boni N.P-N.F " ' 
De Trinita.te Works,Dods's Edn 
Enarrationes i n 
Psalmos N.P-N.F. 
I n Epistolam Jb'annls N.P-N.F. 







vo l . vir:. 
v o l . v i i r 




. De'.Spiritu Sanoto N.P-N.F. Vol. V I I I 
BOETHIUS 
.Philosophiae Consolationis Works, Loeb Edn. 
S. BONAVENTURE 
A l l from E. Gilson."Philosophy of S. Bonaventure" 
. Eng. trans. 
BREVIARUM ROMANUM 
Trans, by Benedictine Nuns of Stanbrook. 
CHALCEDON, Council of . 
Oeoumenioal Documents of the F a i t h , Ed. Bindley. 
CICERO 
De Nature Deorum 




DE SALES, FRANCOIS 
On the Love of God 
DESCARTES 
Meditations. 
S. GREGORY THE GREAT 
Moralia 





S. IGNATIUS OP ANTIOCH 
Ad.Ephesios . 
S. IRENAEUS 
Ad versus Haereses 
S. JOHN OF THE CROSS 
Points.of Love 
S p i r i t u a l Canticle 
Works, Loeb.Edn. 
A-N.L. Vols. IV & X I I 
L.P. Vol* XXVIII 
W.J.Xnox L i t t l e . 






Ed. P. Legge. 
Apostolio Fathers,Ed.Lightfoot 
A-N.L. Vols. V & XI 
Works,Ed.E.A. Peers,1943 Edn. 
Vol. I l l 
" " " Vol. n 
( i n the S p i r i t u a l Cantiole the F i r s t Redaotion 
has been followed,Peers, pp.23 f f . ) 
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S. JUSTIN MARTYR 
Apologia . A-K.L 
KANT. 
Critique of Judgment Works: (Selections)Ed.T.M.Greene. 
MISSALE ROMANUM "The English Missal 1,.Pub. 
Knott, 1933. 
NOVATIAN 
. De T r i n i t a t e Ed. H. Moore. 
ORIGEN-
Contra Celsum A-N.L. Vols.X & X X I I I 
PHILO 
. Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit.Works,Eoeb Edn.Vol.III 
PLATO- ^ Phaedo Works, Loeb Edn. Vol.1 
RUYSBROECK 
.Seven Steps of the ladder of Ed .p. Sherwood Taylor, 
' S p i r i t u a l Love. 1944. 
SPINOZA 
Ethics Ed. White and St e r l i n g . 
TERTULLIAN 
Adversus Maroionem A-N.L Vol. V I I 
Ad versus Praxeam A-N.L Vol.: XV. 
THEOPHILOUS 
Ad Autolycum A-N.L Vol. I l l -
Note . 
The chapter on Saint Bonaventure i s almost wholly 
dependent on the English t r a n s l a t i o n of Gilson's 
book "The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure". The 
thesis was w r i t t e n i n West A f r i c a where i t was 
sometimes impossible to c o l l e c t a l l the books 
one desired. 
